Chapter VIII: Part 8

Upon his arrival in Washington he immediately handed a copy of his inaugural address to his future Secretary of State, and the latter revised it in such a vigorous and arrogant manner that the unfavorable impression was deepened. Mr. Seward was always at hand to offer advice and give directions upon every subject. Lincoln listened with respectful attention, but continued to exercise his own judgment, and the spirit of independence he showed concerning several matters which Mr. Seward undertook to decide for him so alarmed the latter that two days before the inauguration he wrote a polite note asking leave to withdraw his acceptance of the office of Secretary of State. The note was received on Saturday. Any other man but Lincoln would have been disconcerted, at least, and would have immediately sought advice and assistance; but he did not mention the matter to any one, nor did he make any reply until Monday morning. Then, while waiting at Willard's Hotel for President Buchanan to escort him to the Capitol, he dictated a brief note, saying, "I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should, and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction."

He handed the note to Mr. Nicolay, saying, "I can't afford to let Seward take the first trick."

After the return of the inaugural procession to the White House the two men had a long and confidential talk. No one knows what they said to each other, but Mr. Seward accepted the office and his nomination was sent to the Senate the next morning.

Mr. Seward at once assumed that he was Prime Minister with independent and autocratic powers. He sent agents upon secret missions, he indicated to his visitors the policy of the administration,--and made pledges on behalf of the President without consulting him. He opened negotiations with the secession leaders upon his own responsibility. He issued orders to officers of the army and navy over the heads of his associates in charge of those departments, and gave assurances to the representatives of foreign governments without the approval or even the knowledge of the President. He seemed cheerfully to assume responsibility for the entire government, and did not hesitate to permit the official representatives of the Southern States and the public generally to presume that he and not Lincoln was the highest and final authority. He even attempted to deceive his wife on this subject. "I will try to save freedom and my country," he wrote her. "I have assumed a sort of dictatorship.... It seems to me if I am absent only eight days, this administration, the Congress and the District would fall into consternation and despair.... I am the only hopeful, calm, and conciliatory person here...." Again he writes, "Only the soothing words which I have spoken have saved us and carried us along thus far. And still again the cares chiefly fall on me."

Secretary Welles wrote a book to describe the controversies between Mr. Seward and the rest of the Cabinet, in which he shows a good deal of resentment but a good deal of truth. Mr. Seward's moral perceptions were obscured by the responsibilities and power that had been assumed by him. Although he did not suspect it, he was gradually drifting into a collision with a stronger character than his own, and but for the magnanimity and generous nature of the President, his political career might have been swallowed up in his vanity and arrogance.

From a photograph by Brady]

Upon April 1, after the new administration had been in control for a little more than three weeks, under the title "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," he submitted the most extraordinary proposition that appears among the archives of the Department of State. Assuming that he, and not Lincoln, was responsible for the conduct of the administration and the management of the government; writing as if he were the Prime Minister and Lincoln an impotent king; he laid down his plan of action and the line of policy he intended to pursue. He proposed that Lincoln should practically relinquish his Presidential responsibilities and authority; that he should repudiate the party that had elected him; that he should ignore the principles upon which the Presidential campaign had been fought and surrender the moral triumph of the victory; that he should convene Congress and declare war against Great Britain, Russia, France, and Spain, and endeavor to negotiate for an offensive and defensive alliance with Canada, Mexico, and Central America against Europe. The following is the text:

"SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION, APRIL 1,
1861.

"_First._ We are at the end of a month's administration, and
yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

"_Second._ This, however, is not culpable, and it has even
been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to
meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to
other and more grave matters.

"_Third._ But further delay to adopt and prosecute our
policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only
bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country.

"_Fourth._ To do this we must dismiss the applicants for
office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments
forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and
occasional action.

"_Fifth._ The policy at home. I am aware that my views are
singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is
built upon this idea as a ruling one,--namely, that we must

"CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON
SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION:

"In other words, from what would be regarded as a party
question, to one of patriotism or union.

"The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not
in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness
the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and
even by the Union men in the South.

"I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for
changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last
administration created the necessity.

"For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and re-enforce
all the ports in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from
foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island
of Key West under martial law.

"This will raise distinctly the question of union or
disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the
South.

"FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.

"I would demand explanations from Spain and France,
categorically, at once.

"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia,
and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to
rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this
continent against European intervention.

"And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from
Spain and France,

"Would convene Congress and declare war against them.

"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic
prosecution of it.

"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue
and direct it incessantly.

"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the
while active in it, or

"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted,
debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.

"It is not my especial province; but I neither seek to evade
nor assume responsibility."

It is impossible for any one to conceive the feelings of the President when he read this boastful and insolent document. But his self-control was so perfect, his anxiety to preserve harmony among those who were trying to save the Union was so great, and his patience so limitless that he returned the memorandum to Mr. Seward with the following firm and conclusive but courteous rebuke, and the subject was never alluded to again by either of them:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.

"HON. W. H. SEWARD.

"MY DEAR SIR: Since parting with you, I have been
considering your paper dated this day, and entitled 'Some
Thoughts for the President's Consideration.' The first
proposition in it is, '_First._ We are at the end of a month's
administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or
foreign.'

"At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said,
'The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and
possess the property and places belonging to the government,
and to collect the duties and imposts.' This had your distinct
approval at the time; and taken in connection with the order I
immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every
means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises
the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single
exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.

"Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort
Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue, while that of
Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.

"The news received yesterday in regard to San Domingo
certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign
policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and
instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony,
without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.

"Upon your closing proposition--that 'whatever policy we
adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

"'For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue
and direct it incessantly.

"'Either the President must do it himself, and be all the
while active in it, or

"'Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted,
debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.'--I remark
that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line
of policy is adopted, I apprehend that there is no danger of
its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a
subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its
progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice
of all the Cabinet.

"Your obedient servant,
"A. LINCOLN."

The President never revealed this amazing incident to anybody but Mr. Nicolay, and it was never suspected by any member of his Cabinet until the correspondence was published by Nicolay and Hay in the _Century Magazine_, nearly thirty years after. Mr. Seward recognized his master at last and wrote his wife, "Executive force and vigor are rare qualities. The President is the best of us."

From that time there were no serious differences between the President and his Secretary of State, although they frequently differed upon matters of policy as well as details of administration. Mr. Seward was loyal, devoted, and always respectful to his chief.

The same cannot be said of Secretary Chase. He also had been a rival of Lincoln for the Presidential nomination in 1860, and had gone into the Cabinet feeling that his supporters from Ohio had made Lincoln's nomination possible and that he was entitled to special consideration for that reason. He supported Lincoln cordially through the campaign, and among the first telegrams of congratulation received by the President-elect was one from him which read, "I congratulate you and thank God. The great object of my wishes and labors for nineteen years is accomplished in the overthrow of the slave power. The space is now clear for the establishment of the policy of freedom on safe and firm grounds. The lead is yours. The responsibility is great. May God strengthen you for your great duties."

After January 1 following the election, Mr. Chase was invited to Springfield, and upon his arrival the President-elect waived all ceremony and called upon him at his hotel. "I have done with you," said he, "what I would not have ventured to do with any other man in the country,--sent for you to ask you whether you will accept the appointment of Secretary of the Treasury without, however, being exactly prepared to offer it to you." Concerning this conversation Mr. Chase wrote to a friend as follows:

"He said he had felt bound to offer the position of Secretary of State to Mr. Seward as the generally recognized leader of the Republican party, intending, if he declined it, to offer it to me. He did not wish that Mr. Seward should decline it, and was glad that he had accepted, and now desired to have me take the place of Secretary of the Treasury."

Mr. Chase told the President-elect that he was not prepared to give a definite answer because he wanted to ask the advice of friends and be governed by the course of events. He valued the trust and its opportunities, but was reluctant to leave the Senate. No further communication took place between the two on the subject; but, assuming that Mr. Chase had accepted, Lincoln sent his name to the Senate on March 5 with those of other members of his Cabinet.

From the beginning of the administration Mr. Chase advocated a radical policy; was very urgent in advocating the relief of Fort Sumter and pushing the war, while Seward hung back. Mr. Chase's policy was presented in a memorandum, with similar ones from other members of the Cabinet, at the request of the President, in March, and reads as follows:

"If war is to be the consequence of an attempt to provision Fort Sumter, war will just as certainly result from the attempt to maintain possession of Fort Pickens.

"I am clearly in favor of maintaining Fort Pickens and just as clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter. If that attempt should be resisted by military force, Fort Sumter should, in my judgment, be reinforced.

"If war is to be the result, I perceive no reason why it may not be best begun by military resistance to the efforts of the administration to sustain troops of the Union, stationed under the authority of the government, in a fort of the Union, in the ordinary course of service."

From a photograph by M. B. Brady]

In the beginning Mr. Chase was a very strong supporter of General McClellan and frequently called the attention of the latter to his obligations to him. "The country was indebted to me," he wrote McClellan, "in some considerable degree for the change of your commission from Ohio into a commission of major-general of the army of the Union;" and he wrote a friend the good news, "McClellan is Commander-in-Chief! let us thank God and take courage!" but this was his habit. He invariably worshipped the rising sun, and was usually one of the first to turn his back upon old friends when they met with misfortunes. He usually cultivated the closest relations with those generals who had grievances against the administration. His correspondence and his diary, as published by his chosen biographer, are full of caustic and unkind criticisms of his chief. He received many letters containing violent abuse of the President and his colleagues in the government, and neither defended them nor rebuked the writers. He records in his diary a conversation with an officer who, meeting him, the Secretary of the Treasury, for the first time, was rude enough to utter a gross insult directed at the President. In his comments Mr. Chase seems to approve the remarks, and describes the President's assailant as "well read and extremely intelligent." But Mr. Chase never defended his colleagues when they were attacked. In reply to a violent criticism from an enemy of the administration, he wrote, "I am not responsible for the management of the war and have no voice in it, except that I am not forbidden to make suggestions, and do so now and then when I can't help it."

He soon lost his confidence in and admiration for McClellan, however, and in his criticisms concerning his dilatory tactics was the most bitter of all the Cabinet. He once drew up a paper, which he induced several of his colleagues to sign, demanding McClellan's removal. He continually offered advice and suggestions, and when they were not accepted he usually took the trouble to record his resentment in his diary or to express it in vigorous terms in a letter to some friend.

Chase was in favor of the unconditional emancipation of the slaves, and when the President laid before the Cabinet the Emancipation Proclamation he writes in his diary, "I said that I should give to such a measure my cordial support, but I should prefer that no expression on the subject of compensation should be made, and I thought that the measure of emancipation could be better and more quickly accomplished by allowing generals to organize and arm the slaves and by directing the commanders of departments to proclaim emancipation within their districts as soon as practicable. But I regarded this as so much better than inaction on the subject that I could give it my entire support."

The President was not unaware of the disposition of Mr. Seward to criticise himself and the members of his Cabinet, but placed so high a value upon his ability and his importance to the government that he treated him with the same patience that he did Mr. Stanton and others who were critical and petulant concerning his deliberation and other peculiarities. The extent to which this forbearance was exercised may be illustrated by a note addressed to the President by his Secretary of the Treasury, April 25, 1861, in which the latter was guilty of such bad taste and impertinence that Lincoln would have been justified in asking his instant resignation. Mr. Chase held the President practically responsible for the demoralized condition of affairs in the country and for all that had happened before his inauguration as well as since, and said, "Let me beg of you to remember that the disunionists have anticipated us in everything, and that as yet we have accomplished nothing but the destruction of our own property. Let me beg of you to remember also that it has been a darling object with the disunionists to secure the passage of a secession ordinance by Maryland.... Save us from this new humiliation. You alone can give the word."

Mr. Chase was in consultation with the President daily, he had been consulted about every situation and movement, he was quite as familiar with what had been done and what was intended as the President himself, and the reasons which prompted him to address his chief in such a manner can only be conjectured. It is believed that he was prompted to do so by one of the many hostile critics of the administration, and wrote the letter without realizing its tone and impertinence. But Lincoln received it with his usual complacency, made no complaint to any one about it, and calmly filed it away among his other correspondence.

Like Mr. Seward, he went into the Cabinet with the opinion that the President was incapable and inexperienced, and that it was his duty to support and assist him in the management of the government; but, unlike Mr. Seward, he was never able to rid himself of a sense of his own superiority. He had an honest conviction that he was more competent and would make a much better President himself, and that if his advice were accepted and his suggestions carried out, the war would be brought to a close much sooner than otherwise. He lacked confidence in his colleagues also and never lost an opportunity to express it. He considered himself their superior in zeal, ability, and devotion to the general welfare. He imagined that every disaster which occurred in the field was due to the refusal of the President and the Secretary of War to carry out the plans he suggested, and that every victory could be directly attributed to his wise counsel. This was not known at the time. Had it been, the people of the country would have been less charitable towards Mr. Chase. His egotism, jealousy, contempt, and hostility towards Lincoln and his fellow-members of the Cabinet were not fully disclosed until the publication of his biography, which contained extracts from his diary and copies of his voluminous correspondence.

The President would not allow the conduct or the disposition of his Secretary of the Treasury to make the slightest difference in his treatment of that official or to affect the policy of his administration, for in his management of the finances, without previous experience or preparation, Mr. Chase had shown genius equal to that of Alexander Hamilton, unswerving integrity, and untiring industry. So highly did Lincoln esteem his public services in this respect that he would have forgiven him anything; and Mr. Chase not only had his constant support, but he was less interfered with in the administration of his department than any other member of the Cabinet.

Mr. Chase began a serious and systematic canvass for the Presidential nomination as early as the fall of 1863, and although he continued to delude himself and assure his friends that he was indifferent to advancement and anxious only for the public good, he found plenty of leisure in the midst of his arduous duties and immense responsibilities to write hundreds of letters to friends in different parts of the Union pointing out the mistakes of the President and leaving the irresistible conclusion that he was the only man capable of saving the country. Many of these letters are published in his biography, and it is inexplicable that he preserved the documentary evidence of his treachery, and even more remarkable that his family thus exposed him to public censure and contempt.

Although Lincoln had the full confidence of the loyal people of the North, many disappointed politicians and other citizens in different parts of the country were dissatisfied with his management of affairs. The critics naturally gravitated together and sought to organize a movement to prevent his renomination. They found it difficult to contend against the popularity of the President, and looked among the discordant elements for a standard-bearer. Neither in Congress nor in the army was there any one who was willing to undertake the hopeless task until some of the leaders consulted Mr. Chase and, to their surprise, found him so indiscreet and disloyal as to encourage their opposition to the administration of which he was a member, and so foolish as to believe that he was strong enough to lead them to victory.

Mr. Chase fell willingly into the trap, although he continued to protest his loyalty and attachment to Lincoln. His only excuse was that the President's intellect and capacity for government were inferior to his own, and in its great emergency his beloved country needed the strongest man. He wrote his son-in-law, Governor Sprague, of Rhode Island, "If I were controlled by merely personal sentiments I would prefer the re-election of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man, but I think a man of different qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years."

President Lincoln was fully informed concerning every movement Mr. Chase made, for the latter was surrounded by false friends who were willing to destroy him. However, he rebuked the tale-bearers and discouraged all conversation concerning the ambition of his Secretary of the Treasury, and when the criticisms uttered by Mr. Chase of himself and the members of his Cabinet were brought to his attention, he declined to listen to them.

"I have determined," he said, "to shut my eyes so far as possible to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I am entirely indifferent as to his success or failure in these schemes as long as he does his duty at the head of the Treasury Department." He appointed Chase's partisans and wire-pullers to office as fast as the latter proposed them, although he knew perfectly well what he was doing. He was more amused than otherwise at the protestations of his own friends; but all the time he was conscious that he had every reason for magnanimity. With his usual political perspicuity, he was perfectly confident of his own nomination and re-election, and recognized that Chase was daily making mistakes that were fatal to his own political prospects. He endeavored to conceal his knowledge, and avoided explanations from his Secretary of the Treasury until the publication of a secret circular in the Washington newspapers signed by Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, compelled Mr. Chase to allude to the subject. It was a spiteful, unjust, and untruthful attack upon the President, and proposed the nomination of Mr. Chase as his successor, appealing to patriotic citizens to organize in his support and correspond with the chairman of his committee.

Mr. Chase at once disavowed all knowledge of or responsibility for this circular, but explained that he had yielded to the urgent solicitations of friends and had consented to be a candidate for the Presidential nomination. "If there is anything in my action or position which in your judgment will prejudice the public interest under my charge, I beg you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence. For yourself I cherish sincere respect and esteem and, permit me to add, affection."

The next day the President acknowledged the receipt of this letter and promised to answer it more fully later, which he did, saying,--

"... My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made public came to me only the day you wrote; but I had, in spite of myself, known of its existence several days before. I have not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee, and of secret issues which I supposed came from it, and of secret agents who I supposed were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them: they tell me what they think fit to tell me, but I do not inquire for more....

"Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I will not allow myself to consider from any stand-point other than my judgment of the public service, and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change."

If anything was needed to complete the collapse of the plans of Mr. Chase, the reputation of the man who signed the circular was sufficient. As fast as conventions were held delegations were instructed for Lincoln. The Republican members of the Ohio Legislature were so fearful lest they might be suspected of sympathizing with the ambition of Mr. Chase that they held a caucus and unanimously endorsed the President. Even little Rhode Island, supposed to be a pocket borough absolutely controlled by its Governor, who was a son-in-law of Mr. Chase, bolted and declared for Lincoln. The Secretary of the Treasury, left without a supporter in the Republican party, sought consolation from the Democrats, but they repudiated him and selected as their candidate General McClellan, a man who had been alternately eulogized and anathematized by him.

The retirement of Mr. Chase from the Cabinet was due to his determination to control the patronage of the Treasury Department in the State of New York without reference to the wishes of Mr. Morgan and Mr. Harris, the Senators from that State. There was also friction over Treasury appointments in other parts of the country. Mr. Chase's failure as a Presidential candidate made him very irritable, and whenever the President or any member of the Cabinet offered the slightest opposition to his plans or wishes, he showed so much temper that it was impossible to get along with him except by conceding all his demands. Lincoln, valuing his services in the Treasury so highly, endeavored to gratify him as far as possible, and assured other members of his Cabinet that, as Mr. Chase's ability, industry, and integrity were beyond question, he had a right to select men for whose proper conduct he was responsible. But when Mr. Chase invaded the political provinces of the members of the Senate, the President found it difficult to reconcile the differences, and on two occasions the Secretary of the Treasury tendered his resignation rather than yield what he considered to be his right to select all of his subordinates. Maunsell B. Field, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, quotes Lincoln as saying, "I went directly up to him [Chase] with the resignation in my hand, and putting my arm around his neck, said, 'Here is a paper with which I wish to have nothing to do. Take it back and be reasonable.' I had to plead with him a long time, but I finally succeeded, and heard nothing more of that resignation."

But this state of affairs could not endure. There came an occasion upon which the President was not able to give way, and when the two New York Senators objected to the appointment of the same Maunsell B. Field as Assistant Treasurer of New York, he was compelled to recognize their wishes. He wrote Mr. Chase, "As the proverb goes, no man knows so well where the shoe pinches as he who wears it. I do not think Mr. Field a very proper man for the place, but I would trust your judgment and forego this were the greater difficulty out of the way.... Strained as I already am at this point, I do not think that I can make this appointment in the direction of still greater strain." But Mr. Chase felt that the President was acting badly and must be disciplined, and so he resigned again. To submit to Mr. Chase under the circumstances would be to abdicate in his favor and to offend his loyal supporters in New York; hence, without hesitation, he wrote Mr. Chase as follows: "Of all I have said in commendation of your ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, yet you and I have reached a point of mutual embarrassment in our official relations which it seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with the public service."

Mr. Chase was taken entirely by surprise. He supposed that the President, like himself, believed that his presence in the Treasury Department was indispensable to the salvation of the government. Governor Todd, of Ohio, was nominated as his successor, but declined, and the President then sent to the Senate the nomination of William Pitt Fessenden, a Senator from Maine and chairman of the Committee on Finance, entirely without that gentleman's knowledge.

After the President's secretary had left for the Capitol with the nomination, Mr. Fessenden appeared at the White House and, after preliminary conversation, suggested the appointment of Hugh McCulloch, who had served with great ability since the beginning of the war as Comptroller of the Currency. Lincoln listened to his eulogy of Mr. McCulloch with a gentle smile, and then informed him that he had already sent his own name to the Senate. Mr. Fessenden protested and declared that he would decline.

"If you decline," replied the President, "you must do it in open day, for I cannot recall the nomination."

The significance and appropriateness of Mr. Fessenden's nomination to succeed Mr. Chase was immediately recognized as a _coup d'état_ on the part of the President, and the former could not decline the responsibility. He served for only a few months, however, and was succeeded by Hugh McCulloch.

Mr. Chase could not suppress his sense of injury or cease talking about it. After he left the Cabinet, his criticisms of the President personally and the administration of the government became more frequent and bold than ever; but as soon as the death of Chief-Justice Taney of the Supreme Court was announced, he immediately claimed the vacancy. Notwithstanding all that had occurred, he was willing to forgive and forget, provided the President would make him Chief-Justice. Samuel Bowles, editor of the _Springfield Republican_, writes on December 4, 1864, two months after Taney's death, "Chase is going around peddling his grief in private ears and sowing dissatisfaction about Lincoln. Oh, how little great men can be!" The President at once made up his mind to appoint Mr. Chase, but would not announce his intention until he had heard the views of every Republican of importance. In the mean time Mr. Chase was appealing to his friends for support and endorsement and prophesying disasters for the government unless his appointment was made. One day Mr. Nicolay brought the President a letter from Mr. Chase.

"What is it about?" inquired Lincoln.

"Simply a kind and friendly letter."

"File it with the other recommendations," was the laconic reply.

On December 6, when the Senate met, Mr. Chase's nomination appeared among others. It was written out in Lincoln's own hand instead of upon a printed blank, as was customary. The nomination was confirmed without reference to a committee, and the same evening Mr. Chase wrote the President a very grateful acknowledgment. "Be assured," he said, "that I apprize your confidence and good-will more than any nomination to office."

Lincoln afterwards told Mr. Boutwell that he never had any intention of refusing the office to Mr. Chase. "There were three reasons why he should be appointed and one reason why he should not be," said the President. "In the first place, he occupies a larger space in the public mind with reference to the office than any other person. Then we want a man who will sustain the Legal Tender Act and the Proclamation of Emancipation. We cannot ask a candidate what he would do, and if we did and he should answer we should only despise him for it. But Chase wants to be President, and if he does not give that up it will be a great injury to him and a great injury to me. He can never be President."

Among the most urgent friends of Mr. Chase were Senator Sumner and Representative Alley, of Massachusetts, who went to Washington to plead with the President in his behalf.

"We found, to our dismay," said Mr. Alley, "that the President had heard of the bitter criticisms of Mr. Chase upon himself and his administration. Mr. Lincoln urged many of Mr. Chase's defects, to discover, as we afterwards learned, how his objection could be answered. We were both discouraged and made up our minds that the President did not mean to appoint Mr. Chase. It really seemed too much to expect of poor human nature. But early one morning in the following December I went to the White House, found the President in his library, and was cordially received. As I entered he made to me this declaration:

"'I have something to tell you that will make you happy. I have just sent Mr. Chase word that he is to be appointed Chief-Justice, and you are the first man I have told of it.'

"I said, 'Mr. President, this is an exhibition of magnanimity and patriotism that could hardly be expected of any one. After what he has said against your administration, which has undoubtedly been reported to you, it was hardly to be expected that you would bestow the most important office within your gift on such a man.'

"His quaint reply was, 'Although I may have appeared to you and to Mr. Sumner to have been opposed to Chase's appointment, there never has been a moment since the breath left old Taney's body that I did not conceive it to be the best thing to do to appoint Mr. Chase to that high office; and to have done otherwise I should have been recreant to my convictions of duty to the Republican party and to the country.'

"I repeated again my sense of his magnanimity and his patriotism in making the appointment.

"He replied, 'As to his talk about me, I do not mind that. Chase is, on the whole, a pretty good fellow and a very able man. His only trouble is that he has "the White House fever" a little too bad, but I hope this may cure him and that he will be satisfied.'"

One would suppose, after this exhibition of magnanimity on the part of the President, that he would escape the criticism of Mr. Chase at least, but the latter still considered himself the inspired critic of the administration and sought the Democratic nomination for the Presidency. Nor was this all. His decisions upon the bench were in direct contradiction to the positions he had taken as a member of the Cabinet. He had criticised the President for his weakness in refusing to attack the doctrine of State rights, yet, on the first opportunity, he appeared as the judicial champion and defender of that doctrine; from his place on the bench he declared unconstitutional the Legal Tender Act which he had himself assisted in preparing and whose passage through the House of Representatives had been secured by his personal influence. While he was Secretary of the Treasury he sustained and encouraged Mr. Stanton in the exercise of the "war power" more earnestly and took more radical grounds than any other member of the Cabinet, yet when those very transactions came before the Supreme Court he denounced them as illegal and unjustified. The only explanation, the only apology that could be made by the friends of Mr. Chase was that his mind was soured by disappointment. He was a man of unbounded ambition, he had been working all his life to become President, he was convinced of his own great talents, and could not reconcile himself to disappointment.

President Lincoln's character and methods are nowhere better illustrated than in the story of his relations with Edwin M. Stanton, his great Secretary of War, a man of intense personality, of arbitrary disposition, impetuous in action, impatient under restraint, and intolerant of opposition. Combined with these qualities Mr. Stanton had great learning, unselfish patriotism, and conscientious convictions of duty. He was a native of Ohio, a graduate of Kenyon College, and when still young in years attained a high rank in the practice of his profession of the law, making his head-quarters first at Pittsburgh and in 1856 at Washington. He was born and bred in Democratic principles, but had a profound hatred of slavery, and during the administration of President Buchanan was pronounced in his opposition to the disunion schemes of the Southern politicians.

Shortly after the election in 1860, when the situation at Washington was becoming critical, President Buchanan sought his advice, and Mr. Stanton prepared an argument to prove that a State could be coerced into remaining in the Union. A few weeks later Mr. Buchanan called him into his Cabinet as Attorney-General, and he immediately joined with the loyal members of the Cabinet and the Republican leaders in Congress in vigorous efforts to save the Union. But after Lincoln was inaugurated Mr. Stanton became the most scornful and unsparing critic of the new administration. He called the President an imbecile, charged Cameron with corruption, and declared that the administration was treating the treasure of the nation as booty to be divided among thieves. He predicted disaster in every direction; he declared that in less than thirty days Jefferson Davis would be in possession of Washington, and used the most intemperate and unjust language that his lips could frame in his comments upon the character and the conduct of the President and his advisers. Therefore, when he was invited to succeed Mr. Cameron, the chief object of his detestation and attack, he was placed in a peculiar situation, but was broad-minded enough to appreciate Lincoln's magnanimity, and accepted the war portfolio as the highest duty that could be assigned to a citizen. He wrote ex-President Buchanan, "My accession to my present position was quite as sudden and unexpected as the confidence you bestowed upon me in calling me to your Cabinet. And the responsible trust was accepted in both instances from the same motives and will be executed with the same fidelity to the Constitution and the laws." In another letter he wrote, "I knew that everything that I cherish and hold dear would be sacrificed by accepting office, but I thought I might help to save the country, and for that I was willing to perish."

When some one objected to Stanton's appointment on account of his ungovernable temper, and stated that he was in the habit of jumping up and down when he lost his patience, Lincoln replied,--

"Well, if he gets to jumping too much, we will treat him as they used to treat a minister I knew out West. He would get so excited and wrought up at revival meetings that they had to put bricks in his pockets to keep him down. But I guess we will let Stanton jump a while first."

Lincoln and his new Secretary of War had met before, and the President had no reason to be friendly towards him. The story is told in the chapter relating to Lincoln's legal career. But the President was willing to submerge his personal feelings in his patriotism in order to secure the support and assistance of a man for whose ability, energy, and patriotism he had the highest respect. He selected Mr. Stanton for the same reason that he retained McClellan in command and postponed the Emancipation Proclamation. He was not thinking of himself, but of his country. He was not seeking a friend or an agreeable companion, but a man of executive ability, iron will, stern integrity, and physical endurance to relieve him from what was becoming an unendurable burden; for, up to this time, he had borne almost alone the responsibility for military movements in the field as well as the organization and equipment of the army. Months before he had foreseen that Mr. Cameron must soon leave the Cabinet, and had been on the lookout for a suitable Secretary of War. With the silent sagacity and foresight that were among his most remarkable characteristics, he had searched the list of public men, and, finding no one available among his friends, had gone over into the ranks of his opponents and had chosen perhaps the most unfriendly and vigorous critic of his administration. He had learned of Mr. Stanton's tremendous energy and keen perceptions and recognized at once how useful those traits would be in the War Department; while his fearless candor, his indifference to criticism, and the public confidence in his integrity were qualities equally valuable under the circumstances.

Within a few weeks he was satisfied of the accuracy of his judgment in making the selection, and their daily intercourse brought the two men into relations which could not have existed between men of weaker character. Unlike Mr. Chase, his colleague of the Treasury Department, Mr. Stanton had the highest admiration for Lincoln's ability and judgment, and his imperious will and stubborn convictions would not have yielded to any one else. On the other hand, no one appreciated so much as Lincoln the genuine worth, the deep sincerity, and the rare ability to organize and execute that existed in his new Secretary of War. There were continual differences of opinion between them. Men of strong character seldom think alike, and with his peculiar temperament and impulsive disposition Mr. Stanton could not have served under a chief less amiable and considerate than Lincoln.

There is no doubt that the President's patience was often sorely tried, but the same spirit that governed him when he invited Mr. Stanton into the Cabinet continued to recognize the necessity of toleration and forbearance. While he usually yielded to his War Secretary in details, in matters of supreme importance he invariably insisted upon following his own judgment, and with a gentle but unyielding firmness compelled Mr. Stanton to submit to his will. For example, Mr. Stanton refused to carry out an order of the President concerning the enlistment of rebel prisoners of war who wished to enter the service of the Union, and when the order was repeated, refused a second time. General Fry, the Provost-Marshal-General, who was present at the interview, describes the incident as follows:

"'Now, Mr. President, those are the facts, and you must see that your order cannot be executed,' exclaimed Stanton.

"Lincoln sat upon a sofa with his legs crossed, and did not say a word until the Secretary's last remark. Then he said, in a somewhat positive tone, 'Mr. Secretary, I reckon you'll have to execute the order.'

"Stanton replied with asperity, 'Mr. President, I cannot do it.'

"Lincoln fixed his eyes upon Stanton, and in a firm voice, and with an accent that clearly showed his determination, he said, 'Mr. Secretary, it will have to be done.'

"Stanton realized that he was overmatched. He had made a square issue with the President and had been defeated, notwithstanding the fact that he was in the right. Upon an intimation from him I withdrew and did not witness his surrender. A few minutes after I reached my office I received instructions from the Secretary to carry out the President's order."

The President "always liked to get something on Stanton," as he used to say. Judge Shellabarger, of Ohio, relates this incident:

"A young man in the army, Ben Tappan, wanted a transfer from the volunteer service to the regular army, retaining his rank of Lieutenant and with staff duty. There was some regulation against such transfer; but Tappan's step-father, Frank Wright, thought it could be done. He had been to Secretary Stanton, who was an uncle of Tappan by marriage, and, on account of this so-called relationship, the Secretary declined to act in the matter. Wright and I therefore went up to the White House to see the President about it. After talking it over, Mr. Lincoln told a story, the application of which was that the army was getting to be all staff and no army, there was such a rush for staff duty by young officers. However, he looked over Lieutenant Tappan's paper, heard what Secretary Stanton had told us about his delicacy in transferring Lieutenant Tappan against the regulation because of his relationship by marriage. Then Mr. Lincoln wrote across the application something like the following endorsement:

"'Lieutenant Tappan, of ---- Regiment Volunteers, desires
transfer to ---- Regiment, Regular service, and assigned
to staff duty with present rank. If the only objection is
Lieutenant Tappan's relationship to the Secretary of War, that
objection is overruled.

"'A. LINCOLN.'

"Of course this threw the responsibility of breaking the regulation on Secretary Stanton. We never heard anything more about the transfer."

General Fry says, "A story has long been current that Lincoln sent an application for office with a note to the Secretary of War, directing that a letter of appointment be prepared for the man to the office he sought; that the applicant returned to the President and announced that Stanton refused to obey the order; that the President looked disappointed, but merely expressed his regret at the result, and remarked that he had not much influence with the administration. The anecdote has generally been interpreted as meaning that Lincoln could not control Stanton. The inference is erroneous. Lincoln, so far as I could discover, was in every respect the actual head of the administration, and whenever he chose to do so he controlled Stanton as well as all the other Cabinet ministers."

Ex-Representative John A. Kasson, of Iowa, says, "Numerous officers in the field had written me to have Colonel ----, of ---- Iowa Regiment, promoted to be a brigadier-general. The colonel deserved the promotion, but it was difficult to obtain. At last there came an Iowa resignation, and I went to the President, who signed an order to the Secretary of War to let Colonel ---- have the commission in place of the resigning brigadier. Mr. Stanton was seated on a sofa talking with a friend. I told him my errand, and handed him the President's order. He glanced at it, and said, in an angry tone,--

"'I shan't do it, sir; I shan't do it!' and passed the paper up to his clerk.

"Utterly amazed at these words, and indignant at his tone, I inquired why he refused to obey the President's order.

"'It isn't the way to do it, sir, and I shan't do it.'

"I was going on to speak of the merits of the officer and of the proceeding, my wrath rising, when he cut me off with,--

"'I don't propose to argue the question with you, sir; I shan't do it.'

"Utterly indignant, I turned to the clerk and asked to withdraw the paper.

"'Don't you let him have it, sir,' said Stanton; 'don't let him have it.'

"The clerk, whose hands were trembling like an Eastern slave before his pasha, withdrew the document which he was in the act of giving to me. I felt my indignation getting too strong for me, and, putting on my hat and turning my back to the Secretary, I slowly went to the door, with set teeth, saying to myself, 'As you will not hear me in your own forum, you shall hear from me in mine.'

"A few days later, after recovering my coolness, I reported the affair to the President. A look of vexation came over his face. Then he gave me a positive order for the promotion of the colonel to be a brigadier, and told me to take it over to the War Department. I replied that I could not speak again with Mr. Stanton till he apologized for his insulting manner to me on the previous occasion.

"'Oh,' said the President, 'Stanton has gone to Fortress Monroe and Dana is acting. He will attend to it for you.'"

From a photograph by Brady]

Judge Usher, Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior, says, "Chief among his great characteristics were his gentleness and humanity, and yet he did not hesitate promptly to approve the sentences of Kennedy and Beall. During the entire war there are but few other evidences to be found of a willingness on his part that any one should suffer the penalty of death. His great effort seemed to be to find some excuse, some palliation for offences charged. He strove at all times to relieve the citizens on both sides of the inconveniences and hardships resulting from the war. It has often been reported that Secretary of War Stanton arbitrarily refused to carry out his orders. In all such cases reported it will be found that the President had given directions to him to issue permits to persons who had applied to go through the lines into the insurgent districts. The President said at one time, referring to Stanton's refusal to issue the permits and the severe remarks made by the persons who were disobliged,--

"'I cannot always know whether a permit ought to be granted, and I want to oblige everybody when I can, and Stanton and I have an understanding that if I send an order to him that cannot be consistently granted, he is to refuse it, which he sometimes does; and that led to a remark which I made the other day to a man who complained of Stanton, that I hadn't much influence with this administration, but expected to have more with the next.'"

Mr. George W. Julian, a Representative in Congress, said, "I called on the President respecting the appointments I had recommended under the conscription law, and took occasion to refer to the failure of General Frémont to get a command. He said he did not know where to place him, and that it reminded him of the old man who advised his son to take a wife, to which the young man responded, 'Whose wife shall I take?'

"At another time," said Mr. Julian, "a committee of Western men, headed by Mr. Lovejoy, procured from the President an important order looking to the exchange of Eastern and Western soldiers, with a view to more effective work. Repairing to the office of the Secretary, Mr. Lovejoy explained the scheme, as he had done before the President, but was met by a flat refusal.

"'But we have the President's order, sir,' said Lovejoy.

"'Did Lincoln give you an order of that kind?' said Stanton.

"'He did, sir.'

"'Then he is a d--d fool,' said the irate Secretary.

"'Do you mean to say the President is a d--d fool?' asked Lovejoy in amazement.

"'Yes, sir, if he gave you such an order as that.'

"The bewildered Congressman from Illinois betook himself at once to the President and related the result of his conference.

"'Did Stanton say I was a d--d fool?' asked Lincoln, at the close of the recital.

"'He did, sir, and repeated it.'

"After a moment's pause, and looking up, the President said,--

"'If Stanton said I was a d--d fool, then I must be one, for he is nearly always right, and generally says what he means. I will step over and see him.'"