Chapter XXX (3)

We at once acquit Lord Aberdeen and the majority of the Cabinet of any real participation in the scheme of Lord John Russell. What may be the mind of Sir James Graham and Sir William Molesworth on the subject, we cannot tell, but we are tolerably sure that no other minister regards the bill with favour. Even the members of the Manchester party do not seem to consider it as an especial boon. Mr Bright knows well enough that a new reform bill, if carried, cannot be disturbed for a number of years to come; and as this one does not come up to his expectations, he is ready to oppose it. Indeed, it seems to satisfy none of the extreme party beyond old Joseph Hume, who, for some reason or other to us unknown, has of late years been in the habit of spreading his ægis from the back seats of the Treasury bench over the head of the noble Lord, the member for London. The voice of the ten-pounders, as a body, was not favourable in 1852 to the lowering of the franchise; and we have heard no counter-clamour from the class who were and are proposed to be admitted to that privilege. The Whig aristocracy, naturally enough, regard this bill with peculiar bitterness. Therefore we do not think that the astonishing change of opinion, or rather of principle exhibited by Lord John Russell, is to be traced either to the advice of colleagues, or the influence of more matured democrats. Our own theory is this—that he never had, as regarded improvements on the form of the constitution or the representation, anything like a fixed principle—that he was striking just as much at random in 1852 as in 1854; and that, so far from having any settled or original ideas of his own, he grasps at any which may be presented to him with extreme recklessness and avidity.

We are quite aware that it would be, to say the least of it, gross impertinence to make any such statement, or to express any such opinion, without reasonable and rational grounds. We should be very sorry to do so at any time, but more especially at the present, when we wish to see Ministers disembarrassed of all perplexing questions at home. But it is their fault, not ours, if we are forced to make the disclosure; and to show that, in reality, the grand mechanist of 1832 had so forgotten his craft, if he ever had a due knowledge of it, that after his last abortive effort, in 1852, he was fain to derive new notions from the pages of the _Edinburgh Review_. In saying this, we intend anything but an insinuation against the talents of the author of the articles to which we refer. We can admire the ingenuity of his arguments, even while we question their soundness. We have no right to be curious as to what section of politicians he belongs. He may represent the philosophic Liberals, or he may be the champion of Manchester in disguise. All we know is, that he has written three plausible articles, after the manner of Ignatius Loyola, the result of which has been that poor Lord John Russell has plunged into the marsh, misled by the _ignis fatuus_, and is at the present moment very deep in a quagmire.

Some of our readers will doubtless remember that, during the autumn of 1851, various pompous paragraphs appeared in the Whig newspapers, announcing that Lord John Russell had withdrawn himself to country retirement, for the purpose of maturing a grand and comprehensive scheme of Parliamentary Reform. The task was entirely gratuitous and self-imposed; for although the venerable Joseph Hume, Sir Joshua Walmsley, and a few other Saint Bernards of the like calibre, had attempted to preach up an itinerant crusade, their efforts met with no response, and their harangues excited no enthusiasm. Nobody wanted a new Reform Bill. The class which, of all others, was most opposed to innovation, embraced the bulk of the shopkeepers in towns, who, having attained considerable political and municipal influence, were very unwilling to share it with others, and regarded the lowering of the franchise not only with a jealous but with an absolutely hostile eye. It was upon the shoulders of that class that the Whigs had been carried into power; and it really seemed but a paltry return for their support and devotion, that a Prime Minister, upon whom they had lavished all their honours, should attempt to swamp their influence without any adequate reason. It would be absurd or unfair to charge them with selfishness. The first Reform Bill, acceded to and hailed by the great mass of the people, had established a certain property qualification for voters; and no one could allege that popular opinion was not sufficiently represented in the House of Commons. Nay, many of the Whigs began to think that popular opinion was too exclusively represented therein, and did not scruple to say so. Anyhow, the Bill had so worked that there, in 1851, was Lord John Russell, its parent and promoter, in the office of Premier of Great Britain, and in the command of a parliamentary majority. Small marvel if the ten-pounders asked themselves the question, what, in the name of gluttony, he could covet more?

They were quite entitled to ask that question, not only of themselves, but of the singular statesman whom they had been content to follow. Could he state that there was any measure, not revolutionary, but such as they and other well-disposed subjects of the realm desired, which he was prevented from introducing by the aristocratic character of the House of Commons? Certainly not. The triumph of the Free-trade policy was a distinct proof to the contrary. Was there any discontent in the country at the present distribution of the franchise? Nothing of the kind. The apathy was so great that even those entitled to enrolment would hardly prefer their claims. Even the enrolled cared little about voting—so little, indeed, that it was sometimes difficult to persuade one-half of a large constituency to come to the poll. All attempts at public meetings, for the purpose of agitating a reduction of the franchise, had been failures. The people were quite contented with things as they stood, and grumbled at the idea of a change. And yet this was the time, selected by a Prime Minister who had everything his own way, for getting up a fresh agitation!

Every one, beyond himself, saw the exceeding absurdity of his conduct. The leading Whigs became positively angry; and from that period we may date his rapid decadence in their estimation. The real nature of his scheme, consisting of an arbitrary lowering of the franchise, was quite well known; and as that could not, by any possibility, be carried even through the House of Commons, his own friends thought it advisable to put the noble Lord upon another scent.

There appeared, accordingly, in the _Edinburgh Review_ for January 1852, an article on “The Expected Reform Bill,” which took most people by surprise on account of its apparently moderate, philosophic, and even Conservative tone. It would be difficult to analyse it—it is difficult, even after reading it, to draw any distinct conclusion from its propositions and argument. But this, at all events, was admitted, that “clearly there is no _call_ for Parliamentary Reform on the part of any large or influential class. There is no zeal about it, one way or the other. An extension of the franchise is wished for by some, and thought proper and desirable by many; but it is not an actual want largely felt, nor is the deprivation of the franchise a practical grievance, clear enough, tangible enough, generally recognised enough, to have given rise to a genuine, spontaneous, exclusive demand for redress. There is a general languor and want of interest on the subject, manifested nowhere more plainly than in the tone and character of the meetings got up by the Reform Association for the sake of arousing public feeling. _The nation, as a whole, is undeniably indifferent; the agitation is clearly artificial._” Then, again, we are told that “_Quieta non movere_ is, in political matters, as often a maxim of wisdom as of laziness;” and a great deal more to the same effect, which could not have had a very exhilarating effect on the mind of Lord John Russell, supposing, as we do, that he was in total ignorance of the article in question before it was given to the public. Certainly, on this occasion, he had but a poor backing from his friends.

The view of the writer in question seemed to be this—that instead of arbitrarily lowering the franchise on the footing of a property qualification, it is important to discover some criterion by means of which persons morally and educationally qualified, who have not the franchise at present, may be admitted to that privilege. We are not reviewing or discussing the article—we are simply pointing out the sources from which Lord John Russell has derived most of his new ideas. Therefore we shall simply quote one passage from this article.

_Source of Lord John Russell’s new idea of the Savings’ Bank Deposit qualification._—“Our present system is defective and unjust in this—that it selects two kinds or forms of property only as conferring the franchise. Let us continue to maintain a property qualification; but let us not insist that the property, so favourably and honourably distinguished, must be invested in one special mode. If a man has accumulated by diligence or frugality £50 or £100, and spends it either in the purchase of a freehold, or in removing his residence from an £8 to a £10 house, his realised property confers upon him the distinction of a vote. But if he invests the same sum, earned by similar qualities, in the savings’ bank, or in railway shares or debentures, or in the purchase of a deferred annuity—which would probably be much wiser modes of disposing of it—it carries with it no such privilege. This seems neither equitable nor wise. It might easily be rectified, and such rectification would be at once one of the safest, simplest, justest, and most desirable extensions of the franchise that could be suggested. _Let the production before the registration courts of a savings’ bank book, showing a credit of £50_, of at least six months’ standing, or of a _bona fide_ certificate of shares to the same value in a valid railway, or of coupons to the same amount, be held to entitle a man to be inscribed upon the list of voters for that year.”—_Edinburgh Review_, Jan. 1852, p. 265.

Adhering to our original intention of not discussing the merits of the different proposals of this and the other articles in the _Edinburgh Review_, we shall not comment upon the unblushing impudence of such a project as this, which would place the representation of the country principally in the hands of millionaires and railway directors. It _is_ unparalleledly impudent. But we notice it now simply as the germ of Lord John Russell’s £50 savings’ bank qualification.

By the time this article appeared, Lord John Russell’s Bill was prepared; though no one expected that it would be carried. The Whig party were conscious that the hour of their doom was approaching, but they wished to bear with them into opposition a weapon which might be available for future warfare. Lord John’s ideas had not then penetrated beyond a lowering of the franchise and the admission to the register of parties who paid 40s. a-year of direct taxes. These were his deliberate impressions before the schoolmaster of the _Edinburgh Review_ appeared abroad.

After this, Lord John Russell went out of office; but the _Review_ kept harping on Reform. The writer had already stated, “that a new measure of Parliamentary Reform was demanded, rather in the name of theoretical propriety than of practical advantage.” It seems to us that such an admission was nearly tantamount to an argument against the policy of making any change at all; more especially when we were told, nearly in the same page, that “there was no _call_ for Parliamentary Reform on the part of any large or influential class.” If that were true, we should like to know who “demanded” the new measure? But we must not be too critical regarding the advances of the new Lycurgus.

In October 1852, a second article appeared, the preamble of which was very moderate—indeed, rather calculated to impress the casual reader with the idea that the author would have much preferred if “the vexed question of the franchise” could have been left alone. Nevertheless it appeared to him that there were “many reasons which make it impossible either entirely to shelve or long to postpone the question of Parliamentary Reform;” and, having stated these, he dashes again into his subject. He is, however, a great deal too knowing to commence with the proposal of innovations. He treats us to several pages of high Conservativism, condemnatory of universal suffrage; and having thus established a kind of confidence—acting on Quintilian’s advice, to frame the introduction so as “_reddere auditores benevolos, attentos, dociles_”—he begins to propound his new ideas. In this article we have:—

_Source of Lord John Russell’s new proposal to swamp the Counties by the admission of £10 occupants._—“The other plan is to extend the £10 qualification to counties, by which means _every_ householder (to the requisite value) throughout the land would possess a vote; if he resided in a small town or a village, or an isolated dwelling, he would be upon the county register. The only objection we can hear of to this plan is, that in the country districts and in hamlets a £10 occupancy generally includes some land, and would not, therefore, indicate the same social station as the living in a £10 house in town, and that it might lead to the creation, for the sake of augmenting landlord influence, of a numerous and dependent class of tenant voters. But in the first place, the occupier of a £10 house in villages and small towns belongs to a decidedly higher social grade than the occupier of a £10 house in cities; and, in the second place, it would not be difficult to meet the objection, by requiring that the qualifying occupancy shall be, in the county register, a house, and not a house and land, or by fixing a sum which shall, as nearly as can be ascertained, be generally an equivalent to the £10 occupancy contemplated by the present law.”—_Edinburgh Review_, Oct. 1852, p. 472.

That is the second instance of appropriation on the part of the wise, ripe, deliberate statesman, who for twenty years had been watching the progress of his own handiwork with the view to introducing repairs. Before this article in the _Edinburgh Review_ appeared, it had never occurred to him how convenient it might be to swamp the counties, and how very simple were the means of doing so! Now for appropriation third:—

_Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal to admit all Graduates of Universities to Town and County franchise._ “It is, of course, desirable, and is admitted to be so by every party, that _all_ educated men shall be voters; the difficulty is to name any ostensible qualifications which shall include them, and them alone. But though we cannot frame a criterion which shall include all, there is no reason why we should not accept one which will include a considerable number of whose fitness to possess the franchise there can be no question. We would propose, therefore, that the franchise be granted to all _graduates of Universities_,” &c.—_Edinburgh Review_, Oct. 1852, p. 473.

Another hint adopted by Sir Fretful Plagiary! Next we come to a more serious matter:—

_Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal for disfranchising the lesser English boroughs._—“The great majority of them are notoriously undeserving of the franchise, and those who know them best are least disposed to undertake their defence. The plan of combining a number of them into one constituency would be futile or beneficial according to the details of each individual case. If a close or a rotten borough were amalgamated with an open or a manufacturing town, much advantage might possibly result; if two or three corrupt or manageable constituencies merely united their iniquities, the evil of the existing things would only be spread farther and rooted faster. We should propose, therefore, at once to reduce the 61 boroughs with fewer than 500 electors, and now returning 91 members, to one representative each.”—_Edinburgh Review_, Oct. 1852, p. 496.

We shall see presently that this proposal was amended, as not being sufficiently sweeping. Only thirty seats are here proscribed; but it was afterwards found expedient to increase the black list to the number of sixty-six. Pass we to the next instance of palpable cribbage.

_Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal that Members accepting office shall not be obliged to vacate their seats._—“The most desirable man cannot be appointed Colonial Minister, because his seat, if vacated, might be irrecoverable. Administrations cannot strengthen themselves by the alliance of colleagues who possess the confidence of the general public, because the place for which they sit has been offended by some unpopular vote or speech. We need add no more on this head: the peculiarity of the case is, that we have no adverse arguments to meet.”—_Edinburgh Review_, Oct. 1852, p. 501.

The writer is decidedly wrong about the non-existence of adverse arguments; and we shall be happy to convince him of the fact if he will be kind enough to accord us a meeting. In the mean time, however, he has humbugged Lord John, which was evidently his special purpose. Even while we deprecate the morality of his proceeding, we can hardly forbear expressing our admiration of his skill. We know not his earthly name or habitation; but he _is_ a clever fellow, for he has led, with equal audacity and success, the ex-Premier of Great Britain, and the father of Reform, by the nose!

But we have not yet done. The article last referred to was penned and published before the new Parliament met, towards the close of 1852, and before the balance and state of parties could be ascertained. The result of the election showed that parties were in effect almost equally balanced—so much so, that, but for the junction of the Peelites with the Liberals, Lord Derby would have obtained a majority. The election, it will be remembered, took place under circumstances peculiarly unfavourable to the Government; and never perhaps was misrepresentation of every kind more unscrupulously employed than by the Liberal press on that occasion. Still it became evident that Conservatism was gaining ground in the country; and it was a natural inference that, after the question of Protection was finally set at rest, its progress would be still more rapid. This was not exactly what the writer in the _Edinburgh Review_ had calculated on. He now saw that it would be necessary, if the Liberal party was to be maintained in power, to go a good deal further than he at first proposed; and accordingly, when he appears again before us in October 1853, we find him armed this time, not with a pruning-hook, but with a formidable axe. We hear no more about “theoretical propriety”—he is evidently determined upon mischief. Now, then, for his developed views, as adopted by his docile pupil.

_Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal that freemen shall have no votes._—“There is no doubt in the mind of any man, we imagine, that incomparably the most openly and universally venal portion of borough constituencies are the old freemen, so unhappily and weakly retained by the Reform Act of 1832.... The disfranchisement of the freemen is, perhaps, of all steps which will be urged upon Parliament, the most clearly and indisputably right and necessary, and, added to the plan already suggested for pursuing individual cases of venality, will probably sweep away the most incurably corrupt class of electors.”—_Edinburgh Review_, Oct. 1853, p. 596.

We have already seen that, in Oct. 1852, the reviewer proposed to abstract thirty members from the smaller English boroughs. It became evident, however, that so paltry a massacre of the innocents would not suffice, more especially as it had become part of the scheme to swamp the English counties. Accordingly we are told, in an off-hand and easy manner: “To all that we said on a former occasion as to the theoretical propriety and justice of the _small_ borough representation, we unreservedly adhere. But, unfortunately, it is too notorious that these boroughs are generally in a condition which, for the sake of electoral purity, imperatively demands their disfranchisement, partial or entire. _Here again it is true that parliamentary statistics do not altogether bear out our conclusion._ Of the seventy-two boroughs convicted of bribery between 1833 and 1853, only twenty-one can properly be called small—as having fewer than five hundred electors—while some of the more constantly and flagrantly impure places number their votes by thousands.” So, according to the admission of even this writer, there is no case established, on the ground of corruption, for the wholesale disfranchisement of the small boroughs. Nevertheless we are to assume them to be impure, because he says it is notorious that they are so; and by this short and summary process of assertion he gets rid of the trouble of investigation. The boroughs are not put upon their trial, for there is no specific charge against them; but they are condemned at once because the writer has a low opinion of their morality. This is worse than Jeddart justice, where the trial took place after the execution. In the case of the boroughs there is to be no trial at all. The following conclusion is therefore easily arrived at: “There can be no doubt in the mind of any reformer that, in some way or other, these small boroughs ought to be suppressed; that we must have, if possible, no more constituencies under one thousand electors.” So much for the disfranchisement; now for the redistribution.

_Final scheme suggested to Lord John Russell for disfranchising the small boroughs and swamping the counties._—“The third method proposed is to merge all these small boroughs into the county constituencies, by depriving them of their members, and reducing the county franchise to a £10 occupancy. In this way the class would still be represented, and the individuals would still retain their votes, and the electoral lists of counties would be considerably modified and greatly enriched. This plan would, we think, be far the fairest and most desirable, inasmuch as it would give us constituencies large in number and varied in character, and, therefore, to a great extent secure against illicit and undue influences.”—_Edinburgh Review_, Oct. 1853, p. 602.

The next and last point which we shall notice is the representation of minorities. We do not know to whom the credit of having invented this notable scheme is really due. There are various claimants in the field. Mr G. L. Craik, of Queen’s College, Belfast, asserts that he was the original discoverer, having propounded a plan of this nature so early as 1836. Ingenious as the idea may be, it will hardly rank in importance with the discovery of the steam-engine, nor do we think that its originator is entitled to any exorbitant share of public gratitude or applause. We shall give it as we find it in the _Review_.

_Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal to give members in certain cases to minorities._—“The mode by which we propose to insure the constituent minorities their fair share in the representation—_i. e._ to make the majorities and minorities in the House of Commons correspond as nearly as may be to majorities and minorities in the country, or in the electoral bodies—is, to give (as now) to each elector as many votes as there are members to be chosen, and to allow him to divide these votes as he pleases among the candidates, _or to give them all to one_. But as at present most places return two members, it is obvious that, under the proposed arrangement, wherever the minority _exceeded one-third_ of the total number of the electors, they would be able to return one member, or to obtain _one-half_ the representation, which would be more than their fair share, and would place them on an equality with the majority, which would never do; while, if they _fell short of one-third_, they would be, as now, virtually unrepresented and ignored. To obviate this, it will be necessary so to arrange our electoral divisions, that as many constituencies as possible should return _three_ members: one of these a minority, if at all respectable, could always manage to secure.”—_Edin. Review_, Oct. 1853, p. 622.

Here, at all events, is the notion about the representation of majorities, and the establishment of as many constituencies as possible, returning _three_ members. Lord John Russell’s method of working this, is to restrict each elector to two votes.

Thus we see that all the leading features and peculiarities of Lord John Russell’s new Reform Bill—the disfranchisement of the boroughs, the swamping of the counties, the ten-pound occupancy clause, the qualification by deposit in the savings’ bank, the voting of graduates, the retention of their seats by members accepting office, and the representation of minorities—are contained in the articles published in the _Edinburgh Review_, in 1852 and 1853. This is, to say the least of it, a very singular coincidence. Of course we do not mean to maintain that Lord John Russell was debarred from availing himself of any useful hints which might be offered him, or from adopting the notions of any political sage, or harum-scarum cobbler of constitutions; we entirely admit his right to gather wisdom, or its counterfeit, from any source whatever. What we wish to impress upon the public is this, that, down to 1852, not one of these notions had occurred to our grand constitutional reformer, who for twenty years had been sedulously watching the operation of his original measure! Nay, more than that: two years ago, his ideas on the subject of Parliamentary Reform were diametrically opposite to those which he has now promulgated; and that not only in detail, but in absolute essence and form! Had he come before us this year with a scheme based upon the principle of 1852, which was a lowering of the franchise, without any farther disturbance of the constitution of the electoral bodies, it would have been but a poor criticism to have taunted him with a minor change in the details. He might have used his discretion in elevating or lowering the point where the franchise was to begin, without subjecting himself to any sneer on account of change of principle. But, wonderful as are the changes which we have seen of late years in the views of public men, this is the most astounding of them all. Never before, perhaps, did a statesman pass such a decided censure on his own judgment, or make such an admission of former recklessness and error. If he is right now, he must have been utterly wrong before. The constitution of 1852, as he would have made it, must have been a bad one. One-tenth of the members of the House of Commons would still have been returned by constituencies which he now regards as unfit to be constituencies any more. If the maintenance of the small boroughs is a blot on the constitution, how was it that Lord John Russell did not discover that blot until 1853, after the articles we have referred to were published? Did he take his ideas from those articles? If so, was there ever a more humiliating confession of entire poverty of mind? If he did not take his ideas from those articles, what was it that produced so entire a change of opinion?—what eminent political oculist has removed the film which impeded his vision but two short years ago? This is, in reality, a very grave matter. We are accustomed in this country to associate measures with men, and sometimes to accept the former on account of our belief and confidence in the sagacity of those who propose them. But what faith can we repose in a man who thus plays fast and loose upon a question with which he has been occupied all his life? This is not a case of expediency arising out of unforeseen circumstances. That the question is of the deepest import no one in his senses can deny. We know how the constitution, as framed at present, works; but we do not know how it may work if very materially altered. And yet we find the same mechanist proposing, within two years, two separate kinds of alteration! The first was simple enough, and had at least this much in its favour, that it did not require any violent displacement of the machinery. The second is so complex that the whole machinery must be re-arranged. It was our sincere hope that the country had seen the last of sudden conversions of parties—at no time edifying events, and sometimes attended by disastrous consequences—but we must, it seems, prepare ourselves for another conversion on the part of the Whigs, if this bill is to be carried through. They must, supposing them inclined to support Lord John Russell, either unsay what they said, or were prepared to have said, in 1852, or be ready to maintain that they were then greatly in advance of their leader. The dilemma, we admit, is an unpleasant and an odious one; but there is no escape from it, if the Whigs are determined, at all hazards, to follow their erratic leader.

That there is room for certain changes in the national representation we are by no means disposed to deny. It is impossible to devise any system so perfect as to preclude the idea of amendment; indeed, we suppose that there never was a constitution, or phase of a constitution, in the world, which gave entire and perfect satisfaction to all who lived under its operation. We may be told that the present system is theoretically wrong, that its principle is to exalt property and to exclude intelligence, and that in some parts it is incongruous, inconsistent, and contradictory. Possibly there may be some truth in such allegations; but then we must never lose sight of this, that the real test of a constitution is its practical working. It is undeniable that under the present system the middle classes have gained, not only power, but preponderance in the state; and accordingly we find that they are not favourable to a change which would certainly operate to their disadvantage. The ulterior aims of the men of Manchester may prompt them to desire a still further infusion of the democratic element, but neither the members nor the doctrines of that school have found favour with the British public. If public opinion generally, and the great interests of the nation, are well and effectively represented in the House of Commons, it does seem to us a very perilous experiment to disturb that state of matters. We should like very much to hear from Lord John Russell a distinct exposition of the results which he anticipates, should this scheme of his be carried. Is there any real point of interest to the nation which he is at present debarred from bringing forward by the exclusive constitution of the House of Commons? What are the existing grievances which call for so radical an alteration?

“What is there now amiss
That Cæsar and his senate must redress?”

We apprehend that the noble lord would be greatly puzzled to frame an intelligible answer to such queries. Well then, we are, perforce, compelled to fall back upon theory, and to assume that he vindicates his proposal, not because future measures will be of a better kind, or better discussed than heretofore, but because it is desirable, for symmetry’s sake, that the representation should be readjusted.

Be it so. We are content to take that view, albeit a low one, and to examine his scheme without any partial leaning to the present constitution of the House of Commons. And first, let us see what regard he has paid to the principle of equal representation.

It will not, we presume, be denied by any one that the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ought to be put upon an equitable footing as regards one another in this matter of representation. If imperial measures were all that the House of Commons had to discuss, this relative equality might be of less importance; but with separate laws and separate institutions guaranteed to and existing in the three kingdoms, it is proper that each should be fairly represented in the grand council of the nation. At present that is not the case. If we take the test of population, Scotland ought to have 18 more members than are now allotted to her; if we take the test of taxation and revenue, she ought to have 25 more. Combining the two, there is a deficit of more than 20 members to Scotland in her share of the national representation. Now, that is a matter which ought, in the very first instance, to have occupied the attention of the noble lord, and would have so occupied it, had he laid down for himself any fixed principles of action. It is nonsense to talk of inequalities between one borough and another, or between town and country qualification, before the first grand inequality is remedied. Apply the double test of population and revenue, and you will find that Ireland is upon an equality in point of representation with England, but that Scotland is not; and no reason has been, or can be, assigned for this anomaly. The quota for Scotland was fixed by the Act of Union at 45 members. It was increased by the Reform Act of 1832 to 53, but the number is still insufficient. Lord John Russell proposes, out of the 66 disfranchised seats, to give _three_ to Scotland, but he has assigned no reason for doing so. The people of Scotland are not in the position of men supplicating for a boon. They are demanding that, when such a change as this is made, their political rights shall be respected and allowed; and they will not be satisfied with less than a measure of perfect justice. We think it right to put forward this point prominently, because it lies at the foundation of the whole question of the readjustment of the representation.

The question of the disfranchisement of the boroughs is one which should be approached with very great caution. In 1852, as we have already seen, Lord John Russell did not propose to touch them—now he has made up his mind to lop away 66 members from this branch of the representation. This is, in our opinion, by far too reckless a proceeding. We can see no good ground or principle for the entire disfranchisement of any of the boroughs, a step which we think ought never to be taken, except in case of absolute and proved corruption. When constituencies are too small, the proper and natural plan is, to annex and unite, not to abolish; and we believe that this could be effected with very little difficulty. The new Schedule A contains a list of 19 boroughs, returning at present 29 members, which are to be wholly disfranchised, on the ground either that the number of the electors is under 300, or that of the inhabitants under 5000. Therefore the privilege is to be taken from them, and the voters are to be thrown into the counties. We agree with Lord John Russell, that some constituencies are too small, but we do not agree with him in his scheme of disfranchisement, and we utterly object to his proposal of quartering the electors on the counties. They are borough voters, and so they ought to remain; and it is a very poor pretext, indeed, to make this disfranchisement the excuse for altering the county qualification. Let a union of the boroughs, by all means, take place; let the number of their members, if necessary, be considerably reduced; but let us have no disfranchisement, or assimilation between the town and county qualification, which would quite upset the whole system throughout the kingdom.

We do not profess to be conversant with local details, so that we cannot speak with perfect confidence; but it appears to us that some such arrangement as the following, which would unite the smaller boroughs, and at the same time diminish the number of members, might be adopted with advantage:—

┌──────────────┬──────────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┐ │ County. │ Borough. │ Present │Combined │ Present │ Future │ │ │ │Electors.│Electors.│Members. │Members. │ ├──────────────┼──────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤ │Devonshire, │Ashburton, │ 211│ 520│ 1│ 1│ │ „ │Dartmouth, │ 309│ „ │ 1│ „ │ │ „ │Honiton, │ 335│ 649│ 2│ 1│ │ „ │Totness, │ 314│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │Dorsetshire, │Lyme Regis, │ 297│ 665│ 1│ 1│ │Somersetshire,│Wells, │ 368│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │Sussex, │Arundel, │ 208│ 493│ 1│ 1│ │ „ │Midhurst, │ 285│ „ │ 1│ „ │ │Wiltshire, │Calne, │ 151│ 641│ 1│ 1│ │ „ │Marlborough, │ 254│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │ „ │Wilton, │ 236│ „ │ 1│ 1│ │Yorkshire, │Richmond, │ 342│ 642│ 2│ „ │ │ „ │Northallerton,│ 303│ „ │ 1│ „ │ │Essex, │Harwich, │ 299│ 506│ 2│ 1│ │Norfolk, │Thetford, │ 217│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │ │ │ │ │ ——│ —│ │ │ │ │ │ 22│ 7│ └──────────────┴──────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┘

Thus, without any disfranchisement, or violent displacement, fifteen boroughs, at present returning twenty-two members, might be formed into seven respectable constituencies, returning one member each to Parliament. There are, however, four others—Knaresborough, Evesham, Reigate, and Andover—which cannot be so easily thrown together. We would proceed with these on the same principle, by adding them to boroughs at present returning two members, but which Lord John Russell proposes to restrict to one member each. The following is our view:—

┌──────────────┬──────────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┐ │ County. │ Borough. │ Present │Combined │ Present │ Future │ │ │ │Electors.│Electors.│Members. │Members. │ ├──────────────┼──────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┤ │Yorkshire, │Knaresborough,│ 226│ 583│ 2│ 1│ │ „ │Ripon, │ 357│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │Worcester, │Evesham, │ 396│ 755│ 2│ 2│ │ „ │Tewkesbury, │ 359│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │Surrey, │Reigate, │ 297│ 1124│ 1│ 2│ │ „ │Guildford, │ 595│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │Hampshire, │Andover, │ 232│ „ │ 2│ „ │ │ │ │ │ │ ——│ —│ │ │ │ │ │ 13│ 5│ └──────────────┴──────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┘

Here there are twenty-three seats set at liberty, without disfranchisement in any one instance. In justice to ourselves, we must state that we have implicitly followed the schedule attached to Lord John Russell’s bill, and not indulged in speculations of our own. Had the latter been the case, we might have been tempted to ask why Westbury, with an electorate of 289, is to be spared, while Wells, with 368, is to be blotted from the list of boroughs?

Besides these, Lord John Russell proposes that thirty other seats shall be made vacant, by restricting boroughs now returning two members to one. (His number is thirty-three, but we have already noticed Ripon, Tewkesbury, and Guildford.) If it could be shown that there is a really clamant case for representation elsewhere, the reduction might be allowed, but only to the extent required. It seems to us perfect madness to proceed with wholesale disfranchisement, until the necessity of transferring seats to other places is satisfactorily established. We can very well understand why some of the smaller boroughs which have now two members should be restricted to one, in order to satisfy the just requirements of some rising township which has hitherto been unrepresented. We have no doubt that Lord John Russell is quite right in his proposals to give members to Birkenhead, Burnley, and Staleybridge, and to erect Chelsea and Kensington into a Parliamentary borough to return two members. We think that two additional members each might be granted to the West Riding of Yorkshire and to the county of Lancaster—that Salford should return two members instead of one—and that the London University should be represented. We think that these are rational demands, and such as might be accorded; and the necessary number for these purposes, and for putting Scotland on a fair footing of equality with England and Ireland, would amount to the vacation of about thirty or thirty-two existing seats. We have already shown how, without entirely disfranchising any borough, twenty-three seats may be obtained; and if nine others are required, it would be no hardship to take from each of the following boroughs one out of the two members which they presently return:—

County. Borough. Constituency.
Hampshire, Lymington, 328
Cumberland, Cockermouth, 330
Buckinghamshire, Marlow (Great), 335
Wiltshire, Chippenham, 345
Buckinghamshire, Buckingham, 349
Devonshire, Tavistock, 352
Cornwall, Bodmin, 360
Wiltshire, Devizes, 363
Buckinghamshire, Wycombe (Chipping), 365

This would take out of Schedule B no less than twenty-one seats which are now included in it; and it would be obviously unwise to exhaust, all at once, the only source from which new rising constituencies can be endowed. Lord John Russell seems to think—and we agree with him—that the present number of the House of Commons (654) is quite large enough; and although there is no principle to fix numbers, it may be as well to maintain them as they are. It is but natural to expect that, in future years, some places will decrease, and others increase, and that partial changes will be required. For that very reason we deprecate too hasty a reduction of the boroughs, and an apportionment of their seats to places and constituencies which do not require them. Suppose that in ten years after this, new seats of commerce and manufacture, like Birkenhead, Burnley, and Staleybridge, start into existence—that places like Salford increase immensely—and that new Chelseas require to be conjoined with new Kensingtons—where are we to find members for them, without unduly swelling the bulk of the House of Commons, if all the smaller borough seats are to be disposed of at the present time? The Legislature may say just now, with perfect propriety, to the men of Lymington—“Your borough is the smallest in the country which returns two members to Parliament. Birkenhead is a place of such importance that it requires a member; and therefore, as it is not expedient to increase the aggregate number of the national representatives, we shall take a member from you, and give one to Birkenhead.” That is quite intelligible; but why disfranchise boroughs when you do not know what to do with the vacancies? It is true that Lord John Russell tells us what he means to do with them; but we entirely demur to every proposal of his beyond those which we have already noticed. He proposes, we observe, to give three members instead of two to the following cities and boroughs whose constituencies we have noted:—

Towns. Constituencies.
Birmingham, 8,780
Bristol, 10,958
Bradford, 2,723
Leeds, 6,400
Liverpool, 15,382
Manchester, 17,826
Sheffield, 5,612
Wolverhampton, 3,499

It must strike every one that there can be no principle in this. The constituencies both of Manchester and Liverpool are more than five times larger than that of Bradford, and yet all of them are to have three members; whereas the Tower Hamlets with 25,366, Marylebone with 20,377, and Lambeth with 18,522 electors, are but to have two each as heretofore. Even the sage of the _Edinburgh Review_ has borne testimony to the impropriety and injustice of adding to the number of representatives returned for large towns. In his article of October 1852, he says:—

“It would appear that the large towns have their full share of the
representation; since, if we add the small boroughs to the counties,
on the supposition of their returning a somewhat similar class of
members, and containing a somewhat similar constituency, the
comparison would stand thus:—

Population. Members.
Counties and small boroughs, 10,250,000 259
Large towns and cities, 6,660,000 206

—whereas the proper arithmetical proportion for the cities would be
169, instead of 206.”

The fact is, that Lord John Russell has assigned an additional number to each of these towns, not because they require one, but in order to make the extraordinary experiment, to which we have already alluded, of the representation of minorities in Parliament. For that reason, also, he proposes to give thirty-six additional members to so many counties and their divisions, making each up to the number of three, so that minorities may be represented on rather an extensive scale. We shall have occasion presently to say a word or two on that subject. The notion seems to us not only impracticable, but positively silly; and such as no man of ordinary sense could entertain for a moment. Even were it more feasible than it appears, that would not justify an unnecessary disfranchisement of the boroughs. We can see no reason for parting with them so abruptly—many for retaining them; because, undoubtedly, they keep the balance even between town and country, and so perform a very valuable function in the Legislature. We do not dispute the propriety of their remodelment or curtailment. Our views, in that respect, are, we submit, sufficiently liberal; for we think it just that from them, as small constituencies, any palpable defect or positive need in the national representation should be supplied. But we will not consent to their sacrifice merely for theoretical experiment; or in order to give colour to the proposal for assimilating the town and county franchise—in other words, for swamping the latter representation. We are greatly surprised that Lord John Russell should, in his mature years, have thus been led astray. In the popular ferment of 1831–2—the particulars of which are better known to his lordship than to us—almost any proposal might have gone down; but now reason instead of passion must be appealed to and satisfied, before any one can be allowed to make a material inroad on the Constitution. Lord John is singularly unfortunate. Mr Bright is quite as much opposed to the notion of the representation of minorities as we are; and we venture to say that the collective voice of the counties, to which he proposes to give an additional member, will be raised against him. We need not press the point that the borough electors will be especially unwilling to lose their existing privileges. And if it should so happen—as we know, and as every man who knows the political feeling of the country, must be the case—that both the disfranchised parties, and those whose franchise is thereby nominally increased, hold the scheme in detestation and contempt, how is it possible that he can hope to carry it even through the House of Commons? He has no enthusiasm to back him. He is not attempting to give voice to the opinion of any large section of the public—he is simply repeating, parrot-like and without examination, in opposition to all he has heretofore said, the opinions enunciated by another. He is theorising, contrary to his own experience; and sacrificing, for a mere crotchet, his own arrangements, which, for twenty years, and until 1852, he deemed to be mathematically correct.

We now come to the question of qualification. This is a very serious one, and cannot be properly treated without reference to our existing fiscal arrangements. Indirect taxation has been reduced to the lowest possible limit; and, in order to make up the deficiency in the revenue occasioned by numerous relaxations, we are forced to submit to an income-tax which amounted last year to more than five and a half millions, levied from those persons only who are in receipt of more than £100 yearly. From Mr Gladstone’s financial statement, it appears that the Government does not intend to increase the amount of the national debt by contracting fresh loans, but that the inevitable expenses of the war, however large, are to be defrayed by additional yearly taxation. Further, we are told that it is not proposed to raise any portion of this by again resorting to indirect taxation, but that the whole of it is to be charged upon those persons who are already rated to the income-tax. We subscribe in theory to the opinion, that it is not advisable for the interests of posterity to increase the amount of the national debt; which might, however, have been cleared off during the years of peace but for the insane system pursued by successive Ministries, of abandoning indirect taxation for the sake of immediate popularity. In practice, it may be found impossible to avoid the contraction of fresh loans. It is not likely, for some time at least, that any Ministry will be bold enough to resort to the customs and excise duties for the supply of the yearly deficiency, so that there really seems no other available course than that of taxing property and income still farther. The effect of this is, that a certain limited class is made to pay for the others, and that the great bulk of the population are exempted. How long this can be endured we shall not venture to predict. We have demonstrated over and over again, in the pages of the Magazine, the extreme impolicy and ultimate danger of continuing a war tax in time of peace, and the result shows the soundness of our warning. The day will arrive when this burden will become so great as to be intolerable; and then, perhaps, it may be discovered that, in abandoning easy and evident sources of revenue, our commercial legislators have committed a most grievous error. At present, however, we can only look to the fiscal arrangements which have been proposed. It is obvious, at least to us, that it would be highly inexpedient, and even dangerous, to lodge political power in the hands of those who are not called upon to contribute directly to the necessities of the State. If you are to select a certain class as peculiar rate-payers, and to compel them, year after year, to make up the deficiency of the national income, whatever that may be, you are bound also to give them peculiar privileges. We care not how low you make the assessment. Indeed, we are of opinion that it should be brought down to the lowest possible limit, which, probably, would be fixed, as regards income, at £60 per annum. But whatever that limit may be, this principle ought to be established, that no man, not rated to the property and income tax, shall hereafter be capable of voting, or of being enrolled. This is the only good security we can have against confiscation. It is said that the idea of a war is peculiarly popular in the country. No wonder that it should be so. The artisan is informed that no additional tax will be laid in consequence upon any article of his consumpt; that the price of his beer, spirits, tea, coffee, sugar, and tobacco, will not be raised; and that others will defray the cost of equipping those fine fleets, and maintaining those splendid troops, which he cheers as they leave our shores. Very different are the feelings of the unfortunate individual who, by dint of industry, has worked his way to an income of £150 a-year, and has a wife and family to support. Last year he had to pay £4, 7s. 6d., directly to the Exchequer, and was consoling himself with the vision that, after April 1855, his contribution would be lowered to £3, 15s. Down upon him, like a vulture, swoops the tax-gatherer, with a demand for £7, 11s. 3d., to be increased if the war goes on. You cannot expect that man to be quite as enthusiastic as the artisan, whose voice, like that of Sempronius, is still for war, so long as he escapes untaxed. It is easy to be patriotic when there is nothing whatever to pay. What we advocate, therefore, is, an extension of the property and income tax to the lowest available limit, and an exclusion from the franchise of all those who do not contribute to it. It is a proposition not only fair and reasonable, but imperatively necessary under the circumstances in which we are placed; and no one can complain of injustice in being excluded from a privilege for which he does not pay, either from want of means, or because he fraudulently evades the tax.