Chapter IV: The Russian Forces and Approaches

A mere glance at the ponderous military machine with which Russia enforces law and order within her vast domain, and by which she preserves and extends her power, is all that we can give here.

No army in the world has probably undergone, within the last thirty years, such a succession of extensive alterations in organization, in administrative arrangements, and in tactical regulations, as that of Russia. The Crimean War surprised it during a period of transition. Further changes of importance were carried out after that war. Once more, in 1874, the whole military system was remodelled, while ever since the Peace of San Stefano, radical reforms have been in progress, and have been prosecuted with such feverish haste, that it is difficult for the observer to keep pace with them. [Footnote: Sir L. Graham (_Journal Royal U. S. Institution_).]

The military system of Russia is based upon the principles of universal liability to serve and of territorial distribution. This applies to the entire male population, with certain exemptions or modifications on the ground, respectively, of age or education. Annually there is a "lot-drawing," in which all over twenty, who have not already drawn lots, must take part. Those who draw blanks are excused from service with the colors, but go into the last reserve, or "Opoltschenie."

The ordinary term of service is fifteen years,--six with the colors and nine with the reserves; a reduction is made for men serving at remote Asiatic posts; the War Office may send soldiers into the reserve before the end of their terms. Reduction is also made, from eleven to thirteen years and a half, for various degrees of educational acquirement. Exemptions are also made for family reasons and on account of peculiar occupation or profession. Individuals who personally manage their estates or direct their own commercial affairs (with the exception of venders of strong liquors) may have their entry into service postponed two years. Men are permitted to volunteer at seventeen (with consent of parents or guardians); all volunteers serve nine years in the reserve; those joining the Guards or cavalry must maintain themselves at their own expense. The total contingent demanded for army and navy in 1880 was 235,000, and 231,961 were enrolled; of this deficit of 3,039, the greater number, 3,000, were Jews.

_Organization_.--The Emperor is the Commander-in-Chief, who issues orders through the War Ministry, whose head is responsible for the general efficiency of the Army. There is also the "Imperial Head-quarters," under a general officer who, in the absence of the War Minister, takes the Emperor's orders and sees to their execution. The War Council, presided over by the War Minister, supervises all financial matters in connection with the army. There are also a High Court of Appeals, and the Head-quarters Staff, who supervise the execution of all military duties. Commissariat, artillery, engineer, medical, military education, Cossack, and judge-advocate departments complete the list of bureaus.

The military forces are arranged into nineteen army corps: five comprise three divisions of infantry; one, two divisions of cavalry; the remainder, two divisions of cavalry and one of infantry; with a due proportion of light artillery and engineers the war strength of an army corps is 42,303 combatants, 10,755 horses, and 108 guns.

When war is declared an army is formed of two or more corps. The general commanding exercises supreme control, civil and military, if the force enters the enemy's country. His staff are detailed much as usual at an American army head-quarters in the field.

There are in the active army--_Infantry_: 768 battalions (192 regiments, 48 divisions), 54 batt. riflemen. _Cavalry_: 56 regular regiments (4 cuirassiers, 2 uhlans, 2 hussars, 48 dragoons); 29 regt. Cossacks, divided into 20 divisions, kept in time of peace at 768 men (864 with sub-officers) per regiment. _Artillery_: 51 brigades, or 303 batteries of 8 guns each; 30 horse-batteries of 6 guns each; besides 14 batteries with Cossack divisions. Fifty "parks" and 20 sections of "parks" supply each infantry brigade and cavalry division with cartridges.

THE LAND FORCES OF RUSSIA. [Footnote: Approximately from latest (1884-85) returns. (Combatants only.)]

EUROPE.
Field Troops
PEACE.
Engineers. 21,335
Cavalry. 52,902
Infantry. 49,581
Artillery. 323,701
Total. 447,519
Horses. 71,565
Guns. 1,188
WAR.
Total. 821,243
Horses. 155,149
Guns. 2,172

Reserve, Fortress, and Depot Troops
PEACE.
Engineers. -
Cavalry. 10,504
Infantry. 23,704
Artillery. 54,995
Total. 89,203
Horses. 8,703
Guns. 144
WAR.
Total. 891,404
Horses. 109,822
Guns. 1,236

CAUCASUS.
Field Troops
PEACE.
Engineers. 1,548
Cavalry. 12,364
Infantry. 8,442
Artillery. 59,254
Total. 81,608
Horses. 15,927
Guns. 198
WAR.
Total. 150,313
Horses. 31,700
Guns. 366

Reserve Fortress Troops
PEACE.
Engineers. -
Cavalry. 5,480
Infantry. 2,860
Artillery. 2,270
Total. 10,610
Horses. 6,137
Guns. 8
WAR.
Total. 51,776
Horses. 36,862
Guns. 12

TURKESTAN.
PEACE.
Engineers. 496
Cavalry. 6,744
Infantry. 2,468
Artillery. 12,522
Total. 22,230
Horses. 8,246
Guns. 48
WAR.
Total. 34,125
Horses. 12,780
Guns. 76

SIBERIA.
PEACE.
Engineers. 244
Cavalry. 2,606
Infantry. 1,273
Artillery. 7,752
Total. 11,875
Horses. 3,412
Guns. 24
WAR.
Total. 29,779
Horses. 14,745
Guns. 58

_Grand Aggregate of the Empire_.
PEACE.
Engineers. 23,623
Cavalry. 90,600
Infantry. 83,328
Artillery. 460,494
Total. 663,045
Horses. 113,990
Guns. 1,610
WAR.
Total. 1,978,640
Horses. 367,089
Guns. 3,920

During 1884 the engineer corps was reorganized. Henceforward the peace establishment will consist of seventeen battalions of sappers; eight battalions of pontoniers; sixteen field-telegraph companies, each of which is mounted, so as to maintain telegraphic communication for forty miles, and have two stations; six engineering parks or trains, each ten sections, carrying each sufficient tools and material for an infantry division; four battalions of military railway engineers; four mine companies; two siege trains, and one telegraph instruction company. The whole is divided into six brigades, and provisions are taken for training recruits and supplying the losses during war. The fortress troops, for the defence of fortresses, consist of forty-three battalions of twelve hundred men each in time of war, and nine companies of three hundred men each. The depot troops, for garrison service, consist of thirteen battalions and three hundred detachments.

The reserve troops supply 204 battalions of infantry, 56 squadrons of cavalry, 57 batteries of artillery, and 34 companies of sappers. If mobilized, they are intended to supply 544 battalions, 56 squadrons, 144 batteries, and 34 companies of engineers. The second reserve, or "Zapas," consists of "cadres" for instruction, organized in time of war.

The training of the Russian infantry comprises that of skirmishing as of most importance; the whistle is used to call attention; the touch is looser in the ranks than formerly; squares to resist cavalry are no longer used; [Footnote: A British officer, who has had good opportunities, says the infantry drill is second to none.] the Berdan breech-loader is the infantry arm; sergeant-majors wear officers' swords, and together with musicians carry revolvers.

A great stimulus has been given to rifle practice in the Russian army, with fair results, but complaint is made of want of good instructors. The dress and equipment of the infantry is noted for an absence of ornament, and hooks are substituted for buttons. Every thing has been made subordinate to comfort and convenience. Woollen or linen bandages are worn instead of socks. The entire outfit of the soldier weighs about fifty pounds. The Guards, alone, are yet permitted to wear their old uniform with buttons. The arms of the Turkestan troops are mixed Berdan and Bogdan rifles. The field clothing is generally linen blouse with cloth shoulder-straps, chamois-leather trousers, dyed red, and a white kepi. Officers wear the same trousers in the field. Cossacks wear gray shirts of camel's hair.

The artillery is divided into field artillery and horse artillery, of which the strength is given elsewhere. The horse batteries have the steel four-pound gun.

Col. Lumley, of the British army, says: "In Russia it is believed that the field artillery is equal to that of any other Power, and the horse artillery superior." Lieut. Grierson, R.A., from his personal observation, confirms this opinion.

It is not too much to say that, in any European conflict in the near future, the Russian cavalry will be conspicuous and extraordinarily effective. In a war with England, in Asia, the use of large bodies of cavalry, organized, instructed, and equipped after the American plan, must become the main feature.

From the wonderful reforms instituted by Russia in her huge army of horsemen, which have put her before all other nations, not excepting Germany, we may expect to hear of wonderful mobility, stunning blows at the enemy's depots, and the appropriation of choice positions under his nose: of stubborn contests with the Anglo-Indian infantry, the only weapon a Berdan carbine; of communications destroyed by high explosives: especially, of the laying waste smiling Afghan valleys, inexpedient to occupy:--these are a few of the surprises to which we may be treated if Russia gets the chance. In this manner she is doubtless prepared to take the initiative in her next war.

[Footnote: The bold operations of General Gourko in the Russo-Turkish war of 1878, afford the best illustration of the versatile qualities of the progressive military horseman since the American war, 1861-5. An Austrian officer says: "The Russian cavalry reconnoitred boldly and continuously, and gave proof of an initiative very remarkable. Every one knows that Russian dragoons are merely foot soldiers mounted, and only half horsemen: however, that it should come to such a point as making dragoons charge with the bayonet, such as took place July 16th near Twardista, seems strange. Cossacks and Hussars dismounted on the 30th, formed skirmishing lines, coming and going under the fire of infantry, protecting their battery, and conducting alone an infantry fight against the enemy. At Eski Zagra, July 31st, the dragoons did not leave the field until all their cartridges were exhausted. On the other hand, the _offensive_ action, and the spirit of enterprise and dash, which are the proper qualifications of cavalry, were not wanting in the Russians."]

The whole of the regular cavalry of the line has been converted into dragoons armed with Berdan rifle and bayonet; the Guard regiments must adopt the same change when ordered into the field, and the Cossacks have been deprived of the lance (excepting for the front rank); new musketry regulations have been prescribed. Great stress is now laid upon the training of both horses and men in the direction of long marches, and the passage of obstacles. Forced marches are also made to cover the greatest possible distances in the shortest possible time.

[Footnote: Among other experiments are noted that of 7 officers and 14 men of the Orenburg Cossacks who in November last in bad weather travelled 410 versts between Niji Novgorod and Moscow in 5 days--about 53 miles a day; then covering 685 versts from Moscow to St. Petersburg in 8 days--56 miles a day; on arrival an inspector reported horses fresh and ready for service; the party was mentioned in orders, and presented to the Czar. A month before, in snow and intense cold, 7 officers and 7 men of the cavalry school covered 370 versts in 4 days--60 miles a day. It is asserted that the best Russian cavalry can travel 70 miles a day, continuously, without injury. General Gourko recently inspected two sotnias of Don Cossacks who had cleared 340 versts in 3 days, or 74 miles a day.]

Swimming was practised in the Warsaw, Odessa, and Moscow districts, the horses being regularly taught with the aid of inflated bags tied under them. The Suprasl was crossed by the entire 4th Cavalry Division swimming. In order to acquire a thorough knowledge of pioneer duty, both the officers and non-commissioned officers of cavalry are attached to the engineer camp for a short course of instruction. In one division a regular pioneer squadron has been formed for telegraphic and heliographic duty. The mounted force, provided for in the Russian establishment, comprises twenty-one divisions of 3,503 sabres and 12 guns each, or an aggregate of 73,563 men and 252 field guns.

A feature of the Russian cavalry equipment is the pioneer outfit, consisting of tools for construction or destruction, as they desire to repair a bridge or destroy a railroad; this outfit for each squadron is carried on a pack-mule; dynamite is carried in a cart with the ammunition train.

The Cossack (except of the Caucasus) is armed with a long lance (front rank only), a sabre without guard, and a Berdan rifle. Those of the Caucasus have in addition pistol and dagger, besides a _nagaska_ or native whip. The uniform is blue, high boots, fur cap, cloak with cape. The snaffle-bit is universally used, even by the officers, although the average Russian troop-horse is noted for his hard mouth.

In the mounted drill of the Cossacks there is a charge as skirmishers (or "foragers") called the "lava," which is executed at a great pace and with wild yells of "Hourra!"

Lieut. Grierson, of the British army, writes that: "A big fine man mounted on a pony, with his body bent forward and looking very top-heavy, always at a gallop, and waving his enormous whip, the Cossack presents an almost ludicrous appearance to one accustomed to our stately troopers. But this feeling is dashed with regret that we possess no such soldiers."

_Transport and Supply_.--The Russian system of transport is in a very experimental and unsatisfactory state. It is the only army which provides regimentally for the _personnel_ and _materiel_ of this department. In each regiment is a non-combatant company, in which all men required for duty without arms are mustered.

All military vehicles required for the regiment are under charge of this company. The intention of the system now developing is to reduce the quantity of transportation required. [Footnote: In 1878 the head-quarters baggage of the Grand Duke Nicholas required five hundred vehicles and fifteen hundred horses to transport it.] Besides the wagons and carts used for ordinary movements of troops, Russia will, in Afghanistan, depend upon the animals of the country for pack-trains and saddle purposes. After the _Camel_, of which large numbers exist in the region bordering Afghanistan on the north, the most important aid to Russian military mobility is the remarkable _Kirghiz Horse_. The accounts of the strength, speed, endurance, and agility of this little animal are almost incredible, [Footnote: In 1869 a Russian detachment of five hundred men, mounted on Kirghiz horses, with one gun and two rocket-stands, traversed in one month one thousand miles in the Orenburg Steppe, and only lost three horses; half of this march was in deep sand. In October, M. Nogak (a Russian officer) left his detachment _en route_, and rode one horse into Irgiz, 166-2/3 miles in 34 hours.] but they are officially indorsed in many instances. He is found in Turkestan, and is more highly prized than any other breed. The Kirghiz horse is seldom more than fourteen hands, and, with the exception of its head, is fairly symmetrical; the legs are exceptionally fine, and the hoofs well formed and hard as iron. It is seldom shod, and with bare feet traverses the roughest country with the agility of a chamois, leaping across wide fissures on the rocks, climbing the steepest heights, or picking its way along mere sheep-tracks by the side of yawning precipices, or covering hundreds of versts through heavy sand, with a heavier rider, day after day. Its gaits are a rapid and graceful walk of five and one half to six miles an hour, and an amble [Footnote: Moving both feet on a side almost simultaneously.] at the maximum rate of a mile in two minutes. This animal crosses the most rapid streams not over three and one half feet deep, lined with slippery boulders, with ease. They are good weight carriers. [Footnote: The mounted messengers (pony express) over the steppes, use these horses, and carry with them, over stages of 350 miles in 8 days, an equipment and supplies for man and horse of nearly 300 pounds.] With a view of stimulating horse-breeding in Turkestan, the government in 1851 offered prizes for speed. [Footnote: The greatest speed recorded (1853.) was 13-1/2 miles (on a measured course) in 27 minutes and 30 seconds.] Kirghiz horses have been thoroughly tested in the Russian army. For modern cavalry and horse-artillery purposes they are unsurpassed. The average price is L6, but an ambler will bring L12. Great Britain is said to possess 2,800,000 horses, while Russia, in the Kirghiz steppes alone, possesses 4,000,000 saddle or quick-draught horses.

The supply of the Russian army is carefully arranged under the central Intendance. The ration in the field was, in 1878, 14.3 ounces of meat, 14.9 black bread, preserved vegetables and tea, with an issue of brandy in the winter. Immense trains follow each division, at intervals, forming consecutive mobile magazines of food. A division provision train can carry ten days' supply for 230,000 men.

Forage is now supplied for transport in compressed cakes, of which 20,000,000 were used by Russia in her last war. [Footnote: A compressed ration of forage was extensively used by the Russians in 1878, weighing 3-1/2 pounds; 5 days' supply could be carried on the saddle with ease.]

Clothing is furnished by the supply bureau of certain regions in which there are large government factories; it is usual to keep on hand for an emergency 500,000 sets of uniform clothing.

_Routes_.--Having devoted a share of our limited space to an account of the roads leading to Herat, from India, we may consider, briefly, certain approaches to Afghanistan or India from the northwest. This subject has been so clearly treated in a recent paper read before the Royal United Service Institution by Captain Holdich, R.E., who surveyed the region referred to, in 1880, that we quote liberally as follows:

In improving our very imperfect acquaintance, both with the
present military resources and position of Russia in Central
Asia, and of the difficulties presented both geographically and
by the national characteristics of the races that she would have
to encounter in an advance south of the Oxus, a good deal has
been already learned from the Afghans themselves. Among the
turbulent tribes dwelling in and around Kabul, whose chief and
keenest interest always lies in that which bears, more or less
directly, on their chances of success in mere faction fights,
which they seem to regard as the highest occupation in life, the
Russian factor in the general game must be a matter of constant
discussion. Thus it may possibly arise from their individual
interest in their national position that there is no better
natural geographer in the world than the Afghan of the Kabul
district. There is often an exactness about his method of
imparting information (sometimes a careful little map drawn out
with a pointed stick on the ground) which would strike one as
altogether extraordinary, but for the reflection that this one
accomplishment is probably the practical outcome of the
education of half a lifetime.

Russia's bases of military operations towards India are two: one
on the Caspian Sea at Krasnovodsk, and Chikishliar, with
outposts at Chat and Kizil Arvat; and the other on the line of
Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, and Margillan, which may roughly be
said to represent the frontier held (together with a large
extent of boundary south of Kuldja) by the Army of Tashkend,
under General Kaufmann. But between this latter line and the
Oxus, Russia is undoubtedly already the dominant Power. The mere
fact of Russia having already thoroughly explored all these
regions, gives her the key to their future disposal. There is no
doubt that in all matters relating to the acquirement of
geographical knowledge, where it bears on possible military
operations, Russian perceptions are of the keenest. Her
surveying energies appear to be always concentrated on that
which yet lies beyond her reach, rather than in the completion
of good maps to aid in the right government of that which has
already been acquired.

With what lies north of the Oxus we can have very little to say
or to do; therefore it matters the less that in reality we know
very little about it. The Oxus is not a fordable river. At Khoja
Saleh, which is the furthest point supposed to have been reached
by the Aral flotilla, it is about half a mile wide, with a slow
current. At Charjui it is about the same width, only rapid and
deep. At Karki it is said to be one thousand yards wide, and at
Kilif perhaps a quarter of a mile. But at all these places there
are ferries, and there would be ample means of crossing an army
corps, if we take into account both the Aral flotilla and the
native material, in the shape of large flat-bottomed boats,
capable of containing one hundred men each, used for ferrying
purposes, of which there are said to be three hundred between
Kilif and Hazarasp. These boats are drawn across the river by
horses swimming with ropes attached to their manes. But under
any circumstances it seems about as unlikely that any British
force would oppose the passage of a Russian army across the Oxus
as that it would interfere with the Russian occupation of the
trans-Oxus districts; but once south of the Oxus, many new
conditions of opposition would come into play, arising
principally from the very different national characteristics of
the southern races to those farther north. It would no longer be
a matter of pushing an advance through sandy and waterless
deserts, or over wild and rugged mountains, difficulties which
in themselves have never yet retarded the advance of a
determined general, but there would be the reception that any
Christian foe would almost certainly meet at the hands of a
warlike and powerful people, who can unite with all the cohesion
of religious fanaticism, backed up by something like military
organization and a perfect acquaintance with the strategical
conditions of their country. Most probably there would be no
serious local opposition to the occupation by Russia of a line
extending from Balkh eastwards through Khulm and Kunduz to
Faizabad and Sarhadd, all of which places can be reached without
great difficulty from the Oxus, and are connected by excellent
lateral road communications. But the occupation of such a line
could have but one possible object, which would be to conceal
the actual line of further advance. Each of these places may be
said to dominate a pass to India over the Hindoo Kush. Opposite
Sarhadd is the Baroghil, leading either to Kashmir or to Mastuj
and the Kunar valley. Faizabad commands the Nuksa Pass. Khulm
looks southwards to Ghozi and the Parwan Pass into Kohistan,
while from Balkh two main routes diverge, one to Bamian and
Kabul, the other to Maimana and Herat.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that this short list
disposes of all the practicable passes over the Hindoo Kush. The
range is a singularly well-defined one throughout its vast
length; but it is not by any means a range of startling peaks
and magnificent altitudes. It is rather a chain of very elevated
flattish-topped hills, spreading down in long spurs to the north
and south, abounding in warm sheltered valleys and smiling
corners, affording more or less pasture even in its highest
parts, and traversed by countless paths. Many of these paths are
followed by Kuchis in their annual migrations southward, with
their families and household goods piled up in picturesque heaps
on their hardy camels, or with large herds of sheep and goats,
in search of fresh pasturage. South of the Hindoo Kush we find
most of the eastern routes to our northwest frontier to converge
in one point, very near to Jelalabad. There are certain routes
existing between the Russian frontier and India which pass
altogether east of this point. There is one which can be
followed from Tashkend to Kashgar, and over the Karakoram range,
and another which runs by the Terek Pass to Sarhadd, and thence
over the Baroghil into Kashmir; but these routes have justly,
and by almost universal consent, been set aside as involving
difficulties of such obvious magnitude that it would be
unreasonable to suppose that any army under competent leadership
could be committed to them. The same might surely be said of the
route by the Nuksan Pass into the valley of Chitral and the
Kunar, which joins the Khyber route not far from Jelalabad. Its
length and intricacy alone, independently of the intractable
nature of the tribes which border it on either side, and of the
fact that the Nuksan Pass is only open for half the year, would
surely place it beyond the consideration of any general who
aspired to invade India after accomplishing the feat of carrying
an army through it. West of Kafirstan across the Hindoo Kush
are, as we have said, passes innumerable, but only three which
need be regarded as practicable for an advancing force, all the
others more or less converging into these three. These are the
Khak, the Kaoshan (or Parwan, also called Sar Alang), and the
Irak. The Khak leads from Kunduz _via_ Ghori and the valley of
the Indarab to the head of the Panjshir valley. Its elevation is
about thirteen thousand feet. It is described as an easy pass,
probably practicable for wheeled artillery. The Panjshiris are
Tajaks, and, like the Kohistanis generally, are most bigoted
Suniu Mohammedans. The rich and highly cultivated valley which
they inhabit forms a grand highway into Kohistan and Koh Dahman;
but all this land of terraced vineyards and orchards, watered by
snow-cold streams from the picturesque gorges and mountain
passes of the Hindoo Kush and Paghman mountains,--this very
garden of Afghanistan, stretching away southwards to the gates
of Kabul, is peopled by the same fierce and turbulent race who
have ever given the best fighting men to the armies of the
Amirs, and who have rendered the position of Kabul as the ruling
capital of Afghanistan a matter of necessity; with their
instincts of religious hostility, it will probably be found that
the Kohistani, rather than the Hindoo Kush, is the real barrier
between the north and the south. The Sar Alang or Parwan Pass
leads directly from Kunduz and Ghori to Charikar and Kabul. It
is the direct military route between Afghan Turkestan and the
seat of the Afghan Government, but is not much used for trade.
It cannot be much over eleven thousand feet elevation, and it is
known to be an easy pass, though somewhat destitute of fuel and
forage. The next route of importance is that which leads from
Balkh, _via_ Bamian, to the Irak Pass on the Hindoo Kush, and
into the upper watercourse of the Helmund River, and thence by
the Unai over the Paghman range to Kabul. This is the great
trade route from the markets of Turkestan and Central Asia
generally to Kabul and India. The Irak, like the Parwan, is not
nearly so high as has been generally assumed, while the Unai is
a notoriously easy pass. This route is at present very much
better known to the Russians, who have lately frequently
traversed it, than to ourselves. Like the Parwan and the Khak,
it is liable to be closed for three or four months of the year
by snow. During the winter of 1879-80 they were open till late
in December, and appear to be again free from snow about the
middle of April. Between these main passes innumerable tracks
follow the "durras," or lines of watercourse, over the ridges of
the Hindoo Kush and Paghman, which afford easy passage to men on
foot and frequently also to "Kuchi" camels. These passes (so far
as we can learn) could, any of them, be readily made available
for mountain artillery with a very small expenditure of
constructive labor and engineering skill. In Koh Dahman nearly
every village of importance lying at the foot of the eastern
slopes of the Paghman (such as Beratse, Farza, Istalif, etc.)
covers a practicable pass over the Paghman, which has its
continuation across the Shoreband valley and over the ridge of
the Hindoo Kush beyond it. But between the Khak Pass and the
Irak, the various routes across the Hindoo Kush, whether
regarded as routes to India or to Kandahar, although they by no
means converge on Kabul City, must necessarily pass within
striking distance of an army occupying Kabul. Such a force would
have, first of all, thoroughly to secure its communication with
the Oxus, and a strong position at Kabul itself.

Having the official statement of a military engineer with reference to the Oxus-Hindu-Kush line, as a barrier or base or curtain, we may pass to the principal approach to Herat from the northwest.

There are four distinct lines by which Russia could move on Herat:

I. From the _Caspian_ base a trans-Caucasian army corps could move (only with the concurrence and alliance of Persia) by the Mashed route direct;

II. Or it could move outside Persian territory, from _Chikishliar_ by the Bendessen Pass to Asterabad, and would then have to pass through Persian territory to Sarakhs, or across the desert to Merv;

III. From the _Tashkend-Bokhara_ base a route exists _via_ Charjui, the Oxus, direct to Merv; and there is

IV. Also the well-known road by _Balkh_ and Mamiana, direct to Herat.

Routes III. and IV. having just been discussed, let us look at Routes I. and II.

Referring to the small outline map of the trans-Caspian region, herewith, it will be seen that troops could embark from Odessa in the fleet of merchant steamers available, and, if not molested _en route_ by hostile cruisers, would reach Batum in from 2 to 3 days, thence by rail to Baku in 24 hours, another 24 hours through the Caspian Sea to Krasnovodsk, a transfer in lighters to the landing at Michaelovsk, and the final rail transportation to the present terminus of the track beyond Kizil Arvat; this, it is said, will soon reach Askabad, 310 miles from Herat. The Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society, Mr. Cust, with his wife, passed over this route in 1883, and testifies to the ease and comfort of the transit and to the great number of vessels engaged in the oil trade, which are available for military purposes, both on the Black and Caspian seas. He estimates that they could easily carry 8,000 men at a trip. [Footnote: Mr. Cust says: "There are three classes of steamers on the Caspian. 1, the Imperial war steamers with which Russia keeps down piracy; 2, the steamers of the Caucasus and Mercury Company, very numerous and large vessels; 3, petroleum vessels--each steamer with a capacity of 500 men."]

General Hamley [Footnote: Lecture before R. U. S. Institution (London), 1884.] says: "We may assume that if on the railway (single track) the very moderate number of 12 trains a day can run at the rate of 12 miles an hour, the journey would occupy 40 hours. The successive detachments would arrive, then, easily in two days at Sarakhs. A division may be conveyed, complete, in 36 trains. Thus, in six days a division would be assembled at Sarakhs ready to move on the advanced guard. An army corps, with all its equipments and departments, would be conveyed in 165 trains in 17 days. It would then be 200 miles--another 17 days' march--from Herat. Thus, adding a day for the crossing of the Caspian, the army corps from Baku would reach Herat in 35 days. Also the advance of a corps from Turkestan upon Kabul is even more practicable than before." [Footnote: In his plan of invasion, Skobeleff thought 50,000 men might undertake the enterprise without fear of disaster. This force could be doubled from the Caucasus alone.]

The route from Tchikishliar _via_ Asterabad (where it strikes the main Teheran-Mashed-Herat road) would be an important auxiliary to the railway line, _via_ Asterabad. There is also a more direct caravan track running south of this across the Khorassan, from Asterabad (through Shahrud, Aliabad, Khaf, Gurian) to Herat; or, at Shahrud, an excellent road running between the two already described straight (_via_ Sabzawar and Nishapar) to Mashed.

From Sarakhs to Merv the road is said to be good and fairly supplied with water. From Merv to Herat the well-worn expression "coach and four" has been used to denote the excellent condition of the road. [Footnote: For the first 100 miles the road follows the Murghab, which Abbott describes as "a deep stream of very pure water, about 60 feet in breadth, and flowing in a channel mired to the depth of 30 feet in the clay soil of the valley; banks precipitous and fringed with lamarisk and a few reeds."] Yalatun is described as fertile, well populated, and unhealthy. [Footnote: Band-i-Yalatun, or "bank which throws the waters of the Murghab into the canal of Yalatun."] From Penjdeh, where the river is sometimes fordable, the road follows the Khusk River, and, ascending the Koh-i-Baber Pass, descends into the Herat valley, immediately beneath it. [Footnote: Before closing the chapter on the "Russian Forces," a brief description of the order of march customary in Central Asia may be proper. From a translation by Major Clarke, R.A., from Kotensko's "Turkestan," it appears that the horses accompanying Central Asian detachments are so considerable that the latter form, as it were, the escort of the former. As an Asiatic enemy nearly always attacks from every side, the distribution of the troops, during the march, must be such that they may be able to repulse the enemy no matter where he may appear. Usually, a half sotnia (70 men) of cavalry marches in advance at a distance from 3/4 to 1-1/3 miles, so as to be in view of main body. Immediately in front of main body marches a detachment of sappers and a company or two of infantry; then part of the artillery; then more infantry; the train; behind the train, remainder of artillery and infantry; as a rear guard, a sotnia of cavalry. Bivouacs in the Steppe are usually chosen at wells, and are, in many respects, similar to those customary in the Indian country in America. First, an outer line of carts or wagons; then the troops; and inside, all the animals. The accompanying diagram is from _The Journal Royal United Service Institution_ (London).]