Chapter VIII: Conclusions (2)

My statement [31:2] is, that it is admitted that there was no such place as Sychar--I ought to have added, "except by apologists who never admit anything"--but I thought that in saying: "and apologetic ingenuity is severely taxed to explain the difficulty," I had sufficiently excepted apologists, and indicated that many assertions and conjectures are advanced by them for that purpose. I mention that the conjecture which identifies Sychar and Sichem is rejected by some, refer to Credner's supposition that the alteration may be due to some error committed by a secretary in writing down the Gospel from the dictation of the Apostle, and that Sichem is meant, and I state the "nickname" hypothesis of Hengstenberg and others. It is undeniable that, with the exception of some vague references in the Talmud to a somewhat similar, but not identical, name, the locality of which is quite uncertain, no place bearing, or having borne, the designation of Sychar is known. The ordinary apologetic theory, as Dr. Lightfoot may find "in any common source of information,"--Dr. Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," for instance--is the delightfully comprehensive one: "Sychar was either a name applied to the town of Shechem, or it was an independent place." This authority, however, goes clean against Dr. Lightfoot's assertion, for it continues: "The first of these alternatives is now almost universally accepted." Lightfoot [32:1] considered Sychar a mere alteration of the name Sichem, both representing the same place. He found a reference in the Talmud to "_Ain Socar_," and with great hesitation he associated the name with Sychar. "May we not venture" to render it "the well of Sychar"? And after detailed extracts and explanations he says: "And now let the reader give us his judgment as to its name and place, whether it doth not seem to have some relation with our 'well of Sychar.' It may be disputed on either side." Wieseler, who first, in more recent times, developed the conjectures of Lightfoot, argues: "In the first place, there can be no doubt that by [Greek: Suchar] Sichem is meant," and he adds, a few lines after: "Regarding this there is no controversy amongst interpreters." He totally rejects the idea of such in alteration of the name occurring in translation, which he says is "unprecedented." He therefore concludes that in [Greek: Suchar] we have _another_ name for Sichem. He merely submits this, however, as "a new hypothesis to the judgment of the reader," [32:2] which alone shows the uncertainty of the suggestion. Lightfoot and Wieseler are substantially followed by Olshausen, [32:3] De Wette, [32:4] Hug, [32:5] Bunsen, [32:6] Riggenbach, [32:7] Godet, [32:8] and others. Bleek, [32:9] in spite of the arguments of Delitzsch and Ewald, and their Talmudic researches, considers that the old town of Sichem is meant. Delitzsch, [32:10] Ewald, [32:11] Lange, [32:12] Meyer, [32:13] and others think that Sychar was near to, but distinct from, Sichem. Lücke [33:1] is very undecided. He recognises the extraordinary difference in the name Sychar. He does not favourably receive Lightfoot's arguments regarding an alteration of the name of Sichem, nor his conjectures as to the relation of the place mentioned in the Talmud to Sichem, which he thinks is "very doubtful," and he seems to incline rather to an accidental corruption of Sichem into Sychar, although he feels the great difficulties in the way of such an explanation. Ewald condemns the "Talmudische Studien" of Delitzsch as generally more complicating than clearing up difficulties, and his views as commonly incorrect, and, whilst agreeing with him that Sychar cannot be the same place as Sichem, he points out that the site of the _valley of the_ well of the Talmud is certainly doubtful. [33:2] He explains his own views, however, more clearly in another place:--

"That this (Sychar) cannot be the large, ancient Sikhem, which, at
the time when the Gospel was written, was probably already generally
called _Neapolis_ in Greek writings, has been already stated; it is
the place still called with an altered Arabic name _Al 'Askar_, east
of Naplûs. It is indeed difficult to prove that Sychar could stand
for Sikhem, either through change of pronunciation, or for any other
reason, and the addition [Greek: legomenê] does not indicate, here any
more than in xi. 54, so large and generally known a town as Sikhem.
or Flavia Neapolis." [33:3]

Mr. Sanday, [33:4] of whose able work Dr. Lightfoot directly speaks, says:--

"The name Sychar is not the common one, Sichem, but is a mock title
(='liar' or 'drunkard') that was given to the town by the Jews.
[33:5] This is a clear reminiscence of the vernacular that the
Apostle spoke in his youth, and is a strong touch of nature. It is
not quite certain that the name Sychar has this force, but the
hypothesis is in itself more likely than, &c.... It is not,
however, by any means improbable that Sychar may represent, not
Sichem, but the modern village Askar, which is somewhat nearer to
Jacob's Well."

To quote one of the latest "travellers and apologists," Dr. Farrar says: "From what the name Sychar is derived is uncertain. The word [Greek: legomenos] in St. John seems to imply a sobriquet. It may be 'a lie,' 'drunken,' or 'a sepulchre.' Sychar may possibly have been a village nearer the well than Sichem, on the site of the village now called El Askar." [34:1] As Dr. Lightfoot specially mentions Neubauer, his opinion may be substantially given in a single sentence: "La Mischna mentionne un endroit appelé 'la plaine d'En-Sokher,' qui est peut-être le Sychar de l'Evangile." He had a few lines before said: "Il est donc plus logique de ne pas identifier Sychar avec Sichem." [34:2] Now, with regard to all these theories, and especially in so far as they connect Sychar with El Askar, let me quote a few more words in conclusion, from a "common source of information:"--

"On the other hand there is an etymological difficulty in the way of
this identification. _'Askar_ begins with the letter 'Ain, which
Sychar does not appear to have contained; a letter too stubborn and
enduring to be easily either dropped or assumed in a name ... These
considerations have been stated not so much with the hope of leading
to any conclusion on the identity of Sychar, which seems hopeless,
as with the desire to show that the ordinary explanation is not
nearly so obvious as it is usually assumed to be." [34:3]

Mr. Grove is very right.

I have been careful only to quote from writers who are either "apologetic," or far from belonging to heterodox schools. Is it not perfectly clear that no place of the name of Sychar can be reasonably identified? The case, in fact, simply stands thus:--As the Gospel mentions a town called Sychar, apologists maintain that there must have been such a place, and attempt by various theories to find a site for it. It is certain, however, that even in the days of St. Jerome there was no real trace of such a town, and apologists and travellers have not since been able to discover it, except in their own imaginations.

With regard to the insinuation that the references given in my notes constitute a "subtle mode of intimidation" and "literary browbeating," Canon Lightfoot omits to say that I as fully and candidly refer to those who maintain views wholly different from my own, as to those who support me. It is very possible, considering the number of these references, that I may have committed some errors, and I can only say that I shall very thankfully receive from Dr. Lightfoot any corrections which he may be good enough to point out. Instead of intimidation and browbeating, my sole desire has been to indicate to all who may be anxious further to examine questions in debate, works in which they may find them discussed. It is time that the system of advancing apologetic opinions with perfect assurance, and without a hint that they are disputed by anyone, should come to an end, and that earnest men should be made acquainted with the true state of the case. As Dr. Mozley rightly and honestly says: "The majority of mankind, perhaps, owe their belief rather to the outward influence of custom and education than to any strong principle of faith within; and it is to be feared that many, if they came to perceive how wonderful what they believed was, would not find their belief so easy and so matter-of-course a thing as they appear to find it." [36:1]

I shall not here follow Dr. Lightfoot into his general remarks regarding my 'conclusions,' nor shall I proceed, in this article, to discuss the dilemma in which he attempts to involve me through his misunderstanding and consequent misstatement, of my views regarding the Supreme Being. I am almost inclined to think that I can have the pleasure of agreeing with him in one important point, at least, before coming to a close. When I read the curiously modified statement that I have "studiously avoided committing myself to a belief in a universal Father, or a moral Governor, or even in a Personal God," it seems clear to me that the _Supernatural Religion_ about which Dr. Lightfoot has been writing cannot be my work, but is simply a work of his own imagination. That work cannot possibly have contained, for instance, the chapter on "Anthropomorphic Divinity," [36:2] in which, on the contrary, I studiously commit myself to very decided disbelief in such a "Personal God" as he means. In no way inconsistent with that chapter are my concluding remarks, contrasting with the spasmodic Jewish Divinity a Supreme Being manifested in the operation of invariable laws--whose very invariability is the guarantee of beneficence and security. If Dr. Lightfoot, however, succeeded in convicting me of inconsistency in those final expressions, there could be no doubt which view must logically be abandoned, and it would be a new sensation to secure the approval of a divine by the unhesitating destruction of the last page of my work.

Dr. Lightfoot, again, refers to Mr. Mill's "Three Essays on Religion," but he does not appear to have very deeply studied that work. I confess that I do not entirely agree with some views therein expressed, and I hope that, hereafter, I may have an opportunity of explaining what they are; but I am surprised that Dr. Lightfoot has failed to observe how singularly that great Thinker supports the general results of _Supernatural Religion_, to the point even of a frequent agreement almost in words. If Dr. Lightfoot had studied Mill a little more closely, he would not have committed the serious error of arguing: "Obviously, if the author has established his conclusions in the first part, the second and third are altogether superfluous. It is somewhat strange, therefore, that more than three-fourths of the whole work should be devoted to this needless task." [37:1] Now my argument in the first part is not that miracles are impossible--a thesis which it is quite unnecessary to maintain--but the much more simple one that miracles are _antecedently_ incredible. Having shown that they are so, and appreciated the true nature of the allegation of miracles, and the amount of evidence requisite to establish it, I proceed to examine the evidence which is actually produced in support of the assertion that, although miracles are antecedently incredible, they nevertheless took place. Mr. Mill clearly supports me in this course. He states the main principle of my argument thus: "A revelation, therefore, cannot be proved divine unless by external evidence; that is, by the exhibition of supernatural facts. And we have to consider, whether it is possible to prove supernatural facts, and if it is, what evidence is required to prove them." [37:2] Mr. Mill decides that it is possible to prove the occurrence of a supernatural fact, if it actually occurred, and after showing the great preponderance of evidence against miracles, he says: "Against this weight of negative evidence we have to set such positive evidence as is produced in attestation of exceptions; in other words, the positive evidences of miracles. And I have already admitted that this evidence might conceivably have been such as to make the exception equally certain with the rule." [38:1] Mr. Mill's opinion of the evidence actually produced is not flattering, and may be compared with my results:

"But the evidence of miracles, at least to Protestant Christians, is
not, in our day, of this cogent description. It is not the evidence
of our senses, but of witnesses, and even this not at first hand,
but resting on the attestation of books and traditions. And even in
the case of the original eye-witnesses, the supernatural facts
asserted on their alleged testimony are not of the transcendent
character supposed in our example, about the nature of which, or the
impossibility of their having had a natural origin, there could be
little room for doubt. On the contrary, the recorded miracles are,
in the first place, generally such as it would have been extremely
difficult to verify as matters of fact, and in the next place, are
hardly ever beyond the possibility of having been brought about by
human means or by the spontaneous agencies of nature." [38:2]

It is to substantiate the statements made here, and, in fact, to confirm the philosophical conclusion by the historical proof, that I enter into an examination of the four Gospels, as the chief witnesses for miracles. To those who have already ascertained the frivolous nature of that testimony it may, no doubt, seem useless labour to examine it in detail; but it is scarcely conceivable that an ecclesiastic who professes to base his faith upon those records should represent such a process as useless. In endeavouring to place me on the forks of a dilemma, in fact, Dr. Lightfoot has betrayed that he altogether fails to appreciate the question at issue, or to comprehend the position of miracles in relation to philosophical and historical enquiry. Instead of being "altogether superfluous," my examination of witnesses, in the second and third parts, has more correctly been represented by able critics as incomplete, from the omission of the remaining documents of the New Testament. I foresaw, and myself to some degree admitted, the justice of this argument; [39:1] but my work being already bulky enough, I reserved to another volume the completion of the enquiry.

I cannot close this article without expressing my regret that so much which is personal and unworthy has been introduced into the discussion of a great and profoundly important subject. Dr. Lightfoot is too able and too earnest a man not to recognise that no occasional errors or faults in a writer can really affect the validity of his argument, and instead of mere general and desultory efforts to do some damage to me, it would be much more to the purpose were he seriously to endeavour to refute my reasoning. I have no desire to escape hard hitting or to avoid fair fight, and I feel unfeigned respect for many of my critics who, differing _toto coelo_ from my views, have with vigorous ability attacked my arguments without altogether forgetting the courtesy due even to an enemy. Dr. Lightfoot will not find me inattentive to courteous reasoning, nor indifferent to earnest criticism, and, whatever he may think, I promise him that no one will be more ready respectfully to follow every serious line of argument than the author of _Supernatural Religion_.

II.

_THE SILENCE OF EUSEBIUS--THE IGNATIAN EPISTLES._ [Endnote 40:1]

This work has scarcely yet been twelve months before the public, but both in this country and in America and elsewhere it has been subjected to such wide and searching criticism by writers of all shades of opinion, that I may perhaps be permitted to make a few remarks, and to review some of my Reviewers. I must first, however, beg leave to express my gratitude to that large majority of my critics who have bestowed generous commendation upon the work, and liberally encouraged its completion. I have to thank others, who, differing totally from my conclusions, have nevertheless temperately argued against them, for the courtesy with which they have treated an opponent whose views must necessarily have offended them, and I can only say that, whilst such a course has commanded my unfeigned respect, it has certainly not diminished the attention with which I have followed their arguments.

There are two serious misapprehensions of the purpose and line of argument of this work which I desire to correct. Some critics have objected that, if I had succeeded in establishing the proposition advanced in the first part, the second and third parts need not have been written: in fact, that the historical argument against miracles is only necessary in consequence of the failure of the philosophical. Now I contend that the historical is the necessary complement of the philosophical argument, and that both are equally requisite to completeness in dealing with the subject. The preliminary affirmation is not that miracles are impossible, but that they are antecedently incredible. The counter-allegation is that, although miracles may be antecedently incredible, they nevertheless actually took place. It is, therefore, necessary, not only to establish the antecedent incredibility, but to examine the validity of the allegation that certain miracles occurred, and this involves the historical enquiry into the evidence for the Gospels which occupies the second and third parts. Indeed, many will not acknowledge the case to be complete until other witnesses are questioned in a succeeding volume. ...

The second point to which I desire to refer is a statement which has frequently been made that, in the second and third parts, I endeavour to prove that the four canonical Gospels were not written until the end of the second century. This error is of course closely connected with that which has just been discussed, but it is difficult to understand how anyone who had taken the slightest trouble to ascertain the nature of the argument, and to state it fairly, could have fallen into it. The fact is that no attempt is made to prove anything with regard to the Gospels. The evidence for them is merely examined, and it is found that, so far from their affording sufficient testimony to warrant belief in the actual occurrence of miracles declared to be antecedently incredible, there is not a certain trace even of the existence of the Gospels for a century and a half after those miracles are alleged to have occurred, and nothing whatever to attest their authenticity and truth. This is a very different thing from an endeavour to establish some special theory of my own, and it is because this line of argument has not been understood, that some critics have expressed surprise at the decisive rejection of mere conjectures and possibilities as evidence. In a case of such importance, no testimony which is not clear and indubitable could be of any value, but the evidence producible for the canonical Gospels falls very far short even of ordinary requirements, and in relation to miracles it is scarcely deserving of serious consideration.

It has been argued that, even if there be no evidence for our special gospels, I admit that gospels very similar must early have been in existence, and that these equally represent the same prevailing belief as the canonical Gospels: consequently that I merely change, without shaking, the witnesses. Those who advance this argument, however, totally overlook the fact that it is not the reality of the superstitious belief which is in question, but the reality of the miracles, and the sufficiency of the witnesses to establish them. What such objectors urge practically amounts to this: that we should believe in the actual occurrence of certain miracles contradictory to all experience, out of a mass of false miracles which are reported but never really took place, because some unknown persons in an ignorant and superstitious age, who give no evidence of personal knowledge, or of careful investigation, have written an account of them, and other persons, equally ignorant and superstitious, have believed them. I venture to say that no one who advances the argument to which I am referring can have realised the nature of the question at issue, and the relation of miracles to the order of nature.

The last of these general objections to which I need now refer is the statement, that the difficulty with regard to the Gospels commences precisely where my examination ends, and that I am bound to explain how, if no trace of their existence is previously discoverable, the four Gospels are suddenly found in general circulation at the end of the second century, and quoted as authoritative documents by such writers as Irenaeus. My reply is that it is totally unnecessary for me to account for this. No one acquainted with the history of pseudonymic literature in the second century, and with the rapid circulation and ready acceptance of spurious works tending to edification, could for a moment regard the canonical position of any Gospel at the end of that century either as evidence of its authenticity or early origin. That which concerns us chiefly is not evidence regarding the end of the second but the beginning of the first century. Even if we took the statements of Irenaeus and later Fathers, like the Alexandrian Clement, Tertullian and Origen, about the Gospels, they are absolutely without value except as personal opinion at a late date, for which no sufficient grounds are shown. Of the earlier history of those Gospels there is not a distinct trace, except of a nature which altogether discredits them as witnesses for miracles.

After having carefully weighed the arguments which have been advanced against this work, I venture to express strengthened conviction of the truth of its conclusions. The best and most powerful reasons which able divines and apologists have been able to bring forward against its main argument have, I submit, not only failed to shake it, but have, by inference, shown it to be unassailable. Very many of those who have professedly advanced against the citadel itself have practically attacked nothing but some outlying fort, which was scarcely worth defence, whilst others, who have seriously attempted an assault, have shown that the Church has no artillery capable of making a practicable breach in the rationalistic stronghold. I say this solely in reference to the argument which I have taken upon myself to represent, and in no sense of my own individual share in its maintenance.

I must now address myself more particularly to two of my critics who, with great ability and learning, have subjected this work to the most elaborate and microscopic criticism of which personal earnestness and official zeal are capable. I am sincerely obliged to Professor Lightfoot and Dr. Westcott for the minute attention they have bestowed upon my book. I had myself directly attacked the views of Dr. Westcott, and of course could only expect him to do his best or his worst against me in reply; and I am not surprised at the vigour with which Dr. Lightfoot has assailed a work so opposed to principles which he himself holds sacred, although I may be permitted to express my regret that he has not done so in a spirit more worthy of the cause which he defends. In spite of hostile criticism of very unusual minuteness and ability, no flaw or error has been pointed out which in the slightest degree affects my main argument, and I consider that every point yet objected to by Dr. Lightfoot, or indicated by Dr. Westcott, might be withdrawn without at all weakening my position. These objections, I may say, refer solely to details, and only follow side issues, but the attack, if impotent against the main position, has in many cases been insidiously directed against notes and passing references, and a plentiful sprinkling of such words as "misstatements" and "misrepresentations" along the line may have given it a formidable appearance and malicious effect, which render it worth while once for all to meet it in detail.

The first point to which I shall refer is an elaborate argument by Dr. Lightfoot regarding the "SILENCE OF EUSEBIUS." [45:1] I had called attention to the importance of considering the silence of the Fathers, under certain conditions; [45:2] and I might, omitting his curious limitation, adopt Dr. Lightfoot's opening comment upon this as singularly descriptive of the state of the case: "In one province more especially, relating to the external evidences for the Gospels, silence occupies a prominent place." Dr. Lightfoot proposes to interrogate this "mysterious oracle," and he considers that "the response elicited will not be at all ambiguous." I might again agree with him, but that unambiguous response can scarcely be pronounced very satisfactory for the Gospels. Such silence may be very eloquent, but after all it is only the eloquence of--silence. I have not yet met with the argument anywhere that, because none of the early Fathers quote our Canonical Gospels, or say anything with regard to them, the fact is unambiguous evidence that they were well acquainted with them, and considered them apostolic and authoritative. Dr. Lightfoot's argument from Silence is, for the present at least, limited to Eusebius.

The point on which the argument turns is this: After examining the whole of the extant writings of the early Fathers, and finding them a complete blank as regards the canonical Gospels, if, by their use of apocryphal works and other indications, they are not evidence against them, I supplement this, in the case of Hegesippus, Papias, and Dionysius of Corinth, by the inference that, as Eusebius does not state that their lost works contained any evidence for the Gospels, they actually did not contain any. But before proceeding to discuss the point, it is necessary that a proper estimate should be formed of its importance to the main argument of my work. The evident labour which Professor Lightfoot has expended upon the preparation of his attack, the space devoted to it, and his own express words, would naturally lead most readers to suppose that it has almost a vital bearing upon my conclusions. Dr. Lightfoot says, after quoting the passages in which I appeal to the silence of Eusebius:--

"This indeed is the fundamental assumption which lies at the basis
of his reasoning; and the reader will not need to be reminded how
much of the argument falls to pieces if this basis should prove to
be unsound. A wise master-builder would therefore have looked to his
foundations first, and assured himself of their strength, before he
piled up his fabric to this height. This our author has altogether
neglected to do." [46:1]

Towards the close of his article, after triumphantly expressing his belief that his "main conclusions are irrefragable," he further says:--

"If they are, then the reader will not fail to see how large a part
of the argument in _Supernatural Religion_ has crumbled to pieces."
[46:2]

I do not doubt that Dr. Lightfoot sincerely believes this, but he must allow me to say that he is thoroughly mistaken in his estimate of the importance of the point, and that, as regards this work, the representations made in the above passages are a very strange exaggeration. I am unfortunately too familiar, in connection with criticism on this book, with instances of vast expenditure of time and strength in attacking points to which I attach no importance whatever, and which in themselves have scarcely any value. When writers, after an amount of demonstration which must have conveyed the impression that vital interests were at stake, have, at least in their own opinion, proved that I have omitted to dot an "i," cross a "t," or insert an inverted comma, they have really left the question precisely where it was. Now, in the present instance, the whole extent of the argument which is based upon the silence of Eusebius is an inference regarding some lost works of three writers only, which might altogether be withdrawn without affecting the case. The object of my investigation is to discover what evidence actually exists in the works of early writers regarding our Gospels. In the fragments which remain of the works of three writers, Hegesippus, Papias, and Dionysius of Corinth, I do not find any evidence of acquaintance with these Gospels,--the works mentioned by Papias being, I contend, different from the existing Gospels attributed to Matthew and Mark. Whether I am right or not in this does not affect the present discussion. It is an unquestioned fact that Eusebius does not mention that the lost works of these writers contained any reference to, or information about, the Gospels, nor have we any statement from any other author to that effect. The objection of Dr. Lightfoot is limited to a denial that the silence of Eusebius warrants the inference that, because he does not state that these writers made quotations from or references to undisputed canonical books, the lost works did not contain any; it does not, however, extend to interesting information regarding those books, which he admits it was the purpose of Eusebius to record. To give Dr. Lightfoot's statements, which I am examining, the fullest possible support, however, suppose that I abandon Eusebius altogether, and do not draw any inference of any kind from him beyond his positive statements, how would my case stand? Simply as complete as it well could be: Hegesippus, Papias, and Dionysius do not furnish any evidence in favour of the Gospels. The reader, therefore, will not fail to see how serious a misstatement Dr. Lightfoot has made, and how little the argument of _Supernatural Religion_ would be affected even if he established much more than he has asserted.

We may now proceed to consider Dr. Lightfoot's argument itself. He carefully and distinctly defines what he understands to be the declared intention of Eusebius in composing his history, as regards the mention or use of the disputed and undisputed canonical books in the writings of the Fathers, and in order to do him full justice I will quote his words, merely taking the liberty, for facility of reference, of dividing his statement into three paragraphs. He says:

"Eusebius therefore proposes to treat these two classes of writings
in two different ways. This is the cardinal point of the passage.

"(1) Of the Antilegomena he pledges himself to record when any
ancient writer _employs_ any book belonging to their class ([Greek:
tines hopoiais kechrêntai]);

"(2) but as regards the undisputed Canonical books, he only
professes to mention them when such a writer has something to _tell
about them_ ([Greek: tina peri tôn endiathêkon eirêtai]). Any
_anecdote_ of interest respecting them, as also respecting the
others ([Greek: tôn mê toioutôn]), will be recorded.

"(3) But in their case he nowhere leads us to expect that he will
allude to mere _quotations_, however numerous and however precise."
[48:1]

In order to dispose of the only one of these points upon which we can differ, I will first refer to the third. Did Eusebius intend to point out mere quotations of the books which he considered undisputed? As a matter of fact, he actually did point such out in the case of the 1st Epistle of Peter and the 1st Epistle of John, which he repeatedly and in the most emphatic manner declared to be undisputed. [49:1] This is admitted by Dr. Lightfoot. That he omitted to mention a reference to the Epistle to the Corinthians in the Epistle of Clement of Rome, or the reference by Theophilus to the Gospel of John, and other supposed quotations, might be set down as much to oversight as intention. On the other hand, that he did mention disputed books is evidence only that he not only pledged himself to do so, but actually fulfilled his promise. Although much might be said upon this point, therefore, I consider it of so little importance that I do not intend to waste time in minutely discussing it. If my assertions with regard to the silence of Eusebius likewise include the supposition that he proposed to mention mere quotations of the "undisputed" books, they are so far from limited to this very subsidiary testimony that I should have no reluctance in waiving it altogether. Even if the most distinct quotations of this kind had occurred in the lost works of the three writers in question, they could have proved nothing beyond the mere existence of the book quoted, at the time that work was written, but would have done nothing to establish its authenticity and trustworthiness. In the evidential destitution of the Gospels, apologists would thankfully have received even such vague indications; indeed there is scarcely any other evidence, but something much more definite is required to establish the reality of miracles and Divine Revelation. If this point be, for the sake of argument, set aside, what is the position? We are not entitled to infer that there were no quotations from the Gospels in the works of Hegesippus, Papias, and Dionysius of Corinth, because Eusebius does not record them; but, on the other hand, we are still less entitled to infer that there were any.

The only inference which I care to draw from the silence of Eusebius is precisely that which Dr. Lightfoot admits that, both from his promise and practice, I am entitled to deduce: when any ancient writer "has something to _tell about_" the Gospels, "any _anecdote_ of interest respecting them," Eusebius will record it. This is the only information of the slightest value to this work which could be looked for in these writers. So far, therefore, from producing the destructive effect upon some of the arguments of _Supernatural Religion_, upon which he somewhat prematurely congratulates himself, Dr. Lightfoot's elaborate and learned article on the silence of Eusebius supports them in the most conclusive manner.

Before proceeding to speak more directly of the three writers under
discussion, it may be well to glance a little at the procedure of
Eusebius, and note, for those who care to go more closely into the
matter, how he fulfils his promise to record what the Fathers have
to tell about the Gospels. I may mention, in the first place, that
Eusebius states what he himself knows of the composition of the
Gospels and other canonical works. [50:1] Upon two occasions he
quotes the account which Clement of Alexandria gives of the
composition of Mark's Gospel, and also cites his statements
regarding the other Gospels. [50:2] In like manner he records the
information, such as it is, which Irenaeus has to impart about the
four Gospels and other works, [50:3] and what Origen has to say
concerning them. [50:4] Interrogating extant works, we find in fact
that Eusebius does not neglect to quote anything useful or
interesting regarding these books from early writers. Dr. Lightfoot
says that Eusebius "restricts himself to the narrowest limits which
justice to his subject will allow," and he illustrates this by the
case of Irenaeus. He says: "Though he (Eusebius) gives the principal
passage in this author relating to the Four Gospels (Irenaeus,
_Adv. Haer._ iii. 1, 1) he omits to mention others which contain
interesting statements directly or indirectly affecting the
question, _e.g._ that St. John wrote his Gospel to counteract the
errors of Cerinthus and the Nicolaitans (Irenaeus, _Adv. Haer._ iii.
11, 1)." [51:1] I must explain, however, that the "interesting
statement" omitted, which is not in the context of the part quoted,
is not advanced as information derived from any authority, but only
in the course of argument, and there is nothing to distinguish it
from mere personal opinion, so that on this ground Eusebius may well
have passed it over. Dr. Lightfoot further says: "Thus too when he
quotes a few lines alluding to the unanimous tradition of the
Asiatic Elders who were acquainted with St. John, [51:2] he omits
the context, from which we find that this tradition had an important
bearing on the authenticity of the fourth Gospel, for it declared
that Christ's ministry extended much beyond a single year, thus
confirming the obvious chronology of the Fourth Gospel against the
apparent chronology of the Synoptists." [51:3] Nothing, however,
could be further from the desire or intention of Eusebius than to
represent any discordance between the Gospels, or to support the one
at the expense of the others. On the contrary, he enters into an
elaborate explanation in order to show that there is no discrepancy
between them, affirming, and supporting his view by singular
quotations, that it was evidently the intention of the three
Synoptists only to write the doings of the Lord for one year after
the imprisonment of John the Baptist, and that John, having the
other Gospels before him, wrote an account of the period not
embraced by the other evangelists. [51:4] Moreover, the
extraordinary assertions of Irenaeus not only contradict the
Synoptics, but also the Fourth Gospel, and Eusebius certainly could
not have felt much inclination to quote such opinions, even although
Irenaeus seemed to base them upon traditions handed down by the
Presbyters who were acquainted with John.

It being, then, admitted that Eusebius not only pledges himself to record when any ancient writer has something to "tell about" the undisputed canonical books, but that, judged by the test of extant writings which we can examine, he actually does so, let us see the conclusions which we are entitled to draw in the case of the only three writers with regard to whom I have inferred anything from the "silence of Eusebius."

I need scarcely repeat that Eusebius held HEGESIPPUS in very high estimation. He refers to him very frequently, and he clearly shows that he not only valued, but was intimately acquainted with, his writings. Eusebius quotes from the work of Hegesippus a very long account of the martyrdom of James; [52:1] he refers to Hegesippus as his authority for the statement that Simeon was a cousin ([Greek: anepsios]) of Jesus, Cleophas his father being, according to that author, the brother of Joseph; [52:2] he confirms a passage in the Epistle of Clement by reference to Hegesippus; [52:3] he quotes from Hegesippus a story regarding some members of the family of Jesus, of the race of David, who were brought before Domitian; [52:4] he cites his narrative of the martyrdom of Simeon, together with other matters concerning the early Church; [52:5] in another place he gives a laudatory account of Hegesippus and his writings; [52:6] shortly after he refers to the statement of Hegesippus that he was in Rome until the episcopate of Eleutherus, [52:7] and further speaks in praise of his work, mentions his observation on the Epistle of Clement, and quotes his remarks about the Church in Corinth, the succession of Roman bishops, the general state of the Church, the rise of heresies, and other matters. [52:8] I mention these numerous references to Hegesippus as I have noticed them in turning over the pages of Eusebius, but others may very probably have escaped me. Eusebius fulfils his pledge, and states what disputed works were used by Hegesippus and what he said about them, and one of these was the Gospel according to the Hebrews. He does not, however, record a single remark of any kind regarding our Gospels, and the legitimate inference, and it is the only one I care to draw, is, that Hegesippus did not say anything about them. I may simply add that, as that, as Eusebius quotes the account of Matthew and Mark from Papias, a man of whom he expresses something like contempt, and again refers to him in confirmation of the statement of the Alexandrian Clement regarding the composition of Mark's Gospel, [53:1] it would be against all reason, as well as opposed to his pledge and general practice, to suppose that Eusebius would have omitted to record any information given by Hegesippus, a writer with whom he was so well acquainted and of whom he speaks with so much respect.

I have said that Eusebius would more particularly have quoted
anything with regard to the Fourth Gospel, and for those who care to
go more closely into the point my reasons may be briefly given. No
one can read Eusebius attentively without noting the peculiar care
with which he speaks of John and his writings, and the substantially
apologetic tone which he adopts in regard to them. Apart from any
doubts expressed regarding the Gospel itself, the controversy as to
the authenticity of the Apocalypse and second and third Epistles
called by his name, with which Eusebius was so well acquainted, and
the critical dilemma as to the impossibility of the same John having
written both the Gospel and Apocalypse, regarding which he so fully
quotes the argument of Dionysius of Alexandria, [53:2] evidently
made him peculiarly interested in the subject, and his attention to
the fourth Gospel was certainly not diminished by his recognition of
the essential difference between that work and the three Synoptics.
The first occasion on which he speaks of John, he records the
tradition that he was banished to Patmos during the persecution
under Domitian, and refers to the Apocalypse. He quotes Irenaeus in
support of this tradition, and the composition of the work at the
close of Domitian's reign. [54:1] He goes on to speak of the
persecution under Domitian, and quotes Hegesippus as to a command
given by that Emperor to slay all the posterity of David, [54:2] as
also Tertullian's account, [54:3] winding up his extracts from the
historians of the time by the statement that, after Nerva succeeded
Domitian, and the Senate had revoked the cruel decrees of the
latter, the Apostle John returned from exile in Patmos and,
according to ecclesiastical tradition, settled at Ephesus. [54:4] He
states that John, the beloved disciple, apostle and evangelist,
governed the Churches of Asia after the death of Domitian and his
return from Patmos, and that he was still living when Trajan
succeeded Nerva, and for the truth of this he quotes passages from
Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria. [54:5] He then gives an account
of the writings of John, and whilst asserting that the Gospel must
be universally acknowledged as genuine, he says that it is rightly
put last in order amongst the four, of the composition of which he
gives an elaborate description. It is not necessary to quote his
account of the fourth Gospel and of the occasion of its composition,
which he states to have been John's receiving the other three
Gospels, and, whilst admitting their truth, perceiving that they did
not contain a narrative of the earlier history of Christ. For this
reason, being entreated to do so, he wrote an account of the doings
of Jesus before the Baptist was cast into prison. After some very
extraordinary reasoning, Eusebius says that no one who carefully
considers the points he mentions can think that the Gospels are at
variance with each other, and he conjectures that John probably
omitted the genealogies because Matthew and Luke had given them.
[54:6] Without further anticipating what I have to say when speaking
of Papias, it is clear, I think, that Eusebius, being aware of, and
interested in, the peculiar difficulties connected with the writings
attributed to John, not to put a still stronger case, and quoting
traditions from later and consequently less weighty authorities,
would certainly have recorded with more special readiness any
information on the subject given by Hegesippus, whom he so
frequently lays under contribution, had his writings contained any.

In regard to PAPIAS the case is still clearer. We find that Eusebius quotes his account of the composition of Gospels by Matthew and Mark, [55:1] although he had already given a closely similar narrative regarding Mark from Clement of Alexandria, and appealed to Papias in confirmation of it. Is it either possible or permissible to suppose that, had Papias known anything of the other two Gospels, he would not have enquired about them from the Presbyters and recorded their information? And is it either possible or permissible to suppose that if Papias had recorded any similar information regarding the composition of the third and fourth Gospels, Eusebius would have omitted to quote it? Certainly not; and Dr. Lightfoot's article proves it. Eusebius had not only pledged himself to give such information, and does so in every case which we can test, but he fulfil it by actually quoting what Papias had to say about the Gospels. Even if he had been careless, his very reference to the first two Gospels must have reminded him of the claims of the rest. There are, however, special reasons which render it still more certain that had Papias had anything to tell about the Fourth Gospel,--and if there was a Fourth Gospel in his knowledge he must have had something, to tell about it,--Eusebius would have recorded it. The first quotation he makes from Papias is the passage in which the Bishop of Hierapolis states the interest with which he had enquired about the words of the Presbyters, "what John or Matthew or what any other of the disciples of the Lord said, and what Aristion and the Presbyter John, disciples of the Lord, say." [55:2] Eusebius observes, and particularly points out, that the name of John is twice mentioned in the passage, the former, mentioned with Peter, James, and Matthew, and other Apostles, evidently being, he thinks, the Evangelist, and the latter being clearly distinguished by the designation of Presbyter. Eusebius states that this proves the truth of the assertion that there were two men of the name of John in Asia, and that two tombs were still shown at Ephesus bearing the name of John. Eusebius then proceeds to argue that probably the second of the two Johns, if not the first, was the man who saw the Revelation. What an occasion for quoting any information bearing at all on the subject from Papias, who had questioned those who had been acquainted with both! His attention is so pointedly turned to John at the very moment when he makes his quotations regarding Matthew and Mark, that I am fully warranted, both by the conclusions of Dr. Lightfoot and the peculiar circumstances of the case, in affirming that the silence of Eusebius proves that Papias said nothing about either the third or fourth Gospels.

I need not go on to discuss Dionysius of Corinth, for the same reasoning equally applies to his case. I have, therefore, only a few more words to say on the subject of Eusebius. Not content with what he intended to be destructive criticism, Dr. Lightfoot valiantly proceeds to the constructive and, "as a sober deduction from facts," makes the following statement, which he prints in italics: "_The silence of Eusebius respecting early witnesses to the Fourth Gospel is an evidence in its favour_." [56:1] Now, interpreted even by the rules laid down by Dr. Lightfoot himself, what does this silence really mean? It means, not that the early writers about whom he is supposed to be silent are witnesses about anything connected with the Fourth Gospel, but simply that if Eusebius noticed and did not record the mere use of that Gospel by anyone, he thereby indicates that he himself, in the fourth century, classed it amongst the undisputed books, the mere use of which he does not undertake to mention. The value of his opinion at so late a date is very small.

Professor Lightfoot next makes a vehement attack upon me in connection with "THE IGNATIAN EPISTLES," [57:1] which is equally abortive and limited to details. I do not intend to complain of the spirit in which the article is written, nor of its unfairness. On the whole I think that readers may safely he left to judge of the tone in which a controversy is carried on. Unfortunately, however, the perpetual accusation of misstatement brought against me in this article, and based upon minute criticism into which few care to follow, is apt to leave the impression that it is well-founded, for there is the very natural feeling in most right minds that no one would recklessly scatter such insinuations. It is this which alone makes such an attack dangerous. Now in a work like this, dealing with so many details, it must be obvious that it not possible altogether to escape errors. A critic or opponent is of course entitled to point these out, although, if he be high-minded or even alive to his own interests, I scarcely think that he will do so in a spirit of unfair detraction. But in doing this a writer is bound to be accurate, for if he be liberal of such accusations and it can be shown that his charges are unfounded, they recoil with double force upon himself. I propose, therefore, as it is impossible for me to reply to all such attacks, to follow Professor Lightfoot and Dr. Westcott, with some minuteness in their discussion of my treatment of the Ignatian Epistles, and once for all to show the grave misstatements to which they commit themselves.

Dr. Lightfoot does not ignore the character of the discussion upon which he enters, but it will be seen that his appreciation of its difficulty by no means inspires him with charitable emotions. He says: "The Ignatian question is the most perplexing which confronts the student of earlier Christian history. The literature is voluminous; the considerations involved are very wide, very varied, and very intricate. A writer, therefore, may well be pardoned if he betrays a want of familiarity with this subject. But in this case the reader naturally expects that the opinions at which he has arrived will be stated with some diffidence." [58:1] My critic objects that I express my opinions with decision. I shall hereafter justify this decision, but I would here point out that the very reasons which render it difficult for Dr. Lightfoot to form a final and decisive judgment on the question make it easy for me. It requires but little logical perception to recognize that Epistles, the authenticity of which it is so difficult to establish, cannot have much influence as testimony for the Gospels. The statement just quoted, however, is made the base of the attack, and war is declared in the following terms:

"The reader is naturally led to think that a writer would not use
such very decided language unless he had obtained a thorough mastery
of his subject; and when he finds the notes thronged with references
to the most recondite sources of information, he at once credits the
author with an 'exhaustive' knowledge of the literature bearing upon
it. It becomes important therefore to enquire whether the writer
shows that accurate acquaintance with the subject, which justifies
us in attaching weight to his dicta as distinguished from his
arguments." [59:1]

This sentence shows the scope of the discussion. My dicta, however, play a very subordinate part throughout, and even if no weight be attached to them--and I have never desired that any should be--my argument would not be in the least degree affected.

The first point attacked, like most of those subsequently assailed, is one of mere critical history. I wrote: "The strongest internal, as well as other evidence, into which space forbids our going in detail, has led (1) the majority of critics to recognize the Syriac version as the most genuine form of the letters of Ignatius extant, and (2) this is admitted by most of those who nevertheless deny the authenticity of any of the epistles." [59:2]

Upon this Dr. Lightfoot remarks:--

"No statement could be more erroneous as a summary of the results
of the Ignatian controversy since the publication of the Syriac
epistles than this." [59:1]

It will be admitted that this is pretty "decided language" for one who is preaching "diffidence." When we come to details, however, Dr. Lightfoot admits: "Those who maintain the genuineness of the Ignatian Epistles in one or other of the two forms, may be said to be almost evenly divided on this question of priority." He seems to consider that he sufficiently shows this when he mentions five or six critics on either side; but even on this modified interpretation of my statement its correctness may be literally maintained. To the five names quoted as recognising the priority of the Syriac Epistles may be added those of Milman, Böhringer, de Pressensé, and Dr. Tregelles, which immediately occur to me. But I must ask upon what ground he limits my remark to those who absolutely admit the genuineness? I certainly do not so limit it, but affirm that a majority prefer the three Curetonian Epistles, and that this majority is made up partly of those who, denying the authenticity of any of the letters, still consider the Syriac the purest and least adulterated form of the Epistles. This will be evident to anyone who reads the context. With regard to the latter (2) part of the sentence, I will at once say that "most" is a slip of the pen for "many," which I correct in this edition. [60:1] Many of those who deny or do not admit the authenticity prefer the Curetonian version. The Tübingen school are not unanimous on the point, and there are critics who do not belong to it. Bleek, for instance, who does not commit himself to belief, considers the priority of the Curetonian "im höchsten Grade wahrscheinlich." Volkmar, Lipsius, and Rumpf prefer them. Dr. Lightfoot says:

"The case of Lipsius is especially instructive, as illustrating this
point. Having at one time maintained the priority and genuineness of
the Curetonian letters, he has lately, if I rightly understand him,
retracted his former opinion on both questions alike." [60:2]