Chapter I

The New York _Courier and Enquirer_ of November 5th contained an article which has been quite valuable to the author, as summing up, in a clear, concise and intelligible form, the principal objections which may be urged to _Uncle Tom’s Cabin_. It is here quoted in full, as the foundation of the remarks in the following pages.

The author of “Uncle Tom’s Cabin,” that writer states, has committed false-witness against thousands and millions of her fellow-men.

She has done it [he says] by attaching to them as slaveholders, in
the eyes of the world, the guilt of the abuses of an institution of
which they are absolutely guiltless. Her story is so devised as to
present slavery in three dark aspects: first, the _cruel treatment_
of the slaves; second, _the separation of families_; and, third,
their _want of religious instruction_.

To show the first, she causes a reward to be offered for the
recovery of a runaway slave, “dead or alive,” when no reward with
such an alternative was ever heard of, or dreamed of, south of Mason
and Dixon’s line, and it has been decided over and over again in
Southern courts that “a slave who is merely flying away cannot be
killed.” She puts such language as this into the mouth of one of her
speakers:—“The master who goes furthest and does the worst only uses
within limits the power that the law gives him;” when, in fact, the
civil code of the very state where it is represented the language
was uttered—Louisiana—declares that

“The slave is entirely subject to the will of his master, who may
correct and chastise him, _though not with unusual rigor, nor so as
to maim or mutilate him, or to expose him to the danger of loss of
life, or to cause his death_.”

And provides for a compulsory sale

“When the master shall be convicted of cruel treatment of his
slaves, and the judge shall deem proper to pronounce, besides the
penalty established for such cases, that the slave be sold at public
auction, _in order to place him out of the reach of the power which
the master has abused_.”

“If any person whatsoever shall wilfully kill his slave, or the
slave of another person, the said person, being convicted thereof,
shall be tried and condemned agreeably to the laws.”

In the General Court of Virginia, last year, in the case of Souther
_v._ the Commonwealth, it was held that the killing of a slave by
his master and owner, by wilful and excessive whipping, is murder in
the first degree, _though it may not have been the purpose of the
master and owner to kill the slave_! And it is not six months since
Governor Johnston, of Virginia, pardoned a slave who killed his
master, who was beating him with brutal severity.

And yet, in the face of such laws and decisions as these, Mrs. Stowe
winds up a long series of cruelties upon her other black personages,
by causing her faultless hero, Tom, to be literally whipped to death
in Louisiana, by his master, Legree; and these acts, which the laws
make criminal, and punish as such, she sets forth in the most
repulsive colors, to illustrate the institution of slavery!

So, too, in reference to the separation of children from their
parents. A considerable part of the plot is made to hinge upon the
selling, in Louisiana, of the child Eliza, “eight or nine years
old,” away from her mother; when, had its inventor looked in the
statute-book of Louisiana, she would have found the following
language:

“Every person is expressly prohibited from selling separately from
their mothers _the children who shall not have attained the full age
of ten years_.”

“_Be it further enacted_, That if any person or persons shall sell
the mother of any slave child or children _under the age of ten
years, separate from said child or children, or shall, the mother
living, sell any slave child or children of ten years of age, or
under, separate from said mother_, said person or persons shall be
fined not less than one thousand nor more than two thousand dollars,
and be imprisoned in the public jail for a period of not less than
six months nor more than one year.”

The privation of religious instruction, as represented by Mrs.
Stowe, is utterly unfounded in fact. The largest churches in the
Union consist entirely of slaves. The first African church in
Louisville, which numbers fifteen hundred persons, and the first
African church in Augusta, which numbers thirteen hundred, are
specimens. On multitudes of the large plantations in the different
parts of the South the ordinances of the gospel are as regularly
maintained, by competent ministers, as in any other communities,
north or south. A larger proportion of the slave population are in
communion with some Christian church, than of the white population
in any part of the country. A very considerable portion of every
southern congregation, either in city or country, is sure to consist
of blacks; whereas, of our northern churches, not a colored person
is to be seen in one out of fifty.

The peculiar falsity of this whole book consists in making
exceptional or impossible cases the representatives of the system.
By the same process which she has used, it would not be difficult to
frame a fatal argument against the relation of husband and wife, or
parent and child, or of guardian and ward; for thousands of wives
and children and wards have been maltreated, and even murdered. It
is wrong, unpardonably wrong, to impute to any relation of life
those enormities which spring only out of the worst depravity of
human nature. A ridiculously extravagant spirit of generalization
pervades this fiction from beginning to end. The Uncle Tom of the
authoress is a perfect angel, and her blacks generally are half
angels; her Simon Legree is a perfect demon, and her whites
generally are half demons. She has quite a peculiar spite against
the clergy; and, of the many she introduces at different times into
the scenes, all, save an insignificant exception, are Pharisees or
hypocrites. One who could know nothing of the United States and its
people, except by what he might gather from this book, would judge
that it was some region just on the confines of the infernal world.
We do not say that Mrs. Stowe was actuated by wrong motives in the
preparation of this work, but we do say that she has done a wrong
which no ignorance can excuse and no penance can expiate.

A much-valued correspondent of the author, writing from Richmond, Virginia, also uses the following language:

I will venture this morning to make a few suggestions which have
occurred to me in regard to future editions of your work, “Uncle
Tom’s Cabin,” which I desire should have all the influence of which
your genius renders it capable, not only abroad, but in the local
sphere of slavery, where it has been hitherto repudiated. Possessing
already the great requisites of artistic beauty and of sympathetic
affection, it may yet be improved in regard to accuracy of statement
without being at all enfeebled. For example, you do less than
justice to the formalized laws of the Southern States, while you
give more credit than is due to the virtue of public or private
sentiment in restricting the evil which the laws permit.

I enclose the following extracts from a southern paper:

“‘I’ll manage that ar; they’s young in the business, and must
spect to work cheap,’ said Marks, as he continued to read.
‘Thar’s three on ‘em easy cases, ‘cause all you’ve got to do is
to shoot ‘em, or swear they is shot; they couldn’t, of course,
charge much for that.’”

“The reader will observe that two charges against the South are
involved in this precious discourse;—one that it is the habit of
Southern masters to offer a reward, with the alternative of ‘dead or
alive,’ for their fugitive slaves; and the other, that it is usual
for pursuers to shoot them. Indeed, we are led to infer that, as the
shooting is the easier mode of obtaining the reward, it is the more
frequently employed in such cases. Now, when a Southern master
offers a reward for his runaway slave, it is because he has lost a
certain amount of property, represented by the negro which he wishes
to recover. What man of Vermont, having an ox or an ass that had
gone astray, would forthwith offer half the full value of the
animal, not for the carcass, which might be turned to some useful
purpose, but for the unavailing satisfaction of its head? Yet are
the two cases exactly parallel? With regard to the assumption that
men are permitted to go about, at the South, with double-barrelled
guns, shooting down runaway negroes, in preference to apprehending
them, we can only say that it is as wicked and wilful as it is
ridiculous. Such Thugs there may have been as Marks and Loker, who
have killed negroes in this unprovoked manner; but, if they have
escaped the gallows, they are probably to be found within the walls
of our state penitentiaries, where they are comfortably provided for
at public expense. The laws of the Southern States, which are
designed, as in all good governments, for the protection of persons
and property, have not been so loosely framed as to fail of their
object where person and property are one.

“The law with regard to the killing of runaways is laid down with so
much clearness and precision by a South Carolina judge, that we
cannot forbear quoting his dictum, as directly in point. In the case
of Witsell _v._ Earnest and Parker, Colcock J. delivered the opinion
of the court:

[Sidenote: Jan. term, 1818 1 Nott & McCord’s S. C. Rep. 182.]

“‘By the statute of 1740, any white man may apprehend, and
moderately correct, any slave who may be found out of the plantation
at which he is employed; and if the slave assaults the white person,
he may be killed; but a slave who is merely flying away cannot be
killed. Nor can the defendants be justified by the common law, if we
consider the negro as a person; for they were not clothed with the
authority of the law to apprehend him as a felon, and without such
authority he could not be killed.’

“‘It’s commonly supposed that the _property_ interest is a
sufficient guard in these cases. If people choose to ruin their
possessions, I don’t know what’s to be done. It seems the poor
creature was a thief and a drunkard; and so there won’t be much
hope to get up sympathy for her.’

“‘It is perfectly outrageous,—it is horrid, Augustine! It will
certainly bring down vengeance upon you.’

“‘My dear cousin, I didn’t do it, and I can’t help it; I would,
if I could. If low-minded, brutal people will act like
themselves, what am I to do? _They have absolute control; they
are irresponsible despots._ There would be no use in
interfering; _there is no law, that amounts to anything
practically, for such a case_. The best we can do is to shut our
eyes and ears, and let it alone. It’s the only resource left
us.’

“In a subsequent part of the same conversation, St. Clare says:

“‘For pity’s sake, for shame’s sake, because we are men born of
women, and not savage beasts, many of us do not, and dare
not,—we would _scorn_ to use the full power which our savage
laws put into our hands. _And he who goes furthest and does the
worst only uses within limits the power that the law gives
him._’

“Mrs. Stowe tells us, through St. Clare, that ‘there is no law that
amounts to anything’ in such cases, and that he who goes furthest in
severity towards his slave,—that is, to the deprivation of an eye or
a limb, or even the destruction of life,—‘only uses within limits
the power that the law gives him.’ This is an awful and tremendous
charge, which, lightly and unwarrantably made, must subject the
maker to a fearful accountability. Let us see how the matter stands
upon the statute-book of Louisiana. By referring to the civil code
of that state, chapter 3d, article 173, the reader will find this
general declaration:

“‘The slave is entirely subject to the will of his master, who may
correct and chastise him, _though not with unusual rigor, nor so as
to maim or mutilate him, or to expose him to the danger of loss of
life, or to cause his death_.’

“On a subsequent page of the same volume and chapter, article 192,
we find provision made for the slave’s protection against his
master’s cruelty, in the statement that one of two cases, in which a
master can be compelled to sell his slave, is

“‘When the master shall be convicted of cruel treatment of his
slave, and the judge shall deem proper to pronounce, _besides the
penalty established for such cases_, that the slave shall be sold at
public auction, _in order to place him out of the reach of the power
which the master has abused_.’

“A code thus watchful of the negro’s safety in life and limb
confines not its guardianship to inhibitory clauses, but proscribes
extreme penalties in case of their infraction. In the Code Noir
(Black Code) of Louisiana, under head of Crimes and Offences, No.
55, § xvi., it is laid down, that

“‘If any person whatsoever shall wilfully kill his slave, or the
slave of another person, the said person, being convicted thereof,
shall be tried and condemned agreeably to the laws.’

“And because negro testimony is inadmissible in the courts of the
state, and therefore the evidence of such crimes might be with
difficulty supplied, it is further provided that,

[Sidenote: Code Noir. Crimes and Offences, 56, xvii.]

“‘If any slave be mutilated, beaten or ill-treated, contrary to the
true intent and meaning of this act, when no one shall be present,
in such case the owner, or other person having the management of
said slave thus mutilated, shall be deemed responsible and guilty of
the said offence, and shall be prosecuted without further evidence,
unless the said owner, or other person so as aforesaid, can prove
the contrary by means of good and sufficient evidence, or can clear
himself by his own oath, which said oath every court, under the
cognizance of which such offence shall have been examined and tried,
is by this act authorized to administer.’

“Enough has been quoted to establish the utter falsity of the
statement, made by our authoress through St. Clare, that brutal
masters are ‘irresponsible despots,’—at least in Louisiana. It would
extend our review to a most unreasonable length, should we undertake
to give the law, with regard to the murder of slaves, as it stands
in each of the Southern States. The crime is a rare one, and
therefore the reporters have had few cases to record. We may refer,
however, to two. In _Fields v. the State of Tennessee_, the
plaintiff in error was indicted in the circuit court of Maury county
for the murder of a negro slave. He pleaded not guilty; and at the
trial was found guilty of wilful and felonious slaying of the slave.
From this sentence he prosecuted his writ of error, which was
disallowed, the court affirming the original judgment. The opinion
of the court, as given by Peck J., overflows with the spirit of
enlightened humanity. He concludes thus:

[Sidenote: 1 Yerger’s Tenn. Rep. 156.]

“‘It is well said by one of the judges of North Carolina, that the
master has a right to exact the labor of his slave; that far, the
rights of the slave are suspended; but this gives the master no
right over the life of his slave. I add to the saying of the judge,
that law which says thou shalt not kill, protects the slave; and he
is within its very letter. Law, reason, Christianity, and common
humanity, all point but one way.’

[Sidenote: 7 Grattan’s Rep. 673.]

“In the General Court of Virginia, June term, 1851, in _Souther v.
the Commonwealth_, it was held that ‘the killing of a slave by his
master and owner, by wilful and excessive whipping, is murder in the
first degree; _though it may not have been the purpose of the master
and owner to kill the slave_.’ The writer shows, also, an ignorance
of the law of contracts, as it affects slavery in the South, in
making George’s master take him from the factory against the
proprietor’s consent. George, by virtue of the contract of hiring,
had become the property of the proprietor for the time being, and
his master could no more have taken him away forcibly than the owner
of a house in Massachusetts can dispossess his lessee, at any
moment, from mere whim or caprice. There is no court in Kentucky
where the hirer’s rights, in this regard, would not be enforced.

“‘No. Father bought her once, in one of his trips to New
Orleans, and brought her up as a present to mother. She was
about eight or nine years old, then. Father would never tell
mother what he gave for her; but, the other day, in looking over
his old papers, we came across the bill of sale. He paid an
extravagant sum for her, to be sure. I suppose, on account of
her extraordinary beauty.’

“George sat with his back to Cassy, and did not see the absorbed
expression of her countenance, as he was giving these details.

“At this point in the story, she touched his arm, and, with a
face perfectly white with interest, said, ‘Do you know the names
of the people he bought her of?’

“‘A man of the name of Simmons, I think, was the principal in
the transaction. At least, I think that was the name in the bill
of sale.’

“‘O, my God!’ said Cassy, and fell insensible on the floor of
the cabin.”

“Of course Eliza turns out to be Cassy’s child, and we are soon
entertained with the family meeting in Montreal, where George Harris
is living, five or six years after the opening of the story, in
great comfort.

“Now, the reader will perhaps be surprised to know that such an
incident as the sale of Cassy apart from Eliza, upon which the whole
interest of the foregoing narrative hinges, never could have taken
place in Louisiana, and that the bill of sale for Eliza would not
have been worth the paper it was written on. Observe. George Shelby
states that Eliza was _eight or nine years old_ at the time his
father purchased her in New Orleans. Let us again look at the
statute-book of Louisiana.

“In the _Code Noir_ we find it set down that

“‘Every person is expressly prohibited from selling separately from
their mothers _the children who shall not have attained the full age
of ten years_.’

“And this humane provision is strengthened by a statute, one clause
of which runs as follows:

“‘Be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall sell
the mother of any slave child or children _under the age of ten
years, separate from said child or children, or shall, the mother
living, sell any slave child or children of ten years of age, or
under, separate from said mother_, such person or persons shall
incur the penalty of the sixth section of this act.’

“This penalty is a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than
two thousand dollars, and imprisonment in the public jail for a
period of not less than six months nor more than one year.—_Vide
Acts of Louisiana, 1 Session, 9th Legislature_, 1828, 1829, No. 24,