Chapter III: Campaign of 1781 (1)

The year 1781 commenced under auspices more propitious than those of the last year. The British had exercised so much oppression and rapacity over all those who would not join them, and so much insolence over those who did, and were in the least suspected, that the people of South Carolina found there was no alternative but between a state of downright vassalage and warfare. Most of the men of principle already had, or were prepared to take up arms against the enemy, and in general the unprincipled only remained with them in the expectation of plunder. Their army too, being divided into different cantonments over the country, while it extended their oppression, exposed their weakness. The history of all ages shows that a country may be overrun with more facility than kept in a state of subjection, and that a partisan warfare is the best that can be carried on against an enemy of superior force and discipline.

During the present winter Lord Cornwallis formed a design of conquering the upper counties of North Carolina, and marched by the way of Charlotte towards Salisbury, for that purpose. This part of the country was thickly covered with underwood, and settled by a hardy race of industrious yeomanry, all friends of their country. He was fired upon from behind bushes and fences, trees and rocks, by companies in ambush, and individuals on foot and on horseback, and was so much annoyed that he was obliged to retreat back to Winnsborough. The news of this expedition was industriously spread abroad, and encouraged the people of South Carolina to follow the example. In the mean time, Gen. Gates had been superceded in the command of the southern army by Gen. Greene.

With the character of this leader it is intended to make the reader better acquainted than he has been heretofore. His command begun with a good omen, which in all times has had its effect. In a few hours after his arrival in camp at Charlotte, he received the news that Col. Washington had taken Rugely and one hundred men, by the well known stratagem of mounting a pine log over against his block house, which he mistook for a field piece.* Gen. Greene had not only no more than one thousand continentals and about as many militia, but was also bare of ammunition and clothing, and had no money to pay them. With this force he marched down to Pedee, in South Carolina, and took a position near Hick's creek, on the east side of the river, not many miles from Chatham. From this place his first despatch to Gen. Marion is dated, the 19th Jan. 1781, in which he says, "by the last accounts, Lieut. Col. Tarleton was in motion, with about one thousand troops, towards Gen. Morgan." On the 23d Jan. Gen. Greene congratulates Marion on Morgan's victory over Tarleton, and writes him the particulars. On the 25th he says, "before this I hope you have received the agreeable news of the defeat of Lieut. Col. Tarleton. After this nothing will appear difficult."

* This was the same Rugely who behaved so generously to
Governor Rutledge. It seems Lord Cornwallis intended to have
promoted him, but after this affair he wrote to Tarleton,
"Rugely will not be made a brigadier."

As the defeat of Tarleton at the Cowpens has been related by many American writers, whose works are generally read, the account of the renowned chief himself, who was unexpectedly foiled, and which is now out of print, will be extracted for the amusement of the historical reader. "Near the end of the last year, (1780) information had been received by Lord Cornwallis, that Gen. Greene had made a division of his troops, which did not exceed fourteen hundred men, exclusive of militia, and that he had committed the light infantry and Col. Washington's cavalry to Gen. Morgan, with directions to pass the Catawba and Broad rivers, to collect the militia, and threaten Ninety-Six. It is not to be supposed Gen. Greene would have adopted the hazardous plan of dividing his forces, if he had received information of Gen. Leslie's command being withdrawn from Virginia, and united to the force in South Carolina; because such an accession of strength would produce a movement from Winnsborough (where Cornwallis then lay,) and might separate the two divisions of the American army, and endanger their safety. To attain this object, (the separation of the two divisions of the American army,) Col. Tarleton was now detached from the main army of Lord Cornwallis, and was to be supported by his lordship, and Gen. Leslie as soon as he arrived; with orders to push Morgan to the utmost. Tarleton's force was his corps of cavalry and infantry of five hundred and fifty men; the first battalion of the 71st, of two hundred men; two hundred men of the 7th regiment, new recruits; and fifty dragoons of the 17th regiment--total one thousand men. Morgan retreated before Tarleton till the commanding officer in front of the British reported the American troops were halted and forming. (17th Jan.) Lieut. Col. Tarleton, having obtained a position he certainly might deem advantageous, did not hesitate to undertake the measures his commander and his own judgment recommended. He ordered the legion dragoons to drive in the militia, that Morgan's disposition might be inspected. The American commander had formed a front line of about one thousand militia; his reserve of five hundred continental infantry, one hundred and twenty of Washington's cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen. Tarleton ordered his infantry to disencumber themselves of every thing except arms and ammunition, to file to the right, till they became equal to the flank of the American front line; the legion infantry were added to their left, and under the fire of a three pounder they were to advance within three hundred yards of the enemy. This situation being acquired, the 7th regiment was commanded to form on the left of the legion infantry, and the other three pounder was given to its right. A captain with fifty dragoons, was placed on each flank. The first battalion of the 71st extended to the left of the 7th, one hundred and fifty yards in the rear, and composed, with two hundred cavalry, the reserve.

"The animation of the officers and soldiers promised assurances of success. The troops moved in as good line as troops could move, at open files. The militia, after a short contest, were dislodged. The British approached the continentals, and the fire on both sides produced much slaughter. The cavalry on the right were ordered to charge the enemy's left, and executed the order with great gallantry, but were driven back by the reserve and Col. Washington's cavalry. As the contest between the British infantry and continentals was equally balanced, Tarleton brought the 71st into line, and ordered a movement in reserve to threaten the enemy's right flank. Upon the advance of the 71st all the infantry again moved on; the continentals and back woodsmen gave ground; the British rushed forwards; an order was despatched to the cavalry to charge; an unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans who came about, stopped the British and threw them into confusion. Exertions to make them advance were useless. The part of the cavalry which had not been engaged, fell likewise into disorder, and an unaccountable panic extended along the whole line. The Americans advanced and augmented their astonishment. A general flight ensued. Neither promises nor threats could gain attention. All attempts to restore order, recollection or courage proved fruitless. Two hundred dragoons forsook their leader, fourteen officers and forty horsemen were, however, not unmindful of their own reputation, or their commanding officer. Col. Washington's cavalry were charged and driven back into the continental infantry by this handful of brave men. Another party who had seized upon the baggage were dispersed, and this detachment retired towards Broad river unmolested. The number of the killed and wounded at the Cowpens, amounted to near three hundred on both sides, officers and men inclusive; this loss was almost equally shared. But the Americans took two pieces of cannon, the colours of the 7th regiment, and near four hundred prisoners." Thus far Col. Tarleton. Gen. Moultrie received his account of this action of the Cowpens "from an officer of great veracity and high rank, who was conspicuous on that day;" supposed to be Col. Washington. The substance of his account shall now be given; that the two may be compared. Gen. Morgan drew up his men in an open pine barren, the militia of about four hundred men, under Col. Pickens, formed the first line. The continentals of about five hundred men, two hundred of whom were raw troops, formed the second line, under Col. Howard, two hundred yards in the rear. Col. Washington, with seventy-five continental cavalry, and forty-five militia under Capt. M'Call, in the rear. Pickens ordered his men to reserve their fire till the enemy came within fifty yards, which they did, and fired with great success; but they were soon obliged to give way and retreat behind the second line, which received them warmly; at length the second line began to give way. Col. Washington, perceiving this, rode up to their rear with his cavalry, and told Howard, "if he would rally his men and charge the enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry who were cutting down the militia." His riding so close to the rear stopped the British, and Howard rallied his men in the mean time, and charged with fixed bayonets. Col. Washington charged the cavalry and routed them; the militia at the same time recovered themselves and began to fire, and the whole threw the enemy into the utmost confusion. Howard called out to them, "to lay down their arms and they should have good quarters." Upwards of five hundred men threw down their arms and surrendered. Two hundred were left dead on the field, and a great number wounded. Besides the two field pieces mentioned by Tarleton, six hundred men, eight hundred stand of arms, and thirty-five baggage waggons, fell into the hands of the Americans. Col. Washington pursued the British cavalry twenty-five miles."

By this last account the disparity in numbers was not great, and as one half the Americans were either militia or new levies, the superiority was on the side of Tarleton, whose men, except two hundred, were veterans, and he had two field pieces. The ground too he acknowledges was advantageous; so that every thing was in his favour, but _an agency_ which he could not control. But in the last account we can find no place where he and his handful of brave men could encounter Col. Washington. In his bewildered fancy perhaps it was some other object he encountered, since for the space of five and twenty miles, not their faces, but only their backs were to be seen. The fact is, that never was victory more complete, never was vanity more humbled, nor cruelty more justly requited than in the defeat of this tyrannical man. Its first effect was to raise the spirits of the people; its ultimate consequence was the downfall of Cornwallis and peace to the country. But most severe trials are yet to be surmounted, and patriotism the most exemplary remains yet to be recorded.

On the day the last letter of Greene, of the 23d Jan. was written, Gen. Marion and Col. Lee projected a joint expedition to surprise Georgetown. Capts. Carnes and Rudulph, with ninety men, dropped down the Pedee from Snow's island in a boat, to fall in on the back of the town by Winyaw bay, while Marion and Lee were to come down with the main body by land.--Carnes with his party went ashore at Mitchell's landing, and marched over his rice-field bank into the town at day light. The surprise would have been complete, had they pushed up directly to the redoubt, but they delayed too long on the Bay. They took the commandant, Col. Campbell, out of his bed, and killed Major Irvine and some others; but Marion and Lee could not arrive in time to cooperate. The redoubt was alarmed and placed in a state of defence, and Carnes was obliged to retreat. The great cause of delay was the inclination to take the commandant, by which they lost the fort and the town. Lieut. Cryer killed Irvine, by whose orders he had received five hundred lashes some time before, for attempting to take away his horse from Georgetown.

On the 28th Jan. Gen. Huger transmitted an order from Greene to Marion, to strike at the posts beyond Santee. But this Gen. Marion had anticipated.--From Cordes' plantation, in advance, at the distance of one hundred miles from Greene, and on the 29th Jan. he had detached Col. Postell and Major Postell on this important service. The latter had but thirty-eight men, and it is presumed from circumstances, the colonel had about an equal number. The colonel burnt a great quantity of valuable stores at Manigault's ferry, and the major a great many more in its vicinity.--Thence the latter posted to Keithfield, near Monk's corner, and burnt fourteen waggons loaded with soldiers' clothing, baggage and other valuable stores, and took prisoners about forty British regulars, without losing a man. To the Postells "nothing indeed appeared difficult." They received the thanks of Gen. Greene.

About the beginning of this year, Gen. Marion appointed two aids, Thomas Elliott and Lewis Ogier, the first of whom conducted the most of his correspondence. He formed a mess of which Col. Hugh Horry and Col. James Postell were inmates, and apparently his principal counsellors; Serjt. Davis was his caterer, and supplied his dinners, _such as they were_: heretofore he had seldom any thing but meat and sweet potatoes, and often not both of these at a time, but now he had the luxury of rice. He did what was of more consequence than this, he put in requisition all the saws in the country, and all the blacksmiths, and made swords for four troops of militia cavalry.--He had so little ammunition this expedient was necessary. He gave the command of this corps to Col. Peter Horry, who had been a captain with him in the second regiment and had been an excellent infantry officer.--His major was Benson, and his captains John Baxter, John Postell, Daniel Conyers and James M'Cauley; John T. Greene soon after succeeded Baxter, who was appointed colonel on the resignation of Ervine. Hugh Horry had command of M'Donald's regiment, who was a prisoner on parole, and _his_ officers have been mentioned. Capt. Wm. M'Cottry commanded a company of riflemen who were the dread of the enemy. As the brigade was not strong enough for this corps of horse to act in conjunction, single troops were commonly detached by the general. At the head of a party of this cavalry Col. Peter Horry had soon an opportunity to make a trial of his skill in cavalry evolutions. He met and charged a troop of British horse on Waccamaw neck, but by his own account he appears to have been rather worsted, for he was unhorsed himself and his life saved by Serjt. M'Donald; however he brought off some prisoners. Major John Postell, who was mentioned before, was stationed to guard the lower part of Pedee, had better fortune. On the 18th Jan. Capt. James Depeyster, with twenty-nine grenadiers of the British army, had posted himself in the dwelling house of the major's father, and Postell commanded but twenty-eight militia men. Towards day on the morning after, the major, by knowing well the ground and avoiding the sentinels, got possession of the kitchen, and summoned Depeyster to surrender; this was at first refused, and the major set fire to the kitchen. He then summoned him a second time, with the positive declaration if he did not surrender he would burn the house; the British being intimidated, laid down their arms and surrendered unconditionally.

From a part of the correspondence of Gen. Marion with Capt. Saunders, now commandant of Georgetown, it appears that he had either soon after the 17th Jan. or before that, imprisoned Mr. John Postell, the father of the major; Gen. Marion offers "to exchange him, and hopes humanity will induce Capt. Saunders to treat him like a gentleman."* Mr. John Postell was at least seventy years of age, and much afflicted with disease, but possessed the spirit of a Cato.

* Marion's letter, 22d February.

Soon after this, Col. Peter Horry had a conflict with Major Ganey at White's bridge, near Georgetown, which had a more decisive effect than could have been expected at the time. Early in the morning he made a charge upon a party who were killing beeves at the camp near that place. They fled and were pursued through the woods on the left towards Georgetown, with some disorder on the side of Horry. In the mean time the firing was heard in the town, and their tory friends came out to their assistance. A kind of savage warfare now took place in the woods, between the Sampit and Black river roads, during the whole morning. A party of Horry's was at one time seen advancing, and the tories retreating; then again the tories were advancing, and a party of Horry's retreating. At one time the commander was left as he thought alone, and Capt. Lewis at the head of a party was rushing on to shoot him down, when suddenly from behind a tree off went the gun of a boy by the name of Gwyn, and shot Lewis, whose party thinking more guns were behind trees ran away. As Lewis fell his gun went off and killed Horry's horse. Finally the tories were routed. In this affair Serjt. M'Donald performed essential service; he had singled out Ganey as his object of attack, and the latter fled from him.--In going at full speed down the Black river road, at the corner of Richmond fence, M'Donald shot one of Ganey's men, and overtaking him soon after thrust a bayonet up to the hilt in his back; the bayonet separated from the gun, and Ganey carried it into Georgetown; he recovered, but tired of a garrison life, after a few months he and his men deserted the British.

As the navigation of the Wateree river was at that time imperfect, the British were obliged to have most of their stores of rum, salt, ammunition and clothing sent over land, across Nelson's ferry, to Camden, and as the Americans were destitute of these articles, constant conflicts took place upon that road to obtain them from the enemy. To secure these, they had established a line of posts, at Biggen, at Nelson's, and at Scott's lake. Besides this protection, their supplies were always attended by escorts, which, since the enterprizes of the two Postells, seldom consisted of less than three or four hundred men. About the middle of February, Major M'Ilraith was marching from Nelson's ferry at the head of one of these escorts, and Marion with about an equal force assailed him near Halfway swamp, on the road; he first cut off two pickets in his rear in succession, then wheeling round his main body, attacked him in flank and in front. As M'Ilraith had no cavalry, his situation became perilous in the extreme. By a forced march, and constant skirmishing, he at length gained a field upon the road, now belonging to Mr. Matthew James; and as it was open and enclosed, he posted himself on the west of the road, within the enclosure. On the east, skirting the road, there is a large cypress pond stretching towards Halfway swamp, and on the verge of this Marion pitched his camp. Here M'Ilraith sent him a flag, reproaching him with shooting his pickets, contrary, as he alleged, to all the laws of civilized warfare, and defying him to a combat in the open field. Marion replied, that the practice of the British in burning the houses of all who would not submit and join them, was more indefensible than that of shooting pickets, and that as long as they persisted in the one he would persevere in the other. That as to his defiance, he considered it that of a man in desperate circumstances; but if he wished to witness a combat between twenty picked men on each side, he was ready to gratify him. The offer was accepted, and a place pitched upon to the south of an oak tree, which still stands in the field. Accordingly, Gen. Marion appointed Maj. John Vanderhorst, then a supernumerary officer, to take command of this band, and Capt. Samuel Price, of All Saints, to be second in command. The names of the men were written on slips of paper, and presented to them individually, and the first slip was handed to Gavin Witherspoon. Not one refused. Vanderhorst formed in Indian file, and they proceeded to the fence, where Gen. Marion met and harangued them to the following effect: "My brave soldiers! you are twenty men picked this day out of my whole brigade. I know you all, and have often witnessed your bravery. In the name of your country, I call upon you once more to show it. My confidence in you is great, and I am sure it will not be disappointed. Fight like men, fight as you have always done, and you are sure of the victory." This short speech was received with applause by the combatants. Vanderhorst now asked Witherspoon, "What distance would you choose as the surest to strike with buck shot?" "Fifty yards for the first fire," was the reply. Then, said the commander, "when we get within fifty yards, my boys, as I am not a good judge of distances, Mr. Witherspoon will tap me on the shoulder. I will then give the word, and you will form on my left opposite those fellows. As you form, each man will fire at the one directly opposite him, and my word for it, few will be left for a second shot." The British had now formed in a single line in front of the oak, and Vanderhorst advanced boldly on within one hundred yards. At this juncture, an officer was seen to pass swiftly on toward the oak, and the enemy shouldered their muskets and retreated with a quick step towards the main body. Vanderhorst and his men gave them three huzzas! but did not at that distance fire a shot. Thus a British officer was met on his own boasted ground and proved recreant. The next morning Major M'Ilraith abandoned his heavy baggage, left his fires burning, and retired silently from the ground, along the river road towards Singelton's mill, distant ten miles. Near day Marion discovered his movement, and detached Col. Hugh Horry with one hundred men to get ahead of him, before he should reach the mill. The colonel made all possible speed, but finding he could not overtake him, detached Major James at the head of a party mounted on the swiftest horses, to cross the mill pond above, and take possession of Singelton's houses, which stood on a high hill, commanding a narrow defile on the road, between the hill and Wateree swamp. Major James reached the houses as the British advanced to the foot of the hill; but found Singelton's family down with the small pox. This was more dreaded than the enemy. He gave them one fire, by which a captain was killed, and retired. As M'Ilraith was now in a strong hold, Marion pursued him no further.

The character of Major M'Ilraith has been constantly represented by the inhabitants of this state, among whom he passed as the most humane of all the officers of the British army. To those in their power even forbearance was at that time a virtue, but his virtues were active. It has been currently reported that he carried his dislike to house burning so far, that he neglected to carry into effect the orders of his commander in chief on that point to such an extent, as to gain his ill will and that of many other British officers.--How much it is to be regretted that the rigid rules of warfare should have arrayed such a man in opposition to Marion, when both professed the same humane principles.

We come now to the most interesting part of the warfare of Gen. Marion, which, bringing into action all the energies of his officers and men, at the same time developed all the skill and patience of their commander.

At the juncture of the retreat of Gen. Greene before Cornwallis, Sumter and Marion were left alone in South Carolina; Sumter on the Catawba, in York district, and Marion on the Pedee, at Snow's island, about two hundred miles apart, and Lord Rawdon directly between them, with a much superior force. Thus situated his lordship laid a well digested plan to crush Marion. Col. Watson with a British regiment, and Harrison's regiment of tories, amounting in the whole to more than five hundred men, was ordered to march down the Santee, towards Snow's island; and he commenced his expedition from Fort Watson about the first of March.

Shortly after Col. Doyle with another British regiment, was directed to proceed by the way of M'Callum's ferry on Lynch's creek, and down Jeffer's creek, to the Pedee road to the same point, where they were to form a junction. Doyle had to open a road from M'Callum's to Pedee, and his approach, though slow, was unexpected; but Marion's scouts placed from Camden down, with relays of horses, soon informed him of Watson's movement. By one of his rapid marches he met him at Wiboo, about midway between Nelson's and Murray's ferry, and at this swamp commenced his arduous contest with Watson. Col. Peter Horry was placed in advance at the swamp, while the general with the cavalry, and remainder of the brigade, amounting to about four hundred men, lay in reserve. Horry made considerable impression upon the tories in advance; but Watson with two field pieces, and at the head of his column of regulars, dislodged him from the swamp, and the tory cavalry under Harrison pursued. As they advanced, Gavin James, a private of gigantic size and spirit, mounted on a strong grey horse, and armed with a musket and bayonet, threw himself in their way. He first deliberately fired upon the column and one man fell. The causeway was narrow and this occasioned a pause, in which a volley was fired at him without effect. One dragoon advanced and was struck off his horse by the bayonet. A second came to his aid and shared a like fate; in falling he laid hold of the musket near the muzzle to jerk it away, and James dragged him forty or fifty paces. This bold action produced a considerable effect, and was soon followed by many others, not so well recollected, and too numerous to be inserted.--Harrison had not pursued far, when Marion ordered the cavalry to charge; Capts. M'Cauley and Conyers, met him, and soon dispersed his force; whilst Conyers killed one of his officers, said to be Major Harrison, with his own hands. Thus were the tories intimidated at the outset.

On the 9th of March, Col. Watson encamped at Cantey's plantation, and wrote a letter to Gen. Marion, in which he justifies (what the other had complained of by a previous communication,*) the burning of houses and the hanging of those citizens who had taken paroles, and afterwards joined the Americans, upon the principles of the laws of war and nations.--It seems the colonel had reference to the code of barbarous nations. Marion made him no reply, but gave orders to his nightly patroles, to shoot his sentinels and cut off his pickets. Such a retaliation was to be expected; and thus raged the civil warfare.

* Letter of Marion, 7th March.

Watson marched down the river, and at Mount Hope had to build up the bridges, and to sustain a second conflict with Col. Hugh Horry, at the head of Marion's advance. By dint of his field pieces, and the strength of his column, he at length made good his way. Near Murray's ferry he passed the Kingstree road to his left, and when he came to the Black river road, which crosses at the lower bridge, he made a feint of still continuing down the Santee; but soon after wheeling took that road on which the lower bridge was, distant twelve miles. His manoeuvre did not long deceive Marion. He detached Major James at the head of seventy men, thirty of whom were riflemen under M'Cottry, to destroy the remnant of the bridge, which had been partially broken, and to take post there, while the general kept an eye on Watson.

The pass of the lower bridge was now to decide the fate of Williamsburgh, and seventy of her sons, under her most approved leaders, were gone forth to defend it. Maj. James proceeded with great expedition, and crossing the river by a shorter route than the road, arrived at the bridge in time to throw down two of the middle arches, and to fire the string pieces at the eastern end. At this place the west bank of the river is considerably elevated, the east low and somewhat swampy, and on the west the road passes to the bridge through a ravine; the river is forty or fifty yards wide, and though deep, was fordable below the bridge. As soon as the breach in it was effected, Maj. James drew up M'Cottry's riflemen on each side of the ford and end of the bridge, so as to have a fair view of the ravine, and disposed the rest of his little band on the flanks. Not long after, Marion arriving, took post in the rear, and sent Capt. Thomas Potts, with his Pedee company, to reinforce Maj. James; and this had scarcely been effected, when Watson's field pieces opened their fire, from the opposite bank to clear his way, for a passage at the ford. These field pieces could not be brought to bear on the low grounds to the east without exposing his artillerists on the hill to the fire of the riflemen. His balls hit the pines across the river, about midway their trunks, or passed over disregarded. This attempt not succeeding, Watson drew up his columns in the old field over the river, and his advance was now seen approaching the ford with an officer at its head, waving his sword. M'Cottry fired the signal gun, and the officer clapped his hand to his breast and fell to the ground. The riflemen and musketeers next poured in a well directed and deadly fire, and the British advance fled in disorder; nor did the reserve move forward to its support. Four men returned to bear off their officer, but all four shared his fate. In the evening, Watson succeeded in removing his dead and wounded, and took up his head quarters at John Witherspoon's, a mile above the bridge. Here he was overheard to say, "that he never saw such shooting in his life." To men fighting for their homes, wives, families, and their very existence, "nothing appeared difficult;" and good shooting, if not a virtue in them, was highly commendable. Gen. Marion took a position on a ridge below the ford of the river, which is still called the general's island. Next day he pushed M'Cottry and Conyers over the river, and recommenced shooting Watson's pickets and sentinels. Watson posted himself a little farther up the river, at Blakely's plantation, where he pitched his camp in the most open place he could find, but still Marion kept him in a bad humour, (as his letters from that place indicate,) and his regulars in a constant panic. Here he remained for more than a week* in inactivity and irresolution; perhaps he waited for Doyle to make an impression at Snow's island; but if Marion heard of Doyle, he kept it a profound secret. While Blakely's and Witherspoon's provisions lasted, his present plan answered pretty well; but when they failed, it became necessary to have more at a greater distance, and these could not be obtained, but by daily skirmishes. In these Capt. Conyers was greatly distinguished. He was most daring, and sat and managed his horse so remarkably well, that as was the case with the centaur of old, they might have been taken for one animal. Conyers was at this time fighting under the auspicious eye of a young lady,** to whom his faith had been plighted, and beneath her alternate smiles and fears, he presented himself daily before the lines of the enemy, either as a single champion, or at the head of his troop. Often did she hear them repeat, "Take care! there is Capt. Conyers!" It was a ray of chivalry athwart the gloom of unrelenting warfare.

* About ten days, as it appears from the dates of his
letters.

** This young lady was Mary, the second daughter of John
Witherspoon, who after the war, was married to Conyers. One
day when her lover made his appearance as usual, a British
officer made use of language disrespectful to him, which she
bore for some time with patience; at last he said something
indelicate to herself. She immediately drew off a walking
shoe from her foot, and flung it in his face, saying,
"coward! go meet him." In those days kid slippers were not
fashionable.

To increase the panic of the British, Serjt. M'Donald, with a rifle, shot Lieut. Torriano through the knee, at the distance of three hundred yards. This appears to have softened even the proud spirit of Watson; for, on the 15th of March, he wrote a letter to Marion, stating, "we have an officer and some men wounded, whom I should be glad to send where they could be better taken care of. I wish, therefore, to know if they will be permitted to pass to Charleston." Gen. Marion wrote for a list of them, and next day sent the following pass: "Gen. Marion's pass, granted to Lieut. Torriano and twelve privates.--One officer and six wounded men, with six attendants, of the British troops, are permitted to pass to Nelson's ferry, thence to Charleston, unmolested," &c. Col. Watson was now literally besieged; his supplies were cut off on all sides, and so many of his men killed, that, he is said by tradition, to have sunk them in Black river to hide their number. There is a quarry of rock in the neighbourhood of the place, and the only one in that part of the country, where, it is said, he sunk his men. At length Watson, decamping, made a forced march down the Georgetown road; but paused at Ox swamp, six miles below the lower bridge. On each side of the road there was then a thick, boggy swamp--trees were felled across the causeway--three bridges were destroyed, and Marion was watching him with the eye of an eagle. Thus situated, and having to force a more difficult pass at Johnson's swamp, ten miles ahead, Watson most prudently wheeled to the right, and passed on, through open piney woods, to the Santee road, distant about fifteen miles. When overtaken by Marion upon this road, his infantry were passing like horses at a full trot. Here he had not so many obstacles to encounter as on the other road, and, by wheeling covertly and marching so briskly, had gained considerable ground. However, Col. Peter Horry now advanced ahead with the cavalry and riflemen, and annoyed him in flank and in front, while Marion attacked in the rear, until they reached Sampit bridge, where the last skirmish took place. News from Doyle appears to have arrested Marion's progress, and summoned him to new perils.

Watson reached Georgetown, with two waggon loads of wounded men.* It is evident from an intercepted letter of his of the 20th of March, that he had been hemmed in so closely that he was in want of every thing, and had taken this route to Georgetown, fifty miles out of his way, to obtain supplies. From Fort Watson to the lower bridge, he had not advanced more than forty miles on his premeditated route to join Doyle.

* Horry's Narrative.

In the mean time, Col. Doyle, an active, enterprising officer, had driven Col. Ervin, who commanded only a weak guard, from Snow's island. But before retreating he had Marion's arms, stores and ammunition thrown into Lynch's creek. This, at the crisis, was a most serious loss.

From Sampit, Gen. Marion marched back towards Snow's island; on the way he received intelligence that Doyle lay at Witherspoon's ferry, and he proceeded forthwith to attack him. Doyle had taken a position on the north side of the ferry, and when M'Cottry, in advance, with his mounted riflemen, arrived at the creek, the British were scuttling a ferry boat on the opposite side. He took a position behind trees, and gave them a well directed and deadly fire; they ran to their arms and returned a prodigious volley, which did no more harm than that of knocking off the limbs of trees among the riflemen. Doyle had received news, which occasioned him to retreat for Camden. The ferry boat being now scuttled and sunk on the opposite side, and Lynch's creek being swollen, and at this place wide and deep, Gen. Marion proceeded up the creek, and swam over it at the first place he reached, five miles above Witherspoon's. This was the shortest route to come at Doyle. He pursued all that day, and the next morning till nine or ten o'clock, when he came to a house where Doyle had destroyed all his heavy baggage, and had proceeded on with great celerity towards Camden. This seemed mysterious at the time; but here Marion halted.

It appears from what follows, shortly, as well as from Horry's account, that this pursuit was undertaken by Gen. Marion with the desperate resolution of either selling his own life and that of his followers, as dearly as possible, or of cutting his way through the enemy to make good a retreat into North Carolina. Happily for his country, Doyle evaded him, and thus prevented the dangerous attempt. The general now received the melancholy account of the extent of his loss in ammunition and other stores on Snow's island, which under present circumstances appeared irretrievable. However he was but little disposed to brood over misfortunes, and if he had, his enemies were not inclined to allow him leisure. In the mean time Col. Watson, having refreshed and reinforced his party, and received a fresh supply of military stores and provisions at Georgetown, proceeded again towards the Pedee. On his march he had nothing to impede him but a few bridges broken down. He took the nearest route across Black river at Wragg's ferry, and crossing the Pedee at Euhany, and the little Pedee at Potato bed ferry, he halted at Catfish creek, a mile from where Marion court house now stands.--Here Ganey's party flocked in to him in such numbers that he was soon nine hundred strong. Gen. Marion returning from the pursuit of Doyle, and hearing of the approach of Watson, crossed the Pedee and encamped at the Warhees, five miles from him. At this place he consulted with his field officers then in camp, and informed them that although his force was now recruited to five hundred men, that yet he had no more ammunition than about two rounds to each man, and asked them "if he should retreat into the upper parts of North Carolina, or if necessary to the mountains, whether they would follow him." With a firm and unanimous voice the resolution to follow him was adopted. These field officers, whose names should be engraved on tablets of brass, were Cols. Peter Horry, Hugh Horry, James Postell and John Ervin, and Majors John James, John Baxter and Alexander Swinton.

Not long after this resolution was taken, Gen. Marion met Capt. Gavin Witherspoon, who said to him, "General had we not better fight Col. Watson before any more tories join him." "My friend," replied he, "I know that would be best, but we have not ammunition." "Why, general," said Witherspoon, "here is my powder horn full," holding it up. "Ah! my friend," said Marion, "you are an extraordinary soldier, but as for others, there are not two rounds to a man." Witherspoon passed off in silent sorrow; but as soon as he reached his camp, met Baker Johnson, an old tried whig, who begged him for God's sake to give him something to eat, and he set before him some cold rice in a pot. While Johnson was eating, Witherspoon sat pondering over what he had heard for some time; but at last inquired, "What news, Johnson?" "Fine news," said he, "I saw a great number of continental troops, horse and foot, crossing at Long bluff." "Come and tell the general," said Witherspoon. "No," replied the other, "I am starving with hunger, and if the general wants the news he must come to me." Witherspoon immediately posted off to the general, who lost no time in going to Johnson; around whom some hundreds were soon collected. The bearer of the good tidings was to be depended on. The news was sudden and unexpected, and to men now in a state of desperation nothing could be more transporting. Scarce was there an eye but what was suffused with tears of joy. All sufferings appeared now to be at an end, and that balm of the soul hope began to revive. But while Johnson was still communicating his intelligence, it was confirmed by the sound of a drum in the rear; and soon after by the arrival of Major Conyers and Capt. Irby, with Lieut. Col. Lee's legionary infantry. By Conyers, Marion received orders from Gen. Greene to join Lee, and cooperate with him in striking at the posts below Camden, and in furnishing provisions for the main army;* and Lee had moved on towards the Santee for that purpose. Commencing his march immediately, Gen. Marion crossed the Pedee in his rear, and left Witherspoon with a small party to watch Watson. The line of march was directed through Williamsburgh; and Marion joined Lee near Fort Watson, on Scott's lake.

* Greene's letters, 4th and 17th April.

About the same time, Capt. John Brockington, of the tories, had been up to his plantation at Cashway, and hearing the same news with Baker Johnson, pushed over the river, and gave Watson the like information. He lost no time, but immediately rolled his two field pieces into Catfish creek, destroyed all his heavy baggage, re-crossed the little Pedee, and not venturing by Euhany, he passed the Waccamaw at Greene's ferry, and retreating through the neck, between that river and the sea, crossed Winyaw bay, three miles wide, and thus arrived in Georgetown. To those unacquainted with this route, a bare inspection of the map of the country will at once give information, how much Marion was dreaded by Watson.

Upon forming a junction with Col. Lee, it was decidedly the opinion of Gen. Marion, that they should pursue Watson, and either take him or prevent his junction with Lord Rawdon. But Lee was of opinion it would lead them too far from Gen. Greene. Gen. Marion must have given up his point with much reluctance, for he was afterwards heard repeatedly to regret that his orders did not permit him to pursue Col. Watson. But, perhaps the true reason was that Marion and Lee were both bare of ammunition, and could get it only by taking Fort Watson. It was left without the presence of its commander, and as in that day there was no road from Kingstree up Black river to Camden, and the swamps were impassable except to hunters, by taking a position at Scott's lake, they would be on the only road there was from Georgetown, on a direct line, to intercept Watson, as he marched up to Camden.--But while Gen. Marion passed through Williamsburgh, his men having now performed a tour of duty of more than a month against Watson, which with all its watchings and privations was unusually severe, and being suddenly relieved from that pressure, many of them took the liberty of going home to recruit themselves; and he was left to his great mortification with only eighty men. However, they soon dropped in, one or two at a time.*

* Gen. Greene's elegant letter to Marion, 9th May.

On the 15th of April, Gen. Marion invested Fort Watson, at Scott's lake, without any other means of annoyance than musketry. The fort stood on an Indian mound, about forty feet high, and was stockaded, and had three rows of abbatis round it.* The besiegers took post between the fort and the lake, to cut off the water; but the besieged sunk a well in the fort. As there were no trees or other covering near the fort, Marion's riflemen were too much exposed at first to fire with effect; but Col. Maham contrived to raise a tower of logs in one night, so high that it overtopped the fort, and the marksmen began to fire into it. Gen. Marion had no entrenching tools to make a regular approach, but on the day after the investment, a party of militia under Ensign Baker Johnson, and of continentals under Mr. Lee, a volunteer in the legion, with a sudden movement, and much intrepidity, made a lodgment near the stockade, and began to pull away the abbatis and fling them down the mound. Lieut. M'Kay, who commanded, then hoisted a white flag, and the garrison, consisting of one hundred and fourteen men and officers, capitulated. Major Eaton had been detached by Gen. Greene, with one field piece, to join Marion, but arrived too late to participate in this siege. The loss of the Americans was only two militia men killed, and three continentals and three militia wounded.--As this fort lay on the great line of communication between Camden and Charleston, its fall was a great loss to the enemy; and by taking it Gen. Marion obtained supplies of ammunition, which he soon turned to great advantage.

* Marion's letter, 23d April.

During the siege, Col. Watson evaded Marion and Lee. Having arrived in Georgetown, and not yet recovered from his panic, he crossed the north and south Santee, at the lower ferries, and having surmounted this difficulty, he marched up the west side of the river and arrived in Camden by the way of the ferry near the town, with forces much impaired by the incessant attacks of Marion, and long marches, combined with much desertion; but his loss is not confessed by the enemy, nor could it be discovered by the Americans.--Had he been able to have cooperated with Doyle in sufficient time, with their overwhelming force, assisted by Harrison and Ganey, with an equal, if not greater number of tories; there can be little doubt, but Gen. Marion with his scanty means of defence, must either have fallen in the conflict or been driven out of the country. When he first marched from Scott's lake, Col. Watson had only seventy miles to traverse, and only Black river to pass, before he reached Snow's island; yet such was the consummate skill and indefatigable exertions of Gen. Marion, that from the 9th of March until the 10th of April, he had not reached his place of destination, and then made a hasty retreat through roads unfrequented, and over wide swamps and rivers, unpursued. To effect this he took a circuitous route, nearly one hundred miles out of his way, which detained him until about the 9th of May, more than two months from his first setting out on this expedition.

Col. Watson was considered by the British one of their best partisans; yet we have seen how he was foiled. Had his regiment attempted, as was no doubt intended, to ford the river at the lower bridge, they would have found the passage narrow, and the river at that time deep; or had he undertaken to repair the bridge, in either case he must have lost a great portion of his men. He was, however, a better officer than historian or civilian, otherwise he would not have justified the practice of burning houses, in the face of the universal censure cast upon Lewis XIV. for adopting the same measure in the Palatinate. But when Watson, Balfour, and other British officers, professing to know the laws of war and nations, burnt houses and hanged those citizens who had taken deceptive paroles upon their authority, certainly it may be affirmed that Marion, who was self-taught, and had no book of the law of nations, or perhaps any other book in his camp, was justifiable as a matter of retaliation, to shoot down their pickets and cut off their sentinels wherever he could find them; and always to fight such invaders in their own barbarian manner. Nothing ever showed, in such a strong light, the plain good sense of Marion. Col. Watson had orders to burn houses, but did not however appear to wish to carry them rigourously into effect. It is believed he burnt but two; one was the house of Lieut. Dickson, who was with Marion; the other belonged to Nathaniel Dwight, of Waccamaw neck. Upon a retrospection, Col. Watson's character appears in a favourable point of view; and, as far as was consistent with orders, his humanity is undoubted.

On the 18th of April, Col. William Harden, acting under the orders of Marion, took the British fort at Pocotaligo, with one militia colonel, one major, three captains, three lieutenants, sixty privates and twenty-two dragoons, prisoners. He writes, "I wish you would send some commissions, with your orders. It seems they wait for Col. Hayne, and he says he cannot act without a commission, and I am sure, if he turns out, at least two hundred will join him. If so, I am very certain that this part of the country may be held." Every one has either read or heard of the subsequent melancholy fate of Col. Hayne; but more of that in the sequel.

Major John Postell had been pitched upon as the first victim. After distinguishing himself, as related, he obtained leave from his general to go with a flag to Georgetown, to obtain the release of his father, (who was still a prisoner) and of some others. Capt. Saunders, now the commandant, detained him, and threw him also into gaol, on the plea of his having broken his parole;* and, in a long correspondence with Gen. Marion, he and Col. Balfour, the commandant of Charleston, vindicated the measure, as consistent with the laws of war and nations. It appears Balfour was the civilian of the British while here in power. He was just such a minion as would have suited the purposes of Tiberius Caesar. He had several hundreds of Americans pining in want and misery in loathsome prison-ships, and in dungeons under the Exchange, damp and noisome, which he called _his provost_.

* By a copy of Major Postell's parole, preserved in Horry's
correspondence, it appears he was paroled in Charleston;
but, soon after, the British or tories stripped him of all
his property, which was a breach of it on their part. In a
letter to Gen. Marion, 14th Jan. he says, "My honour is all
I have left--my family has been reduced to beg their
bread."