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Chapter XI: The Economic Conflict Over Ratification as Viewed by Contemporaries (2)

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Indeed, evidence that it was not appears in a pamphlet written in defence of the Constitution by Dr. David Ramsay, who was afterward a member of the ratifying convention in South Carolina. He particularly warns his fellow-citizens against the debtor element. “Be on your guard,” he says, “against the misrepresentations of men who are involved in debt; such may wish to see the Constitution rejected because of the following clause, ‘no state shall emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.’ This will doubtless bear hard on debtors who wish to defraud their creditors, but it will be real service to the honest part of the community. Examine well the characters and circumstances of men who are averse to the new constitution. Perhaps you will find that the above clause is the real ground of the opposition of some of them, though they may artfully cover it with a splendid profession of zeal for state privileges and general liberty.”[736]

_Georgia._—The speedy and unanimous ratification of the Constitution in Georgia seems to have prevented any very vigorous pamphleteering on the question. Indeed, the energies of the state were being strained to the limit in preparing for defence against the Indians, and there was little time for theorizing. Foreign invasion generally silences domestic discord.

CONCLUSIONS

At the close of this long and arid survey—partaking of the nature of catalogue—it seems worth while to bring together the important conclusions for political science which the data presented appear to warrant.

The movement for the Constitution of the United States was originated and carried through principally by four groups of personalty interests which had been adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping.

The first firm steps toward the formation of the Constitution were taken by a small and active group of men immediately interested through their personal possessions in the outcome of their labors.

No popular vote was taken directly or indirectly on the proposition to call the Convention which drafted the Constitution.

A large propertyless mass was, under the prevailing suffrage qualifications, excluded at the outset from participation (through representatives) in the work of framing the Constitution.

The members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the Constitution were, with a few exceptions, immediately, directly, and personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from, the establishment of the new system.

The Constitution was essentially an economic document based upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities.

The major portion of the members of the Convention are on record as recognizing the claim of property to a special and defensive position in the Constitution.

In the ratification of the Constitution, about three-fourths of the adult males failed to vote on the question, having abstained from the elections at which delegates to the state conventions were chosen, either on account of their indifference or their disfranchisement by property qualifications.

The Constitution was ratified by a vote of probably not more than one-sixth of the adult males.

It is questionable whether a majority of the voters participating in the elections for the state conventions in New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, and South Carolina, actually approved the ratification of the Constitution.

The leaders who supported the Constitution in the ratifying conventions represented the same economic groups as the members of the Philadelphia Convention; and in a large number of instances they were also directly and personally interested in the outcome of their efforts.

In the ratification, it became manifest that the line of cleavage for and against the Constitution was between substantial personalty interests on the one hand and the small farming and debtor interests on the other.

The Constitution was not created by “the whole people” as the jurists have said; neither was it created by “the states” as Southern nullifiers long contended; but it was the work of a consolidated group whose interests knew no state boundaries and were truly national in their scope.

INDEX

Adams, John, theories attacked, 313.

Annapolis convention, 62.

Army, place in government, 171 ff.

Articles of Confederation, conditions under, 47, 58;
system of government, 52.

Baldwin, Abraham, economic interests of, 74;
political philosophy of, 190.

Baltimore, petitions for protection, 42;
popular vote in, 247.

Bancroft, interpretation of history, 1.

Bassett, Richard, economic interests of, 75.

Bedford, Gunning, economic interests of, 76;
political philosophy of, 191.

Blair, John, economic interests of, 77.

Blount, William, economic interests of, 78.

Boston, petitions for protection, 44;
property interests in, 261 ff.;
vote in, 244.

Bowdoin, Governor, demands stronger union, 55.

Brearley, David, economic interests of, 79.

Broom, Jacob, economic interests of, 80;
political philosophy of, 191.

Burgess, Professor, cited, 62.

Butler, Pierce, economic interests of, 81;
political philosophy of, 192.

Capital, attacks on, 31 ff.;
invested in lands, 49;
_see_ Money and Securities.

Carroll, Daniel, economic interests of, 82.

“Centinel,” essays of, 312.

Checks and balances, 159 ff.

Cincinnati, Society of the, 38 ff.

Cities, populace feared, 215.

Clymer, George, 41;
economic interests of, 82;
political philosophy of, 193.

Commerce, demands for protection of, 40 ff.;
influence in politics, 172, 183 ff.

Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, 52;
calls the Convention at Philadelphia, 63.

Connecticut tax returns, in, 31;
suffrage qualifications, 66;
elections to state convention, 228;
vote on the Constitution, 228;
voters for members of convention, 240;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 265 ff.;
public securities in, 265;
conflict over ratification, 306 ff.

Constitution, U. S., juristic theory of, 10 ff., 299;
economic forces in creation and adoption, 16 ff.;
movement for, 52 ff.;
nature of, 152 ff.

Constitutional law, interpretation of, 13 ff.

Contracts, provision for safeguarding, 179 ff.

Convention, at Philadelphia, called, 63;
movement for, 52 ff.;
method of electing delegates, 64; 73 ff.

Creditors, consolidation of, 32.

Currency, depreciation of, 31.

Davie, William R., economic interests of, 84;
political philosophy of, 193.

Dayton, Jonathan, economic interests of, 85.

Debt, Public, _see_ Securities.

Debtors, political schemes, 28;
war on creditors, 31 ff.;
in revolt in New England, 59.

Delaware, suffrage qualification, 68;
elections to state convention, 230;
vote on the Constitution, 230;
voters for members of convention, 241;
ratification of the Constitution, 272.

Depreciation, of securities, 32.

Dickinson, John, economic interests of, 87;
political philosophy of, 194.

Disfranchised, the, 24 ff.

Economic interests, appealed to, in behalf of the Constitution, 53.

Economic interpretation of history, 5 ff.;
of law, 7 ff.;
of constitutional law, 13;
Madison’s, 14 ff.; 156 ff.

Elections, popular, feared, 214;
annual, 216;
popular vote on the Constitution, 239 ff.;
to state conventions, 226 ff.;
number voting in, 242 ff.;
_see_ Suffrage.

Ellsworth, Oliver, economic interests of, 88;
political philosophy of, 196;
on ratification, 220.

Executive, veto power, 213; 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202,
203, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216.

Farms, mortgaged, 22;
small, 27.

_Federalist, The_, on the Constitution, 152 ff.

Few, William, economic interests of, 90.

Fitzsimons, Thomas, 41;
economic interests of, 91;
political philosophy of, 196.

Franklin, Benjamin, on conditions of the country in 1787, 47;
and land speculation, 49;
economic interests of, 92;
political philosophy of, 197.

Freeholders, dangers from, 71;
best guardians of liberty, 195; 189–216 _passim_;
_see_ Suffrage and Elections.

Georgia, suffrage qualifications, 70;
elections to state convention, 236;
vote on the Constitution, 236;
voters for members of convention, 241;
reasons for speedy ratification, 290.

Gerry, Elbridge, views on the Cincinnati, 38;
economic interests of, 95;
political philosophy of, 197;
on property qualifications, 167.

Gilman, Nicholas, economic interests of, 93.

Gorham, Nathaniel, economic interests of, 99;
political philosophy of, 198;
on ratification, 219.

Hamilton, Alexander, views on the working-class, 25;
estimate of debt, 33;
economic interests of, 100;
political philosophy of, 199;
on ratification, 222.

Henry, Patrick, and land speculation, 49.

History, interpretation of, 1 ff.

Holmes, Justice, economic views cited, 9 n.

Houston, W. C., economic interests of, 114.

Houstoun, William, economic interests of, 115;
political philosophy of, 200.

Ingersoll, Jared, economic interests of, 116;
political philosophy of, 200.

Jenifer, Daniel, 116.

Jhering, work cited, 14 n.

Johnson, W. S., economic interests of, 117.

Judicial control, nature of, 162, 196;
Spaight against, 214; 216.

King, Rufus, economic interests of, 118;
political philosophy of, 201;
on ratification, 218.

Knox, General, believes the Confederation is in ruins, 58; 301.

Land, policy, 27;
western, speculation in, 23, 49;
members of the Convention, interests in, 151.

Langdon, John, economic interests of, 120.

Lansing, John, economic interests of, 123.

Lassalle, cited, 14 n.

Law, interpretation in the United States, 7 ff.;
England, 7.

Libby, O. G., work on the Constitution, 5.

Livingston, William, economic interests of, 123;
political philosophy of, 201.

Madison, James, interpretation of history and politics, 14 ff.;
on universal suffrage, 25;
on the dissolution of the Confederation, 60;
on the Annapolis convention, 62;
economic interests of, 125;
political philosophy of, 156;
on property qualifications, 165, 167;
on ratification, 222;
view as to causes of opposition to Constitution, 293.

Maitland, and economic interpretation, 8 n.

Majority rule, devices for checking, 156 ff.

Manufacturing, 23;
demands for protection, 41 ff.; 175.

Marshall, opinion as to nature of the Constitution cited, 10;
on the obligation of contracts, 181 f.; 287;
analysis of the conflict over the Constitution, 295 ff.

Martin, Alexander, economic interests of, 126.

Martin, Luther, and debtors, 28;
economic interests of, 126;
political philosophy of, 205.

Maryland, petitions for protection, 43;
suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 234;
vote on the Constitution, 235;
voters for members of convention, 241;
vote on Constitution in, 247;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 281;
conflict over ratification, 316 ff.

Mason, George, economic interests of, 127;
political philosophy of, 205.

Massachusetts, tax returns in, 31;
rebellion in, 59;
suffrage qualifications, 65;
elections to state convention, 226;
vote on the Constitution, 227;
voters for members of convention, 240;
elections in, 242;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 257 ff.;
public securities in, 261;
conflict over ratification, 301 ff.

McClurg, James, economic interests of, 130;
political philosophy of, 203.

McHenry, James, economic interests of, 130;
political philosophy of, 204;
elected to the Maryland convention, 247.

Mercer, J. F., economic interests of, 131;
political philosophy of, 207.

Merchants, petition for adequate naval protection, 56.

Mifflin, Thomas, economic interests of, 132.

Minority, rights of the, 156 ff.; 322.

Monarchy, favored by Dickinson, 195.

Money, distribution of, 31;
paper, 28 ff.;
forbidden in the Constitution, 179; 281.

Money-lending, 28.

Monroe, on the Annapolis convention, 62.

Morley, on Macaulay, 4 n.

Morris, Gouverneur, economic interests of, 133;
political philosophy of, 207;
on property qualifications, 166;
view of conflict in Pennsylvania, 311.

Morris, Robert, and land speculation, 49;
economic interests of, 133;
political philosophy of, 209.

Navy, _see_ Army.

New England, rebellion in, 59.

New Hampshire, tax returns in, 31;
suffrage qualifications, 65;
elections to state convention, 225;
vote on the Constitution, 226;
voters for members of state convention, 240;
economic interests and the Constitution, 254;
conflict over ratification, 300.

New Jersey, suffrage qualifications in, 68;
elections to state convention, 230;
vote on the Constitution, 230;
voters for members of convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 271 f.;
public securities in, 271.

New York, petitions for protection, 43;
suffrage qualifications, 67;
number of voters in, 67;
elections to state convention, 229;
vote on the Constitution, 229;
demand for a second national Convention, 229;
voters for members of convention, 241;
popular vote on the Constitution, 244;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 268 ff.;
public securities in, 270;
conflict over ratification, 309.

North Carolina, suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 235;
ratification of Constitution deferred, 235;
ratification, 236;
voters for members of convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 287 f.;
conflict over ratification, 319.

Paper money, 28 ff.

Paterson, William, 136, 209, 222.

Pennsylvania, suffrage qualifications, 68;
elections to state convention, 231;
vote on the Constitution, 233;
conflict over ratification, 231 ff.;
voters for members of convention, 241;
popular vote on the Constitution, 246;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 273 ff.;
public securities in, 274;
conflict over ratification, 310 ff.

Personal property, distribution of, in the United States, 19 ff.

Philadelphia, petitions for protection, 40, 44;
residents seek relief from financial disorders, 57;
popular vote in, 247.

Pierce, William, economic interests of, 137;
political philosophy of, 209.

Pinckney, Charles, economic interests of, 138;
political philosophy of, 210.

Pinckney, C. C., economic interests of, 137;
political philosophy of, 211.

Pound, Professor, writings cited, 9.

Powers, balance of, 159 ff.

President, _see_ Executive.

Property, rights of, 156 ff.;
qualifications on voters and officers, 164 ff.;
position under the Constitution, 176;
qualifications for officers, 213;
_see_ Suffrage and Elections.

Protection, for manufacturing, demanded, 40;
for trade, 175.

Public securities, records of, at Treasury Department, 20.

Randolph, Edmund, economic interests of, 139;
political philosophy of, 212;
on ratification, 219.

Ratification, _see_ separate states;
plan suggested by the Convention, 217;
accepted by Congress, 217;
criticism and defence of, 218 ff.;
accepted by the states, 225.

Read, George, economic interests of, 140;
political philosophy of, 213.

Real property, groups of interests, 26 ff.

Referendum, 239.

Representatives, House of, 160, 162, 191, 192, 197, 199, 207, 210, 212.

Rhode Island, ratification of the Constitution, 237.

Rutledge, John, economic interests of, 141;
political philosophy of, 213.

Schuyler, Philip, demands a national convention, 55, 108.

Securities, Public, amount of, 32 f.;
depreciation of, 32;
gain in appreciation of, 34 ff.;
members of the Convention holding, 149 f.;
in Massachusetts, 261 ff.;
in Connecticut, 266 f.;
in New York, 270;
in New Jersey, 271;
in Pennsylvania, 273;
in Virginia, 286;
in North Carolina, 287;
in South Carolina, 289.

Senate, 161, 162;
and property, 190, 192, 199, 206, 211, 212, 213;
_see_ Senators.

Senators, life term proposed, 213;
term of, 214;
popular election, 216.

Shays’ Rebellion, 39.

Sherman, Roger, economic interests of, 142;
political philosophy of, 213;
view of plan of ratification, 218.

Slave-holders, interest in the Constitution, 29.

Slaves, members of the Convention holding, 151;
danger of revolt, 174;
trade in, discussed in the Convention, 176;
Rutledge’s view of, 213.

Smith, Melancton, 246.

South Carolina, suffrage qualifications, 70;
popular vote on the Constitution, 248;
elections to state convention, 236;
vote on the Constitution, 236;
voters for members of Convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 288 f.;
public securities in, 289;
conflict over ratification, 321.

Spaight, R. D., economic interests of, 143;
political philosophy of, 214.

States, restrictions on, 178 ff.;
causes of conflict among, 186 ff.

Stock Exchange, founding of, 35.

Strong, Caleb, economic interests of, 144;
political philosophy of, 214.

Suffrage, qualifications on, in 1787, 64 ff.;
discussed in the Convention, 164 ff., 190 ff.;
manhood in New York, 241;
for electors voting on the Constitution, 240 f.;
number disfranchised, 242.

Taxation, absence of power under the Confederation, 52;
power conferred by the Constitution, 169;
interpretation of the system, 170;
Hamilton on, 171.

Territories, provisions for, in the Constitution, 175.

Teutonic school, interpretation of history, 2.

Tories, 240.

Turner, Professor, historical interpretation, 5.

Veto, absolute, proposed, 213.

Veto power, 215.

Virginia, suffrage qualifications, 69;
elections to state convention, 235;
vote on the Constitution, 235;
voters for members of Convention, 241;
economic interests and ratification of the Constitution, 282 ff.;
public securities in, 286;
conflict over ratification, 318.

Vote, popular, _see_ Elections.

Washington, George, and the Cincinnati, 39;
and land speculation, 49;
fears for the safety of the country, 58;
economic interests of, 144;
political philosophy of, 215.

Williamson, Hugh, and land speculation, 23, 50;
economic interests of, 146;
political philosophy of, 215.

Wilson, James, economic interests of, 147;
political philosophy of, 215.

Wilson, Woodrow, description of the movement for the Constitution, 61.

Women, legal position of, 24.

Working-class, and politics, 25.

Wythe, George, economic interests of, 148;
political philosophy of, 216.

-----

Footnote 1:

_The History of the Constitution of the United States_ (1882 ed.),
Vol. II, p. 284.

Footnote 2:

American Historical Review, Vol. II, p. 13.

Footnote 3:

Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 6.

Footnote 4:

It has been left to a Russian to explain to Englishmen the origin of
Teutonism in historical writing. See the introduction to Vinogradoff,
_Villainage in England_. W. J. Ashley, in his preface to the
translation of Fustel de Coulanges, _Origin of Property in Land_,
throws some light on the problem, but does not attempt a systematic
study.

Footnote 5:

Note the painstaking documentation for the first chapters in Stubbs’
great work.

Footnote 6:

What Morley has said of Macaulay is true of many eminent American
historical writers: “A popular author must, in a thoroughgoing way,
take the accepted maxims for granted. He must suppress any whimsical
fancy for applying the Socratic elenchus; or any other engine of
criticism, scepticism, or verification to those sentiments or current
precepts or morals which may in truth be very equivocal and may be
much neglected in practice, but which the public opinion of his time
requires to be treated in theory and in literature as if they had been
cherished and held _semper, ubique, et ab omnibus_.” _Miscellanies_,
Vol. I, p. 272.

Footnote 7:

For instance, intimate connections can be shown between the vogue of
Darwinism and the competitive ideals of the mid-Victorian middle-class
in England. Darwin got one of his leading ideas, the struggle for
existence, from Malthus, who originated it as a club to destroy the
social reformers, Godwin, Condorcet, and others, and then gave it a
serious scientific guise as an afterthought.

Footnote 8:

See also the valuable and suggestive writings on American history by
Professor W. E. Dodd, of Chicago University; W. A. Schaper,
“Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical Association
Report_ (1900), Vol. I; A. Bentley, _The Process of Government_; C. H.
Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_. There are three works by socialist
writers that deserve study: Simons, _Social Forces in American
History_; Gustavus Myers, _History of Great American Fortunes and
History of the Supreme Court_.

Footnote 9:

See Seligman, _The Economic Interpretation of History_.

Footnote 10:

Vincent, in his treatise on _Historical Research_ (1911), dismisses
the economic theory without critical examination.

Footnote 11:

The _Congressional Record_ requires more care in use than any other
great source of information on American politics.

Footnote 12:

Attention should be drawn, however, to the good work which is being
done in the translation of several European legal studies, the “Modern
Legal Philosophy Series,” under the editorial direction of the
Association of American Law Schools. Perhaps the most hopeful sign of
the times is the growth of interest in comparative jurisprudence. See
Borchard, “Jurisprudence in Germany,” Columbia Law Review, April,
1912.

Footnote 13:

For examples of Maitland’s suggestiveness, see the English Historical
Review, Vol. IX, p. 439, for a side light on the effect of money
economy on the manor and consequently on feudal law. See also the
closing pages of his _Constitutional History of England_, where he
makes constitutional law in large part the history of the law of real
property. “If we are to learn anything about the constitution, it is
necessary first and foremost that we should learn a good deal about
the land law. We can make no progress whatever in the history of
parliament without speaking of tenure; indeed our whole constitutional
law seems at times to be but an appendix to the law of real property”
(p. 538). Maitland’s entire marvellous chapter on “The Definition of
Constitutional Law” deserves the most careful study and reflection. He
was entirely emancipated from bondage to systematists (p. 539).

Footnote 14:

J. C. Carter, _The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law_ (1884),
pp. 6–8.

Footnote 15:

Of the newer literature on law, see the following articles by
Professor Roscoe Pound: “Do we need a Philosophy of Law?” Columbia Law
Review, Vol. V, p. 339; “Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence,” Green
Bag, Vol. XIX, p. 607; “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law
Review, Vol. VIII, p. 605; “Law in Books and Law in Action,” American
Law Review, Vol. XLIV, p. 12; Professor Munroe Smith, “Jurisprudence”
(in the Columbia University Lectures in Arts and Sciences); Goodnow,
_Social Reform and the Constitution_.

Footnote 16:

Consider, for example, the following remarks by this eminent Justice
in his dissenting opinion in the New York Bakery case: “This case is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain.... The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s _Social Statics_.... General propositions do not decide
concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise.” 198 U. S. 75.

Footnote 17:

_Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 367.

Footnote 18:

4 Wheaton, p. 316. No doubt the learned Justice was here more
concerned with discrediting the doctrine of state’s rights than with
establishing the popular basis of our government.

Footnote 19:

S. F. Miller, _Lectures on the Constitution_ (1891), p. 71.

Footnote 20:

_Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 324.

Footnote 21:

See A. Bentley, _The Process of Government_.

Footnote 22:

In the preface to his first edition, Jhering says: “Die Schrift, von
der ich hiermit die erste Hälfte der Öffentlichkeit übergebe, ist eine
Ausläuferin von meinem Werk über den Geist des römischen Rechts. Der
letzte Band desselben ... schloss ab mit einer Grundlegung der Theorie
der Rechte im subjektiven Sinn, in der ich eine von der herrschenden
abweichende Begriffsbestimmung des Rechts im subjektiven Sinn gab,
indem ich an Stelle des Willens, auf den jene den Begriff desselben
gründete, das Interesse setze. Dem folgenden Bande war die weitere
Rechtfertigung und Verwertung dieses Gesichtspunktes Vorbehalten....
Der Begriff des Interesses nötigte mich, den Zweck ins Auge zu fassen,
und das Recht im subjektiven Sinn drängte mich zu dem im objektiven
Sinn, und so gestaltete sich das ursprüngliche Untersuchungsobjekt zu
einem ungleich erweiterten, zu dem des gegenwärtigen Buches: der Zweck
im Recht.... Der Grundgedanke des gegenwärtigen Werkes besteht darin,
dass der Zweck der Schöpfer des gesamten Rechts ist, dass es keinen
Rechtssatz gibt, der nicht einem Zweck, d.i. einem praktischen Motiv
seinen Ursprung verdankt.”

Footnote 23:

Was ist es, das den innersten Grund unserer politischen und socialen
Kämpfe bildet? Der Begriff des erworbenen Rechts ist wieder einmal
streitig geworden—und dieser Streit ist es, der das Herz der heutigen
Welt durchzittert und die tief inwendigste Grundlage der
politisch-socialen Kämpfe des Jahrhunderts bildet. Im Juristischen,
Politischen, Oekonomischen ist der Begriff des erworbenen Rechts der
treibende Springquell aller weitern Gestaltung, und wo sich das
Juristische als das Privatrechtliche völlig von dem Politischen
abzulösen scheint, da ist es noch viel politischer als das Politische
selbst, dann da ist es das sociale Element. Preface to _Das System der
erworbenen Rechte_ by Ferdinand Lassalle.

Footnote 24:

And before Madison’s century, Harrington had perceived its
significance. H. A. L. Fisher, _Republican Tradition in Europe_, p.
51.

Footnote 25:

Number 10.

Footnote 26:

The theory of the economic interpretation of history as stated by
Professor Seligman seems as nearly axiomatic as any proposition in
social science can be: “The existence of man depends upon his ability
to sustain himself; the economic life is therefore the fundamental
condition of all life. Since human life, however, is the life of man
in society, individual existence moves within the framework of the
social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions of
maintenance are to the individual, the similar relations of production
and consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore,
must be traced in the last instance those transformations in the
structure of society which themselves condition the relations of
social classes and the various manifestations of social life.” _The
Economic Interpretation of History_, p. 3.

Footnote 27:

The question of geographic distribution will be considered below,
Chap. X.

Footnote 28:

A few years ago a negro attendant at the Treasury sold a cart-load or
more of these records to a junk dealer. He was imprisoned for the
offence, but this is a small consolation for scholars. The present
writer was able to use some of the records only after a vacuum cleaner
had been brought in to excavate the ruins.

Footnote 29:

See below, p. 50.

Footnote 30:

See Curtis, _The Constitutional History of the United States_, Book I,
Chaps. II-VII; Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_; McMaster,
_History of the People of the United States_, Vol. I; Channing,
_History of the United States_, Vol. III.

Footnote 31:

See below, Chaps. IV and IX.

Footnote 32:

Working-men in the cities were not altogether indifferent spectators.
See Becker, _Political Parties in New York_. They would have doubtless
voted with the major interests of the cities in favor of the
Constitution as against the agrarians had they been enfranchised. In
fact, this is what happened in New York. See below, Chap. IX.

Footnote 33:

“If the authority be in their hands by the rule of suffrage,” struck
out in the Ms. See also the important note to this speech in Farrand,
_Records_, Vol. II, p. 204, note 17.

Footnote 34:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 203.

Footnote 35:

December 5, 1791. _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 126.

Footnote 36:

Roosevelt, _Gouverneur Morris_, pp. 14 ff.

Footnote 37:

Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 44.

Footnote 38:

Libby has shown the degree of correspondence between the rural vote on
paper money measures, designed for the relief of debtors, and the vote
against the ratification of the Constitution. _Op. cit._, pp. 50 ff.

Footnote 39:

See below, p. 205.

Footnote 40:

The landholders were able to do this largely because New York City was
the entry port for Connecticut and New Jersey. The opportunity to
shift the taxes not only to the consumers, but to the consumers of
neighboring states, was too tempting to be resisted.

Footnote 41:

For a paragraph on nascent capitalism in South Carolina, see W. A.
Schaper, “Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical
Association Report_ (1900), Vol. I. See the letter of Blount, Davie,
and Williamson to the governor of North Carolina, below, p. 169.

Footnote 42:

It is not without interest to note that about the time Calhoun made
this criticism of New England capitalist devices he was attempting to
borrow several thousand dollars from a Massachusetts mill owner to
engage in railway enterprise in the south.

Footnote 43:

See, however, _State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, pp. 414 ff.

Footnote 44:

_Ibid._, Vol. I, pp. 442 ff.

Footnote 45:

See the picturesque description of the monetary system or lack of
system in Fiske, _Critical Period of American History_.

Footnote 46:

See below, p. 146.

Footnote 47:

_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 451; also see below, pp. 261–2.

Footnote 48:

_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 19.

Footnote 49:

W. De Knight, _History of the Currency_, p. 21.

Footnote 50:

_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 325.

Footnote 51:

_Ibid._, Vol, I, p. 231.

Footnote 52:

Callender, not a very reliable authority on most matters concerning
Hamilton, claims that twenty-five million dollars was made by the
funding of the public debt, and that about ten millions more was made
out of the state debt assumption process. He further declared that a
public debt of eighty million dollars had been created of which only
about thirty millions was all that was necessary. Gallatin held also
that the unnecessary debt created by the assumption act amounted to
about eleven million dollars. Callender, _A History of the United
States for 1796_, pp. 224 ff. The ethics of redeeming the debt at face
value is not here considered although the present writer believes that
the success of the national government could not have been secured
under any other policy than that pursued by Hamilton. Callender claims
that those who held it were, in large measure, speculators and that
they made huge fortunes out of the transaction. By a stroke of the pen
the federal government created capital to the amount of millions in
the hands of the holders.

Footnote 53:

_A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States_, p. 31.

Footnote 54:

Tables from Pitkin, _A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United
States_, pp. 367–368, and _An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of the United States for the Year 1795_, p. 65

Footnote 56:

Undoubtedly a large appreciation had taken place between 1787 and
1800.

Footnote 57:

“The public securities of the United States of America were a dead,
inactive kind of property, previous to the establishment of the
constitution of the new government; then they became at once the
object of avarice. They before had an existence as to value, on the
slender hope of having something done for them at some distant future
period; and obtained a motion only from the sagacity of the few, who
happened to be right in their conjectures respecting the then future
events of American financeering. Upon the adoption of the new system
of government they assumed all the properties of a rising credit, and
became an immense active capital for commerce.” James Sullivan, _An
Inquiry into the Origin and Use of Money_ (1792). Duane Pamphlets,
Library of Congress.

Footnote 58:

Tench Coxe, _A View of the United States of America_ (1795), p. 360.
Tucker, _Progress of the United States_ (1843), p. 205.

Footnote 59:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 114.

Footnote 60:

_Ibid._, Vol. II, p. 119.

Footnote 61:

_Ibid._, Vol. III, p. 43.

Footnote 62:

“A large majority of the officers of the army of the Revolution were
in favor of the new Constitution. The Cincinnati were mostly among its
warmest advocates; and as they were organized and were, many of them,
of exalted private and public worth and could act in concert through
all the states, their influence was foreseen and feared by its
opponents.” Blair, _The Virginia Convention of 1788_, Vol. I, p. 36,
note 41.

Footnote 63:

_American Museum_, Vol. I, p. 313. Other signers were C. Pettit, J.
Ross, I. Hazlehurst, M. Lewis, T. Coxe, R. Wells, J. M. Nesbit, J.
Nixon, J. Wilcocks, S. Howell, and C. Biddle.

Footnote 64:

_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 9.

Footnote 65:

_American State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, pp. 5 ff.

Footnote 66:

Carey, _American Museum_, Vol. IV, p. 348. See also Winsor, _Memorial
History of Boston_, Vol. IV, p. 77.

Footnote 67:

For illustrative evidence that the protection of manufactures and
shipping was being widely agitated previous to the adoption of the
Constitution, and that an extensive consciousness of identity of
interest was being developed among the individuals concerned, see the
articles in _The American Museum_, Vol. I, on American Manufactures;
Winsor, _Memorial History of Boston_, Vol. IV, Chap. III. See
memorials in _The American Museum_, from Philadelphia mercantile
interests (April 6, 1785), Vol. I, p. 313; from Boston merchants,
_ibid._, Vol. I, p. 320. For the merchants’ movement in New York, see
the Magazine of American History, April, 1893, pp. 324 ff.

Footnote 68:

Vol. I, p. 117.

Footnote 69:

M. Carey, _The American Museum_, for January, 1787, Vol. I, pp. 5 ff.

Footnote 70:

The Historical Magazine (1871), Vol. IX, Second Series, pp. 157 ff.

Footnote 71:

For an interesting and novel view of the state of commerce under the
Articles of Confederation, see Channing, _History of the United
States_, Vol. III, pp. 422 ff.

Footnote 72:

Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 62. American Historical
Association Papers for 1891. See also the lists printed in A. M. Dyer,
_First Ownership of Ohio Lands_ (1911).

Footnote 73:

_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 678.

Footnote 74:

But see Madison’s view as to the chief reason for calling the
Convention, below, p. 178.

Footnote 75:

A study of the newspapers of the period shows a large number of
prominent advocates of the Constitution among the merchants and
brokers advertising in the Federalist press.

Footnote 76:

Bancroft, _op. cit._, Book I, Chaps. II-VII; Fiske, _Critical Period_;
Marshall, _Life of Washington_ (1850 ed.), Vol. II, pp. 75 ff.

Footnote 77:

The Connecticut Courant, September 10, 1787.

Footnote 78:

Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 29.

Footnote 79:

See below, p. 109.

Footnote 80:

Elliot’s _Debates_, Vol. I, p. 95. See below, Chaps. V and VII.

Footnote 81:

Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 190.

Footnote 82:

See below, p. 263.

Footnote 83:

See above, p. 46 _n._

Footnote 84:

Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 48.

Footnote 85:

Ms. Library of Congress: _Papers of the Continental Congress_
(Memorials), No. 41, Vol. VI, p. 283. Simpson, _Eminent
Philadelphians_.

Footnote 86:

_Ibid._, No. 42, Vol. VI, p. 254.

Footnote 87:

_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 20.

Footnote 88:

_Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p. 30.

Footnote 89:

_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 83.

Footnote 90:

_Ibid._, Vol. IV, p. 88.

Footnote 91:

_Division and Reunion_, p. 12.

Footnote 92:

James Monroe to James Madison. New York, September 3, 1786. “I
consider the convention of Annapolis as a most important æra in our
affairs—the eastern men be assur’d mean it as leading further than the
object originally comprehended. If they do not obtain that things
shall be arranged to suit them in every respect, their intrigues will
extend to the objects I have suggested above—Pennsylvania is their
object—upon succeeding or failing with her they will gain or lose
confidence—I doubt not the emissaries of foreign countries will be on
the ground.” _Documentary History of the Constitution_, Vol. IV, p.
25.

Footnote 93:

_Political Science and Constitutional Law_, Vol. I, p. 103.

Footnote 94:

_Writings of James Madison_ (1865), Vol. I, p. 246.

Footnote 95:

On the suffrage and elections in general in the eighteenth century,
see the state constitutions in the well-known collections of Poore and
Thorpe; A. E. McKinley, _The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen
English Colonies_; Paullin’s “The First Elections under the
Constitution,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics, Vol. II; Jameson,
“Did the Fathers Vote,” New England Magazine, January, 1890; Thorpe,
_Constitutional History of the American People_; S. H. Miller, “Legal
Qualifications for Office,” _American Historical Association Report_
(1899), Vol. I; F. A. Cleveland, _Growth of Democracy_; C. F. Bishop,
_History of Elections in the American Colonies_; see below, Chap. IX.

Footnote 96:

The data on the constitutions here given are taken from Thorpe’s
collection, _Charters, Constitutions_, etc.

Footnote 97:

Senators were apportioned among the respective districts on the basis
of public taxes paid by the said districts.

Footnote 98:

_The Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies_, p. 414.

Footnote 99:

_Greene’s Register for the State of Connecticut_, for the Year 1786,
p. 4.

Footnote 100:

Magazine of American History, April, 1893, p. 311.

Footnote 101:

See below, p. 241.

Footnote 102:

New York Journal, June 5, 1788.

Footnote 103:

_Ibid._

Footnote 104:

McKinley, _The Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies_, p. 270.

Footnote 105:

Tench Coxe fixes the number of “taxables” in Pennsylvania at 39,765 in
1770 and 91,177 in 1793. _A View of the United States_, p. 413.

Footnote 106:

Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia_, p. 29, note 11; for details see
McKinley, _op. cit._, pp. 40 ff.

Footnote 107:

Schaper, “Sectionalism in South Carolina,” _American Historical
Association Report_ (1900), Vol. I, p. 368.

Footnote 108:

_Statutes at Large_ (S.C.), Vol. IV, p. 99.

Footnote 109:

See below, p. 242.

Footnote 110:

_Ibid._, p. 167.

Footnote 111:

Some of the states selected delegates before Congress issued the call.
Bancroft, _op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 269 ff.

Footnote 112:

Herring, _National Portrait Gallery_, Vol. IV.

Footnote 113:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledger B, Assumed
Debt_, folio 135; _ibid._, _Ledger C_, folio 135; _ibid._, _Ledger A_,
folio 136.

Footnote 114:

_Ibid._, _Ledger E, Treasury_, Vol. 44, folio 46; _Ledger C,
Treasury_, 6 per cents, Vol. 42, folio 55; and Treasury Ledgers,
_passim_. Consult Index.

Footnote 115:

It is here assumed that when a member of the Convention appears upon
the funding books of the new government he was a public creditor at
the time of the Convention. Of course, it is possible that some of the
members who are recorded as security holders possessed no paper when
they went to Philadelphia, but purchased it afterward for speculation.
But it is hardly to be supposed that many of them would sink to the
level of mere speculators. There is plenty of evidence for the
statement that many of the members did possess public paper _before_
the meeting of the Convention, but the incompleteness of the old
records prevents the fixing of the exact number. Those members who
purchased after the Convention for speculation must have had idle
capital seeking investment.

Footnote 116:

_Papers of the Delaware Historical Society_, No. XXIX (1900).

Footnote 117:

_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. XI, p. 530.

Footnote 118:

_History of the Bank of North America_, p. 68.

Footnote 119:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury_, Vol. 44, folio 26; and
_ibid._, _Ledger C, Treasury_, 6 per cents, Vol. 42, folio 33.

Footnote 120:

_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. XI, p. 530.

Footnote 121:

Delaware Mss., _Tax Lists_; Library of Congress. This was probably the
father of the member of the Convention.

Footnote 122:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, Delaware_, 1777–1784, see under
date, May, 1779.

Footnote 123:

_Journal C_; _Register of Certificates_ (1777); and _Ledger C_.

Footnote 124:

_Biographia Americana_, p. 48.

Footnote 125:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 95.

Footnote 126:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office (Va.) Register of
Subscriptions_, 1791, see date March 8, 1791.

Footnote 127:

_Ibid._, _Register of Certificates of Public Debt Presented_.

Footnote 128:

_Ibid._, _Virginia Loan Office, 1791_, under date September 30, 1791.

Footnote 129:

_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. VII, p. 206.

Footnote 130:

Haskins, _The Yazoo Companies_, p. 83.

Footnote 131:

_Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. VII, p. 206.

Footnote 132:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, N. C., 1791–1797_, folio 75.

Footnote 133:

_The Brearley Family Genealogy_ (Library of Congress).

Footnote 134:

_Biographia Americana_, p. 49.

Footnote 135:

L. Elmer, _Constitution and Government of New Jersey_, p. 274.

Footnote 136:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Register—Loan Office, N.J._, under date,
Feb. 1779.

Footnote 137:

_Ibid._, _Loan Office, N. J., Ledger_ C/2, folio 38.

Footnote 138:

_Brearley Family Genealogy_ (L. C.).

Footnote 139:

See records in Treasury for N. J. Loan Office, _passim_; also _Family
Genealogy_.

Footnote 140:

_Genealogy._

Footnote 141:

W. W. Campbell, _Life and Character of Jacob Broom_, Papers of the
Historical Society of Delaware, Vol. LI, pp. 10, 26.

Footnote 142:

_History of the Insurance Company of North America_, p. 138.

Footnote 143:

Campbell, _op. cit._, p. 26.

Footnote 144:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E, Treasury_, 3%, Vol. 44, folio 67;
also _ibid._, _Ledger C, Treasury_, 6%, Vol. 42, folio 67.

Footnote 145:

_Calendar Madison Correspondence_, under Broom.

Footnote 146:

_National Encyclopædia of Biography_, Vol. II, p. 162.

Footnote 147:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 97.

Footnote 148:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, S. C., 1791–1797_, folio 128.
The entry in the ledger notes the residence of Sarah Butler as
Charleston; there was another Sarah Butler in South Carolina at the
time, but according to the first Census she did not reside in that
city. For the evidence that Sarah Butler was the daughter of Pierce
Butler, see Salley, _South Carolina Marriages_, p. 108, for the record
of her marriage.

Footnote 149:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 93.

Footnote 150:

Madison Ms: Letter to James Madison, October 28, 1787. Library of
Congress.

Footnote 151:

_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 6.

Footnote 152:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Loan Office, Maryland, 1790–1797_, folio 98;
_Loan Office_, Penna., 1790–1791, folio 94; _Ledger C, 3% Stock_
(_Pa._), folio 54. _Alphabet to Dividend Book of Domestic Debt,
Maryland_, under “C” (book not found). Charles Carroll was also a
holder of securities. Ms. Treasury Department: _Maryland Loan Office,
1790–1797_, folios 157 and 226 for over $5000 worth of sixes and
threes.

Footnote 153:

Scharf, _History of Western Maryland_, Vol. I, p. 679; H. Crew,
_History of Washington_, p. 108.

Footnote 154:

_Magazine of American History_, Vol. V, p. 196.

Footnote 155:

Sanderson, _Biography of the Signers_ (1831 ed.), Vol. III, p. 147.

Footnote 156:

Sanderson, _ibid._, p. 150.

Footnote 157:

Simpson, _Lives of Eminent Philadelphians_ (1859 ed.), p. 693.

Footnote 158:

Sanderson, _ibid._, p. 147.

Footnote 159:

McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
705.

Footnote 160:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger C_, 3% Stock, _Pa._, folio 231; see
also _Ledger E, Treasury_, 3%, Vol. 44, folio 170; and _Ledger C,
Treasury_, 6%, Vol. 42, folio 114. The existence of this latter small
account in sixes in 1797 is the basis for the surmise above that
Clymer held also his quota of sixes. With his business acumen he might
very well have disposed of most of this stock after “taking the rise”
in 1787–1792, for he could have made more money in business than from
the interest which the government paid.

Footnote 161:

Peele, _Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians_, p. 59.

Footnote 162:

_Ibid._, p. 69.

Footnote 163:

_Ibid._, p. 69.

Footnote 164:

_Ibid._, p. 80.

Footnote 165:

_Ibid._, p. 78.

Footnote 166:

_State Papers: Public Lands_, Vol. I, pp. 104–106.

Footnote 167:

_Ibid._, p. 129.

Footnote 168:

_Ibid._, p. 118.

Footnote 169:

John Wood, _Suppressed History of the Administration of John Adams_,
pp. 149 ff.

Footnote 170:

Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Loan Office, 1791_, folio 130.

Footnote 171:

_Ibid._, _N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio 208.

Footnote 172:

_Ibid._, _Ledger B, New York Office, Deferred 6% Stock, 1790_, folio
55.

Footnote 173:

J. Wood, _Suppressed History of the Administration of John Adams_
(1846 ed.), p. 145.

Footnote 174:

Stillé, _Life and Times of John Dickinson_, p. 14.

Footnote 175:

_Ibid._, p. 35.

Footnote 176:

_Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 747.

Footnote 177:

Stillé, p. 331.

Footnote 178:

_Ibid._, p. 327.

Footnote 179:

The Index in the Treasury Department gives the name of John Dickinson
among the security holders, but the volume referred to was not found.

Footnote 180:

Morris Ms. in the Library of Congress, _Private Letter Book_, Vol.
III, p. 160.

Footnote 181:

G. Brown, _The Life of Oliver Ellsworth_, p. 11.

Footnote 182:

Brown, _ibid._, p. 23.

Footnote 183:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledgers A, B, and
C_, folio 21 in each volume.

Footnote 184:

Consult same volumes through the Index.

Footnote 185:

Facts here are taken from his _Autobiography_, in the Magazine of
American History, Vol. VII, pp. 343 ff.

Footnote 186:

Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 81.

Footnote 187:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Register of Certificates of Public Debt
Presented to the Auditor of the Treasury_.

Footnote 188:

Volume 31, folio 346.

Footnote 189:

McMaster and Stone, _Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution_, p.
706.

Footnote 190:

Simpson, _Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 373.

Footnote 191:

McMaster and Stone, _op. cit._, p. 707.

Footnote 192:

Simpson, _op. cit._, 373.

Footnote 193:

Sumner, _The Financier and the Finances of the Revolution_, Vol. II,
p. 294.

Footnote 194:

Maclay, _Journal_ (1890 ed.), p. 178.

Footnote 195:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Register of Certificates of Public Debt
Presented to the Auditor of the Treasury_.

Footnote 196:

_Ibid._, See _Ledger E, Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 44, folio 335. Also
_Ledger C, Treasury, 6%_, Vol. 42, folio 300 for small entries.

Footnote 197:

Morris Mss. in the Library of Congress: _Private Letter Book_, Vol. I,
p. 529. Marshall (a brother of John Marshall) was the confidential and
trusted agent of Morris in large transactions in land.

Footnote 198:

Bigelow, _Life of Franklin_, Vol. III, p. 470.

Footnote 199:

Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_, p. 62.

Footnote 200:

Bigelow, _Works_, Vol. X, pp. 206 ff.

Footnote 201:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 232.

Footnote 202:

Consult the Loan Office Records of New Hampshire in the Treasury
Department, _passim_.

Footnote 203:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger C, Treasury, 6%_, Vol. 42, folio 368.

Footnote 204:

State Papers: _Public Lands_, Vol. I, p. 118.

Footnote 205:

Hammond, _State Papers of New Hampshire_, Vol. XVIII, p. 790.

Footnote 206:

Sanderson, _Lives of the Signers_ (1831 ed.), Vol. I, p. 197; Austin,
_Life of Gerry_.

Footnote 207:

Sanderson, _Biography of the Signers_, Vol. I, p. 230.

Footnote 208:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. II, p. 356.

Footnote 209:

_Ibid._, 413.

Footnote 210:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Mass. Loan Office, Register of Certificates
of Interest Issued_ (Vellum bound), folios 15 ff.

Footnote 211:

_Ibid._, _Mass. Loan Office, Certificates for Liquidated Debt_, folios
3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. This paper had evidently been bought by Gerry for
speculation.

Footnote 212:

_Ibid._, _Loan Office, Pa., 1790–1791_, folio 60.

Footnote 213:

_Ibid._, _Ledger C, 3% Stocks, Pa._, folio 37.

Footnote 214:

_Ibid._, _Massachusetts Loan Office, 1791_, Item 582; this was also
paper bought up by Gerry for speculation.

Footnote 215:

Gerry was accused by Ellsworth (_q.v._) of having turned against the
new Constitution because the Convention refused to put the old
continental paper money on the same basis as other securities. Toward
the close of the Convention, “Gerry,” says Ellsworth, “introduced a
motion respecting the redemption of the old continental money—that it
should be placed on a footing with other liquidated securities of the
United States. As Mr. Gerry was supposed to be possessed of large
quantities of this species of paper, his motion appeared to be founded
in such bare-faced selfishness and injustice, that it at once
accounted for all his former plausibility and concession, while the
rejection of it by the convention inspired its author with the utmost
rage and intemperate opposition to the whole system he had formerly
praised.” Ford, _Essays on the Constitution_, p. 174. Gerry
indignantly denied that he ever made such a motion in the Convention,
or that he held much continental money. _Ibid._, p. 127. It does not
appear in Farrand, _Records_, that any such motion was made in the
Convention; and under the circumstances it seems not unjust to remark
that Ellsworth’s charges were made with very bad grace, particularly
in view of the fact that he and members of his family and intimate
friends held considerable amounts of public securities. “Bare-faced
selfishness” was not monopolized by Gerry in the Convention.

Footnote 216:

See above, p. 49.

Footnote 217:

King, _Life and Correspondence_, Vol. I, p. 72.

Footnote 218:

A. M. Dyer, _The Ownership of Ohio Lands_, p. 68.

Footnote 219:

Sumner, _The Financier and the Finances of the Revolution_, Vol. II,
pp. 253 ff. See Turner, _Pioneer History of the Holland Purchase of
Western New York_, pp. 326 ff.

Footnote 220:

T. Wyman, _Genealogies and Estates of Charlestown_, Vol. I, p. 424.

Footnote 221:

To be found in the Hamilton Mss., Library of Congress.

Footnote 222:

Haskins, _The Yazoo Land Companies_.

Footnote 223:

_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 8.

Footnote 224:

Hamilton, _Works_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VI, p. 453.

Footnote 225:

_Ibid._, Vol. VI, p. 454; _Annals of Congress_, Vol. III, pp. 900 ff.

Footnote 226:

See below, p. 112.

Footnote 227:

Mr. Lodge calls the three investigators “inquisitors,” but this seems
like a strong word to apply to members of Congress engaged in running
down rumors relative to the official conduct of a government officer.
_Works_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VI, p. 450 note. The impropriety of Monroe’s
action in allowing the story to escape is another matter.

Footnote 228:

The pamphlet by Hamilton in his defence is printed in the Lodge
edition, Vol. VI, pp. 449 ff.

Footnote 229:

Compare the date of the receipts on page 20 of Mr. Fox’s _A Study in
Hamilton_ with the date in the pamphlet (Lodge ed.), Vol. VI, p. 494.

Footnote 230:

_Works of Hamilton_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VIII, p. 268. Perhaps the
remnant of an old account of Hamilton on the Treasury Books in 1797
refers to this petty holding. Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger E,
Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 44, folio 434.

Footnote 231:

J. A. Hamilton, _Reminiscences_, p. 18.

Footnote 232:

W. Maclay, _Journal_ (1890 ed.), p. 188.

Footnote 233:

_State Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 188.

Footnote 234:

_Reminiscences of J. A. Hamilton_, p. 18.

Footnote 235:

Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Loan Office, 1791_, folio 24. See also
the volume of _N. Y. Loan Office Receipts_ in the Mss. Division of the
Library of Congress for General Schuyler’s receipts for interest on
securities. The intimate correspondence between Hamilton and General
Schuyler during the period of the formation of the Constitution was
destroyed by a son of one of the latter’s executors. American
Historical Review, Vol. X, p. 181. See Tuckerman, _Life of General
Schuyler_.

Footnote 236:

Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio
325.

Footnote 237:

PHILADELPHIA, Feby. 24^{th}, 1790.

[ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Esq.,
Secretary of the Treasury at New York.]
SIR:

I have had this day the honor of yours inclosing your power of
substitution on behalf of Mr. Church. At present the sale of stock,
and indeed every other money transaction is nearly at a stand. The
produce of the State and the sale of Bills of Exchange will alone
command it, untill we receive a supply from sea.

Mr. Constable has informed me of the purchase he had made of 20 shares
and when they appear the transfer will be compleated.

I observe what you say respecting the sale of what remains of Mr.
Church’s shares and shall do whatever may be in my power to dispose of
them, whenever I receive the certificates and your orders to make the
sale. I am, Sir, with great respect,

Y^r Obed^t Serv^t
THOS. WILLING.

_Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XXIII, p. 1.

Footnote 238:

Library of Congress: _Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XX, p. 180.

Footnote 239:

_Ibid._, Vol. XX, pp. 182 ff. Lodge omits references to this
correspondence on Seton’s part, although he gives selected letters
from Hamilton to Seton. _Works of Alexander Hamilton_, Vol. VIII, pp.
231 ff.

Footnote 240:

Library of Congress: _Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XXIII, p. 180.

Footnote 241:

A. M. Dyer, _The Ownership of Ohio Lands_, p. 69.

Footnote 242:

Mss. Library of Congress: _Treasury Department, 1790–1792_ (Washington
papers), folio 291.

Footnote 243:

P. 108.

Footnote 244:

_Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, Vol. I, p. 402.

Footnote 245:

Library of Congress, _Hamilton Mss._, Vol. XVI, p. 126. The editor of
King’s letters says this letter is lost.

Footnote 246:

Hamilton’s _Works_ (Lodge ed.), Vol. VIII, p. 234.

Footnote 247:

_Ibid._, Vol. VIII, p. 240, date March 14, 1792.

Footnote 248:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger B, N. Y. Office, 1790, Deferred 6%
Stock_, folio 260; also _N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio
144.

Footnote 249:

T. A. Glenn, _William Churchill Houston_, pp. 71–72 (Privately
printed), copy in Library of Congress.

Footnote 250:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 97.

Footnote 251:

Simpson, _Eminent Philadelphians_, p. 596.

Footnote 252:

His private fortune was much impaired by the failure of Robert Morris,
for whom he had pledged his faith in several transactions. Morris
Mss., Library of Congress: _Private Letter Book_, Vol. II, pp. 193,
261, 327, 351, 414.

Footnote 253:

H. Binney, _Leaders of the Old Philadelphia Bar_, p. 83; _State
Papers: Finance_, Vol. I, p. 81.

Footnote 254:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 93.

Footnote 255:

_Census of 1790: Heads of Families_, p. 51; consult Index.

Footnote 256:

Appleton, _Encyclopædia of American Biography_, Vol. III, p. 426.

Footnote 257:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Maryland Loan Office, 1790–1797_, folio 14.

Footnote 258:

_Ibid._, folio 134.

Footnote 259:

Beardsley, _Life and Times of William Samuel Johnson_, pp. 8–9.

Footnote 260:

_Writings of Jefferson_ (Ford ed.), Vol. I, p. 223.

Footnote 261:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Ledger B, New York Office, Deferred 6%,
1790_, folios 10, 152, 457.

Footnote 262:

Folios 152 and 457 of above _Ledger B_.

Footnote 263:

Ms. Treasury Department: _Connecticut Loan Office, Ledger A_, folio
15; _Ledger B_, folio 15; _Ledger C_, folio 15. _Connecticut Loan
Office Receipts_, Library of Congress, Mss. Division.

Footnote 264:

_Ibid._, _New York Loan Office, 6% Ledger, 1791–1797_, folio 161;
_ibid._, _New York Office, Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio 107—two
entries of about $25,000 each. _Ledger B, New York Office, Deferred 6%
Stock, 1790_, folios, 152, 457. _Ledger E, Treasury, 3%_, Vol. 44,
folio 529. There can be no question of the identity of the Robert
Charles Johnson who appears on the public security records and the
Robert Charles Johnson who was the son of William Samuel. The cross
entries between father and son in the records constitute one piece of
evidence. The residence of Robert Charles in Stratford presents
another, for that was the family place. Furthermore, the signature to
the Loan Office Receipts is the signature of Robert Charles, son of
William Samuel Johnson.

Footnote 265:

Rufus King, _Life and Correspondence_, Vol. I, 132.

Footnote 266:

_Life and Correspondence of King_, Vol. I, p. 624.

Footnote 267:

_Writings_ (Ford ed.), Vol. I, p. 223. Maclay makes some quite
uncomplimentary remarks about King, _Journal_, p. 315.

Footnote 268:

Dunlap’s Daily Advertiser, October 23, 1791.

Footnote 269:

Ms. Treasury Department: _N. Y. Office, 6%, Ledger, 1791–1799_, folio
14. _Ibid._, _Ledger B, N. Y. Office, Deferred 6%, 1790_, folio 60;
_ibid._, _Deferred 6%, 1790–1796_, folio 14. The Treasury Index gives
a number of references to volumes not found.

Footnote 270:

See above, p. 112.

Footnote 271:

C. W. Brewster, _Rambles about Old Portsmouth_ (1859), pp. 360–361.

Footnote 272:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 233.

Footnote 273:

Batchellor, _New Hampshire State Papers_, Vol. XXI, p. 804 note.

Footnote 274:

_Ibid._, Vol. XX, p. 868.

Footnote 275:

Batchellor, _New Hampshire State Papers_, Vol. XX, p. 872.

Footnote 276:

_Journal of William Maclay_ (1890 ed.), p. 178.

Footnote 277:

Ms. Treasury Department: See _Loan Office Certificate Book_, New
Hampshire (Loan of 1777 _passim_).

Footnote 278:

_Ibid._, _New Hampshire Loan Office, Journal A_, folio 4, date March,
1791, and _passim_.

Footnote 279:

Hammond, _State Papers of New Hampshire_, Vol. XVIII, p. 824.

Footnote 280:

Farrand, _Records_, Vol. III, p. 90.

Footnote 281:

Ms. Treasury Department: _New York Loan Office, 1791_, folio 97.

Footnote 282:

Johannis, Garrit, Abraham, John J., Henry R., and other Lansings
appear on _Ledger C, Funded 6%, 1790_, Ms. Treasury Department.
Consult Index.

Footnote 283:

L. Elmer, _The Constitution and Government of New Jersey_ (1872), pp.
57–59.

Footnote 284:

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An economic interpretation of the Constitution of the United StatesChapter XI: The Economic Conflict Over Ratification as Viewed by Contemporaries (2)

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