Chapter XIII: Bruni (2)

The Limbang chiefs, after having maintained their independence for six years, early in 1890 decided to settle the question of their future for themselves. They assembled, and of their own free will and accord placed their country under the protection of Sarawak, and themselves under the authority of its Government; in token of which they hoisted the Sarawak flag. In justice to the claims of the inhabitants, and in conformity with a promise he had made to them to tender such assistance as lay in his power, the Rajah accepted the responsibility thus placed upon him, and annexed the country on March 17, subject to the approval of her Majesty's Government.

The Rajah had already frequently approached the Sultan on behalf of these unfortunate people to urge that justice should be done to them, and that they should not be given over to be preyed upon by rapacious pangirans. The Pangiran Muda, son of the late Rajah Muda Hasim, who by birth was the nearest to the throne, and who possessed feudal rights over a part of the Limbang, having abandoned all hope of being able to exercise those rights and draw any revenue from the district, ascended the river and openly proclaimed to his people that he had handed over all his rights to the Rajah. The other hereditary holders of feudal authority in the district had again approached the Rajah, and had entreated him to annex Limbang, which had become not only unprofitable to them, but a menace to Bruni. The Rajah would have been untrue to his word passed to the Limbang chiefs had he left them to their fate, after the failure of his negotiations and repeated attempts to intercede for them with the Sultan. Although he was averse to taking this step, yet he felt that it was not possible for him to refuse the appeals that came to him from all sides to interfere, and it was the only solution of the difficulty, failing the appointment of a British Resident, for the people could not be expected to again place themselves under the power of a Sultan who would keep no promises, and who intended no mercy.

The Sultan, however, mortified in his pride, and being thus prevented from giving vent to his vindictive feeling, had remained obdurate. For some time he had been accumulating arms and ammunition at Bruni for a great attempt upon the Limbang, whilst through his minister, the di Gadong, he was keeping up a pretence of peace. If he succeeded, the horrors that would have ensued in the Limbang may well be conceived; but if he failed, he would draw on Bruni hordes of desperate savages, infuriated by years of ill-treatment, and the Brunis feared that the capture of their town and a general massacre would be the result.

These were the reasons that led the Rajah to act promptly, and to appeal to her Majesty's Government to sanction such action. The Foreign Office approved, after having kept the Rajah in anxious suspense for a year, and fixed the annual sum to be paid by the Sarawak Government for the Limbang at $6000, but failing the Sultan's acceptance of this for three consecutive years, this indemnity would be forfeited.

The Sultan declined to receive this compensation, not, however, so much as a protest against the action of the Rajah,—a purpose with which he has generally been accredited, with not a little misplaced sympathy,—but mainly to punish his recalcitrant ministers, the Pangirans Bandahara and di Gadong. Hitherto he had been quite powerless to do this, but an opportunity was now afforded him, and he did not hesitate to avail himself of it. The two pangirans were the principal holders of the feudal rights over the Limbang, which of late years had yielded them nothing, and they naturally desired, badly off as they were, that the Sultan should sanction the acceptance of the indemnity, the greater part of which would have reverted to them, and would have afforded them a fixed and ensured revenue, even more than they had ever been able to extort from the people. The remainder would have gone to the Pangiran Muda, and not a cent of it would have gone to the Sultan. But by the laws of Bruni, feudal rights cannot be alienated without the sanction of the Sultan; and he subsequently informed the British Consul that he had withheld his sanction, and would do so as long as he lived, a determination to which he vindictively adhered, solely that he might deprive his two ministers of the revenues to which they were entitled. He went so far as to tell the Consul that he had no real grievance against the Rajah, but it being necessary to find some plausible pretext for his decision he had invented one, which no one in Bruni could call into question.

Sir Spenser St. John, writing privately to the Rajah at this time said, "If the Foreign Office could understand how the Bruni Rajahs govern Limbang, they would make no objection to your taking it over. It is a most interesting river, and when no longer harassed by Kayan raids[317] and plundered by Bruni Rajahs, it will be one of the richest on the coast. Sago can be planted to any extent, and it used to be famous for its pepper gardens. In fact Chinese were working there nearly to the foot of Mulu mountain"—over one hundred miles from the coast.

But in his life of _Rajah Brooke_ published in 1899, Sir Spenser St. John alters his tone. He remarks that "unless we are to adopt the principle that 'the end justifies the means,' it is difficult to approve the action of Sarawak in seizing by force any part of the Sultan's dominions. A little gentle, persevering diplomacy would have secured Limbang without violating any principle of international law. I am convinced, however, that the present Rajah was deceived by some one as to the political position of that district, as he wrote that, for four years previous to his action, Limbang was completely independent of the Sultan, which his officers subsequently found was not the case."

As to the first part of this statement, Sir Spenser when he wrote it, had severed his connexion with Borneo for nearly forty years, and it shows how little he was kept in touch with Bornean affairs since he left; or does Sir Spenser imagine that he would have succeeded where such men as the Rajah and Sir Hugh Low had failed; both of whom had continually urged reforms on the Sultan, to which he had turned a deaf ear?

With regard to the second part of the statement, the Rajah certainly did not place himself in a position in which he could be deceived. He conducted all negotiations and all inquiries himself, and on the spot. He was no more deceived as to the true state of affairs than were Sir William Treacher, Dr. Leys (Consul-General), Sir F. Weld, and Sir Hugh Low. It is, moreover, not correct that the Rajah's officers subsequently made the great discovery that is attributed to them. Sir Spenser might well have been a little more explicit as to this last remark. He agrees, however, that there can be no doubt that the inhabitants of Limbang rejoiced to be placed under the Sarawak flag.

"I knew them well, and how they suffered from the exactions of the Pangirans, and their rapacious followers, and no one would have more rejoiced than myself to hear that they had been put under Sarawak rule in a less forcible way. As poverty increased in Bruni, so had the exactions augmented, and Limbang, being near, suffered the most. Perhaps some of my readers may think that in this case the 'end _did_ justify the means.' At all events, that appears to have been the view taken by the Foreign Office."

Sir Spenser might very well have accepted the view taken by the Foreign Office, under which he has served with distinction for many years. The Foreign Office judged upon facts that were placed before it, and these facts Sir Spenser had not under his eye when basing this unfair criticism upon the Rajah's proceedings.

The Limbang having been annexed in 1890, a Government station was established some fifteen miles from the river's mouth, and settlers, both Malay and Chinese, soon arrived, and took up their quarters there; indeed, a good many quitted Bruni, and applied for sites upon which to build shops and houses directly the flag was raised.

The station is now a flourishing little place, and has been well laid out by Mr. O. F. Ricketts,[318] who has been Resident there since its establishment. It is the prettiest out-station in Sarawak; has miles of good riding roads, a bazaar that is well attended; and, being another refuge for the oppressed, the Malay population is continually increasing. Mr. Ricketts, who also has over-charge of the Trusan and Lawas districts, has been eminently successful in his management of the Muruts and Bisayas, of whom he has had some twenty years' experience, and is popular with all classes at Bruni.

In reporting on Limbang in February, 1891, Mr. Ricketts observes: "since the occupation of the river in March last, matters have progressed satisfactorily, and the inhabitants have shown themselves well disposed and satisfied with the new order of things, with the exception of three or four of the Danau chiefs, who have been incited to be otherwise from Bruni.

"Little has been done with the exception of visiting the people, who at all times have been allowed to trade freely with Bruni; no import or export duties have been collected. A number of Brunis have come into the river at different times to wash sago, who previously were unable to do so, owing to the unsettled state of the place.

"Most of the principal Chinese of Bruni have been over here at different times, and have expressed their wish to commence business here. One firm already holds one of the shops, of which there are six, the others being held by Sarawak and Labuan Chinese; one sago factory is in course of erection.

"There has been no revenue for the year; the expenditure amounting to $11,812. No revenue was demanded, until the natives settled down, and had recovered from their previous unsettled state. The expenditure was chiefly in public buildings, bungalows, court house, barracks, etc." The imports and exports in 1906 amounted to $282,277, against only $86,687 in 1891.

There is no fort at Limbang.

If the reader will look at the map he will see that a peninsula or horn runs out from Bruni, sheltering the bay against the winds and waves from the north-west. Labuan is actually a continuation of the same, but the belt of land has been broken through, leaving only Labuan and a few little islands rising above the surface of the ocean. At the extreme point of the promontory is a lighthouse erected by the Rajah. This promontory goes by the name of Muara. The coal-beds that come to the surface in Labuan, continue in Muara, and Mr. W. C. Cowie[319] had obtained from the Sultan Mumin a concession of the coal-fields in Muara, and all rights over this district were ceded to him in perpetuity by the late Sultan in 1887. These rights confer complete and absolute possession of all the lands in the district, with power to sell, impose taxes, rents, and assessments, the possession of the revenue farms, with power to create new farms of any description, and certain judicial rights conjoined with power to inflict penalties.

This Muara district, the town in which was founded by Mr. Cowie, and named by him Brooketon in honour of the Rajah, is the richest portion of the small and shrunken territory now remaining to the Sultanate of Bruni, and it remains to it, as may be seen, attached by a thread only. It is not large, but it is of much importance, as it possesses a good colliery and an excellent harbour. Previous to the opening of this colliery the population, consisting of a few Kadayan peasants and Malay fishermen, was small and scattered, and, in common with the lower classes throughout the Sultanate, led a miserable existence under misrule.

Mr. Cowie found that a much larger capital was needed to develop the colliery than he possessed, without which the workings would be unremunerative. Every year entailed increasing loss, and in 1888, two years before the acquisition of the Limbang by the Rajah, he sold to him all his rights in Muara.

Previous to the transfer, for want of capital, the mines had been worked in a hand-to-mouth fashion by a few coolies under a manager with but little experience, the output being confined to meeting the very limited local demand in Labuan. There was practically no plant, and only a small ricketty wharf, to which the surface coal was conveyed in buffalo-drawn waggons over a roughly constructed line.

Those who knew Brooketon in those days and know it now, can testify to the great improvements that have been made by the Rajah's persistent efforts. The greatest possible benefits have been conferred upon the people by the establishment of a large and growing industry among them, but it has been effected at a heavy financial loss. The colliery has been placed under experienced managers; expensive, though necessary, machinery, locomotives, a steam collier, lighters, etc., have been purchased, extensive and solid wharves built, and a new line laid down. The cost of these, with the many other preliminary expenses incidental to the proper working of a large colliery, have been heavy, and so far it has proved an unremunerative speculation. The colliery employs hundreds of miners and workmen, and through it, indirectly, many people gain a livelihood, and the thriving settlement of Brooketon is solely dependent upon it. Law and order have been effectively maintained by the Rajah at his own cost, though in the name and with the consent of the Sultan. Although financial improvement may be remote, closing the mines down would mean a loss of all these benefits to the people; the place would revert to its former condition, and the population would be dispersed. This consideration has induced the Rajah to continue working the colliery, with the hope of ultimately lessening the losses, and the remoter hope of ultimate success. To Brooketon we shall again refer.

In March, 1905, a chief named Lawai, who had been dignified by the Sultan with the title of Orang Kaya Temanggong, with some 400 of his numerous following, removed into the Limbang river from the Baram, in defiance of Government orders. In former days these people had been the most forward amongst those employed by the Bruni Government to molest the Limbang people, and a short time previous to their removal to the Limbang had killed three Kadayans in Bruni territory, who had incurred displeasure in certain high quarters. After these murders had been committed, Lawai had been favourably received by the Sultan at Bruni, and this no doubt encouraged him openly to resist the Government. A small force was despatched against him, and, taken by surprise, he was captured.

The rendezvous of this expedition was off Muara island, at the entrance to Bruni bay, and, as its object was kept a profound secret, considerable uneasiness arose in the suspicious minds of those at Bruni, who with good reason feared the displeasure of the Rajah. A secret meeting of the leading pangirans and chiefs was held; at which it was decided that should it be the Rajah's intention to sweep away their evil government they would kill the Sultan and hand over the city to him.

With this exception, from the day that the Sarawak flag had been hoisted, there have been no disturbances in the Limbang. But in the neighbouring river, the Trusan, the perpetual petty feuds amongst the Muruts, which led to isolated cases of murder, wounding, and cattle-lifting, caused the Government considerable trouble. In 1900, it became necessary to administer a severe lesson. Some Muruts living in the far interior under their chief, Okong, aided by those of the Lawas, not then under the Sarawak Government, having killed twenty-one Muruts of the lower Trusan, an expedition, with which the Rajah Muda went, was sent to punish them. This was so effectually done, that it resulted in the people of the interior coming in from all quarters to renounce their feuds; and since that Trusan has also been free from such troubles.

Commenting upon Bornean affairs, the _Singapore Free Press_ in August, 1900, remarked that: "Bruni, though independent, is in a state of bankruptcy and decay, and would not be a desirable acquisition for any one. Its revenues, such as they are, are all leased and sold, and those who should benefit from them have long parted with their interests. The aged Sultan, troubled with debts and worried by creditors, has given powers to the most importunate in their claims, which action has alienated the support of those hereditary chiefs who are entitled to share with him the government of the country. These chiefs assume semi-independence, and each goes his own way unchecked, a method which tends to bring affairs of State to chaos. It is erroneously supposed that the British Government is responsible for this condition of the country. As a matter of fact the British Government has no right, and certainly no inclination, to interfere in the internal affairs of an independent kingdom."

This is a very accurate description of the situation at Bruni; but, unless we accept the theory that might makes right, how can the action of the British Government in appointing a Resident to take charge of Bruni a few years later on be justified? No one, however, can quarrel with the statement that the British Government had no inclination to interfere. That had been made manifest enough by many years of indifference to the sufferings of a people, and of shirking moral responsibilities. It is stretching a point to say that the British Government had no right to interfere; it was their duty to do so, and that duty involved the right. Not content with this neglect of an obvious duty, the Government stood in the people's way, by preventing them from turning to others for the aid they so sorely needed.

What these sufferings were, Mr. Keyser, who was Consul at Bruni, fully sets forth in his report to the Foreign Office for 1899. He wrote: "Such trade as there was has completely fallen off, and the monthly steamer from Singapore has ceased its visits. The debts and difficulties of the Sultan and his chiefs have so increased with time that this state of affairs naturally reacts upon the people. With the exception of catching fish, no one does any work, and all live in poverty and constant want of food. Hundreds of families have left, and continue to leave, to escape the seizure of their women and children by impecunious headmen, who wish to relieve their own necessities by selling them as slaves.[320] Others are driven from the country by the infliction of fines, and the exorbitant demands of those Chinese and money-lenders to whom the collection of taxes and all saleable rights have been long since transferred for cash. Those traders have full power to oppress the people, and they do so remorselessly. In a short space of time, if the present Government continues, Bruni will be empty of inhabitants."

The two small provinces, the river districts of Tutong and Belait, now remaining to the Sultan, have been in a constant state of revolt. In June, 1899,[321] the people of these rivers openly threw off their allegiance and hoisted the Sarawak flag, an act which caused some excitement in the East, and a good deal of comment in English papers. The principal chiefs then waited upon the Rajah, and begged him to take over their country, a petition that was repeated shortly afterwards. The British Consul was informed by them that they absolutely refused to remain under Bruni rule, and they prayed to be placed under that of Sarawak. But the Consul could only report; and that Government, which had "no right and certainly no inclination to interfere," again proved obstructive, and the people were forced to continue a hopeless effort to gain their liberty.

A desultory war commenced, weak in attack from want of power,[322] and weak in resistance from lack of ammunition and supplies. Treachery was resorted to by those sent to suppress the revolt. As an instance of one cold-blooded deed, Pangiran Tejudin, the Sultan's son-in-law, of whom one infamous act has already been recorded, persuaded the inhabitants of some of the Tutong villages to submit, under a guarantee that their lives and property would be spared. To ratify the terms, the pangiran took twenty-five men from these villages to the Tutong town, and there they were bound and confined. Then one man from each village was selected, placed bound within a fence, and there at intervals slashed at until all had bled to death. Seven only managed to escape.

In October, 1902, many of the inhabitants of Belait and Tutong, unable to continue the struggle, having sought a refuge in the Trusan and Limbang rivers, and the Sultan being wearied into granting an amnesty on the payment of a heavy fine, those remaining surrendered; their principal chiefs, however, the Datus Kalim and De Gadong, with their people, elected to place themselves under Sarawak rule by also moving into the Limbang.

In January, 1905, the British North Borneo Company, with the sanction of her Majesty's Government, transferred their cession of the Lawas river to the Sarawak Government. The inhabitants of this river are closely allied to those of the Trusan, and, in a lesser degree, to those of the Limbang. It is a beautiful and fertile district, but sparsely inhabited.

If the yearly cession money paid upon the districts that have been acquired by Sarawak during the sovereignty of the present Rajah is taken into consideration, not one of these districts has yet paid its way, and even Limbang, upon which no cession money is paid, showed a deficit of expenditure over revenue in 1906, but the increased trade, of these districts, which in 1906 amounted to just a million dollars in value shows them to be in a flourishing state, and this has added to the general prosperity of the raj.

In 1905, an agreement was made between his Majesty's Government and the Sultan, by which the latter accepted a Resident, by whose counsel the affairs of the State were to be guided, and on January 1, 1906, this agreement came into effect, and the Sultan and his wazirs were practically laid aside, the rule becoming British under the _de facto_ ruler, the Resident.

The reason given for this step was not so much that the iniquitous conditions of affairs at Bruni could no longer be tolerated, but that the country was bankrupt, and therefore something had to be done. There were two alternatives presented, the absorption of Bruni by Sarawak, or the introduction of the same system of government that prevails in the Federated Malay States. The latter was adopted as being, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, likely to be more beneficial to the Sultanate, as well as being a healthy example to the neighbouring protectorates, and it has been expressly stated by the Foreign Secretary that this was done not merely with a view to the future interests of Bruni, but to those of the other British Protectorates in Borneo.[323] The only pretext that has been advanced for not allowing the natural absorption of Bruni by Sarawak was the supposed animosity the Sultan bore towards the Rajah, though, had it still existed, this might well have been regarded only in the light of a compliment to the latter.

ON THE LAWAS RIVER.]

But undue importance has been placed upon the ill-feeling the Sultan had formerly borne to the Rajah, and the fact that a complete reconciliation had taken place long before this time appears to have been ignored. Apart from this, however, the likings and dislikings of an isolated, and now defunct, old tyrant were not quite a sufficient basis upon which to establish a policy antagonistic to the natural fate of Bruni and the pronounced wishes of the people. But, many months before it was proposed to establish a British Residency in Bruni, the Sultan, completely at the end of his resources, had confided to the British Consul his unfortunate situation; had expressed his deep regret for the estrangement between himself and the Rajah, and his desire for a reconciliation, which he begged the Consul would bring about, for he had no one else to turn to for the help he so sorely needed, and which he knew the Rajah would not refuse him.

The Rajah, who had never lost his kindly feeling towards the Bruni rulers, at once visited Bruni, and exchanged visits with the Sultan, which were marked by extreme cordiality and confidence on the part of the latter. But by no method short of a clean sweep of its debased Government and corrupt officials, of whom the Sultan was the most corrupt, could any improvement be effected in the sad condition of Bruni, or in the Sultan's miserable plight, and therefore the Rajah, through the British Consul, offered terms for the transfer of Bruni to his Government, and these were far more generous to the Sultan than those which the Foreign Office, with full knowledge of this offer, subsequently forced the Sultan to accept.

The terms offered by the Rajah were placed before the Sultan by the British Consul, and were well received by him and his family, and they were anxious to accept these at once. They were, however, completely in the power of three of the members of Council,—the Juwatan[324] Abu Bakar, Orang Kaya Laksamana, and Orang Kaya di Gadong, who had battened on the Sultan by lending him large sums of money on extortionate interest, and who, seeing their way to further affluence, prevented the Sultan accepting the Rajah's offer until he should have assigned to them all the benefits it would convey to him, when he would have been called upon to accept it for their advantage.

All who have read these pages will agree there can be no possible doubt that the Sultan and his ministers had well deserved to have their powers curtailed, even to the extent of absolute deprivation of all control in the affairs of their country, but not a few will naturally wonder why the Foreign Office had not arrived at such an obvious conclusion many years ago. Then the reasons for interference were tenfold more weighty than now. Successive years have seen the Sultanate stripped of its territories, and the capacity of the Sultan and his bureaucracy to do evil lessened in proportion to the loss of population, revenues, and power. Then the British Government would have become possessed of a large territory, nearly as large as England, with a numerous population, and would have had a reasonable prospect before it of establishing a State or Colony which might at this time be as flourishing as any of those in the Malay peninsula; now they have unnecessarily hampered themselves with a miserable bankrupt remnant of a formerly large State, some 3000 square miles in area only, with a total population of not more than 15,000; with no internal resources to develop, and with revenues so slight as to be inconsiderable, an experiment which appears to be proving costly.

To contend that the governmental system of the Federated Malay States would be a good example to Sarawak is to presume a superiority in that system, and to infer that the conditions prevailing in the former and latter States are on a parity. So far there has been no convincing evidence of the superiority of this system in its application to Bruni, though that is not surprising, as the British Resident can hardly be expected to make bricks without straw; and Sarawak, which has the credit of having "the best form of government for a country populated by an Oriental people of various races," would scarcely be wise to exchange the simple methods that have been gradually built up to meet the requirements of her population for an elaborated system, which, however successful it has been in the States for which it was formed, might not be altogether conformable to existing conditions in Sarawak. There is almost as much difference between the populations of the Malay States and Sarawak, as there is between that of the latter and Java or Ceylon, and the same difference exists in regard to Bruni. To argue that a form of government, because it is eminently adapted to the circumstance of one country would necessarily be suitable to another, is to be optimistic, and shows a want either of common sense, or of knowledge of the respective conditions of the countries indicated.

Perhaps the mysterious profession of the Foreign Secretary in regard to the future interests of all the British Protectorates in Borneo, which has been noticed, conceals the real motives, yet to be revealed, for this sudden departure, which red tapeism can hardly explain away, and which has given rise to a political position that is peculiar, whether viewed in the light of expediency or as a matter of sheer justice. The professed motives appear to be scarcely logical, for this fresh policy involved no obvious advantages to the Empire, was displeasing to the natives, and unfair to the interests of Sarawak. But, unfortunately, evidence is not wanting that there are other motives, which are not only illogical but unwarrantable, and it is only by keeping these in view that the policy of the British Government becomes intelligible. It is a policy that has not originated at the Foreign or the Colonial Office, but has been adopted by both "on advice given with entire knowledge of place and people"—how, when, and by whom acquired, it would be interesting to learn.

Whether Bruni was governed from Singapore or absorbed by Sarawak was a question of little importance to the public, and should have been one of minor importance to the Foreign Office, for either way its position as a British Protectorate would remain unaffected. No one can assert that it is possible to find a man with greater qualifications as a ruler of natives or with a greater knowledge of Bruni and its people than the Rajah of Sarawak, or one whose counsel would have greater weight with chiefs and people, to whom the task of reforming and regenerating that country might with wisdom have been entrusted. Then comes the question of means, so necessary to the establishment of an effective government. To set up such a government in Bruni, and to maintain it, requires a considerable outlay, and an ever-recurring yearly subsidy. This the Rajah knew, and this he was willing and able to bear, but those "with entire knowledge of place and people" thought differently, with the result that the overflowing Treasury chest of the Federated Malay States has had to be drawn upon,[325] and within two years yet another burden in the shape of a debt of some £24,000 has been needlessly put upon an already bankrupt State; and still, with a newly-imposed tariff, which is scarcely in harmony with that of the Federated Malay States, or of Sarawak, Bruni is unable to make both ends meet, and has the pleasant prospect before it of having to negotiate a further loan with no security to offer. So much for expediency.

That the Sultan was not averse to Bruni being incorporated with Sarawak has been shown, and the fact must not be overlooked that he _was_ averse to the appointment of a British Resident, and the acceptance of the agreement by himself and his Prime Minister and brother-in-law, the Pangiran Bandahara, was obtained only under pressure, and was granted in opposition to the forcibly expressed wishes of his own immediate relations, of his chiefs, and of his people. He died shortly afterwards, at a great age, though he retained his faculties until the end, and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad-ul-Alam, a minor, who was placed under the regency of his uncle, the Pangiran Bandahara.

That they might pass under the protection of the Rajah and share with his subjects the liberties and privileges the latter have gained, has always been and still is the desire of the people. With the methods of his government they are familiar and in sympathy. They and their chiefs, from the Regent downwards, have petitioned to be so placed. To them the Rajah's name is a household word, and by them he is trusted. When the change came in 1905, many of the principal nobles begged him to become the guardian of their children, to safeguard their inheritance and welfare. His great influence, acquired by an intercourse of half a century, has always been exerted for their benefit, and it is an influence that, together with his knowledge of the people and what is best for them, can scarcely be equalled by ever-changing officials.

Between the populations of Sarawak and Bruni there exists community of origin, and relationship of ideas and customs. Formerly the two countries were one. Then in a corner of that country arose the little independent raj of Sarawak, which gradually expanded up to, around, and beyond Bruni. Now Bruni is but an enclave within Sarawak, and socially, politically, and commercially, as well as geographically, is undoubtedly within the sphere of her influence.

A short description of Brooketon has already been given, showing how the prosperity of that flourishing little settlement is dependent upon the working of its colliery, and that this has been the Rajah's main reason for continuing to work it, though with a recurring annual loss which in the aggregate during the past twenty years has exceeded $800,000; of course exclusive of purchase money and interest thereon. In no one year have the receipts exceeded the expenditure, and the chances of financial improvement appear to be vastly remote; yet, in October, 1906, the Colonial Office decided, presumably "on advice given with entire knowledge of place and people," to further hamper this industry by imposing a duty on the coal exported, thereby seriously compromising the welfare of the district by taxing the sole factor in its prosperity.

The levying of such a "harsh and oppressive"[326] tax, was not only unjust, but distinctly contrary to the terms of the deed under which the Rajah holds his concession. Whilst protesting against the assumption that the Bruni Government has the right to impose such a duty, the Rajah informed the Colonial Office that if it was insisted upon he would be compelled practically to close down the colliery. In the House, Sir Edward Sassoon pointedly asked the Under-Secretary for the Colonies "on what principle such a tax would be imposed upon a nascent industry which is being created at a sacrifice in an impoverished country, while on the other hand his Majesty's Government has recently withdrawn the duty levied on all coal exported from Great Britain." To this question no direct reply was or could have been given, but it was not until a year afterwards that the Colonial Office decided that the tax would not at present be imposed.

The reason given for the imposition of this tax was that all other sources of revenue at Brooketon having been hypothecated to the Rajah, it was therefore necessary to levy export duties. It has already been stated (p. 357) how these revenues had reverted to the Rajah, but it must not be supposed that they had been obtained for little or no consideration. To protect his own interests by guarding against any imposition of harassing taxes, the original lessee of the Brooketon Collieries had leased the revenues of the district from the Sultan for an annual sum, and this rent was subsequently capitalised by the payment of a sum of money equivalent to ten years' rent; thus these revenues passed from the Sultan's hands for ever, and subsequently became vested in the Rajah by purchase. A careful consideration of the deed by which these revenue rights were granted, combined with a competent knowledge of the prerogatives of the Sultan, would leave little doubt in an unprejudiced mind that the imposition of any import or export duties at Brooketon by others than the Rajah would be an infringement of the rights conveyed by that deed. The revenues derived by the Rajah under this deed (and he has not exerted his powers to increase them) represent but a very small return as interest on the purchase money; yet in face of such kindly moderation, we find the Colonial Office attempting to impose a tax on the Rajah's property, which would yield to them more than three times the amount of the legitimate revenue arising from a benevolent enterprise.

Previously to the appointment of a British Resident at Bruni, the Rajah had, as we have noticed, administered the government in the Muara district, with the full approval of the Sultan. In compliance with the Rajah's desire, the Sultan had placed a Malay chief, as his representative, at Brooketon, but even his salary had to be paid by the Rajah. It has already been shown that certain judicial powers have been vested in the Rajah under the revenue concession, in regard to which the then British Consul at Bruni had occasion to write to the Rajah's agent at Labuan in July, 1900, that "the acting High Commissioner for Borneo believes in and acknowledges the right of Sarawak to exercise magisterial powers in Brooketon." Nevertheless, on the appointment of the British Resident at Bruni the Colonial Office called upon the Rajah to withdraw his officials and police from Brooketon, and notified him that the administration of the district would be carried on by the Resident, in the Sultan's name. In a written reply to a question by Sir Edward Sassoon, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies denied that by the deed the Rajah was authorised to maintain a police force in Bruni (_sic_), but passed over in silence the main point of Sir Edward's question as to the Rajah's powers to adjudicate as well as to impose fines throughout the district of Muara.

In a leading article which appeared in the issue of the _Straits Budget_ (Singapore) of January 10, 1907, the editor attempts to refute the issues raised in the questions put by Sir Edward Sassoon in the House of Commons, and the arguments advanced in an editorial article which appeared in the _Standard_ dealing with the above matters. He writes authoritatively in reply to Sir Edward and "the special pleading" of the _Standard_, and presumably his article is therefore an inspired one, for his own knowledge of Bornean affairs is restricted to what "the man in the street" can tell him, and his leader displays a deeper insight into the political aspect than can usually be found outside of a Government office. He tells us that: "Bruni wanted better administration. There were three possible ways of obtaining this—the Protectorate might have been transferred to the British North Borneo Company; it might have been handed over to the neighbouring Rajah of Sarawak; or it might have been incorporated in the territories administered by the Colonial Office through the Straits Settlements. Of the three alternatives the Foreign Office chose the last. No doubt Sarawak is an object lesson in administration, but it must not be forgotten that it has been fortunate in having two successive rulers of marked capacity for dealing with native races. It may not always be so fortunate, and perhaps the Foreign Office, having this possibility in view, hesitated to add to the territory of Sarawak. On the other hand, the experience of the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements warranted the handing over of Bruni to the Colonial Office, and we are sure that when consideration is given to the larger interests involved it will have to be admitted, one day, that the Foreign Office took the wiser course. There may come a day when British interests in Borneo will have to be amalgamated and concentrated under one administration; but until then Bruni affairs can be best administered and the interests of the natives safeguarded under the arrangement now in force."

The editor has ignored the fact that the natives of Bruni of all races— and the small population is a very diversified one—desired incorporation in Sarawak, and had petitioned for it; and he has overlooked the fact that such incorporation, whilst saving the Straits Settlements both money and trouble, could in no way have affected the position of Bruni as a British Protectorate, or have interfered with any policy which the Foreign Office may possibly have in view. So far as Sarawak is concerned, "the possibility in view" can mean only one thing: future interference with its independence, arising out of anticipated maladministration by the present Rajah's successor. Such an inuendo is as uncalled for, as it is unjust, however the suggestion may be disguised; and it behoves the Foreign and Colonial Offices to dissociate themselves from such expressions, which unfortunately have derived some colour from their subsequent actions.

That the system of government in vogue in the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements is irreproachable cannot be denied; but at the same time it cannot fairly be contended—in the face of all evidence to the contrary—that it is as well adapted to the requirements of Bruni as is that in vogue in Sarawak, a system which the editor admits "is an object lesson in administration," and which his local contemporary, the _Singapore Free Press_, has before described as "a government for natives second to none."

What are "the larger interests involved" which appear, in the editor's opinion, to have necessitated the handing over of Bruni, against the wishes of the people, to a government foreign to them? The editor answers the question with a prophecy, which, unless it emanates from his own fertile brain, throws light on the policy of the British Government, and hints at a possible disregard of fair-play and treaties, which has only been made possible by the acceptance of British protection by Sarawak. The British Government as far back as 1863 fully acknowledged the independence of Sarawak under the rule of its white Rajah, and the agreement of 1888, by which the State was placed under British protection, was not intended, nor accepted, as one which would militate against that independence, and such a possibility can scarcely be construed as following in the train of that agreement.

THE "GAZELLE."

(One of the small Government steamers for river work).]

-----

Footnote 307:

_Forests of the Far East_, S. St. John.

Footnote 308:

Formerly of the Royal Navy, and the Labuan Civil Service. Joined the
Sarawak Civil Service 1871. Was Resident at Muka, and subsequently
Divisional Resident of the 3rd Division. Died 1884.

Footnote 309:

St John's _Forests of the Far East_.

Footnote 310:

It will be remembered that in 1849 the late Rajah, as her Majesty's
Commissioner, had concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, but this
had to be ratified within two years. The British Government, however,
would not place a man-of-war at the Rajah's disposal, and he was
unable to proceed to Sulu to effect this necessary ratification. The
Spaniards, by force of arms, enforced another treaty upon Sulu, and
before those two years had expired. But the British Government took no
interest in Sulu, and this was allowed to pass unheeded.

Footnote 311:

He had succeeded Mr. Pope Hennessy, and was Mr. Ussher's predecessor.

Footnote 312:

Named after the late Mr. C. A. C. de Crespigny.

Footnote 313:

In a great degree due to the able administration of Mr. Charles Hose,
D.Sc., who served in this district for twenty years, during sixteen of
which he was Resident in charge. In 1904 he became Divisional Resident
of the 3rd Division; he retired in 1907.

Footnote 314:

Joined 1872; was Assistant Resident, and Resident of Batang Lupar and
Saribas, and in 1881 became Divisional Resident of Sarawak proper. He
retired in 1895, and died in 1897.

Footnote 315:

See footnote, p. 69.

Footnote 316:

Sir Hugh Low, G.C.M.G., who was then British Resident of Perak, had
for many years been Colonial Secretary at Labuan.

Footnote 317:

These had long ceased.

Footnote 318:

Mr. Ricketts, who is a son of the first British Consul to Sarawak,
joined in 1881.

Footnote 319:

Now Managing Director of the British North Borneo Company.

Footnote 320:

For this reason a large number of Malays, men, women, and children, in
April, 1904, moved into the Limbang. The men were the ironsmiths of
Bruni, and this useful class was forced to leave to save their girls.
And because some of their women had been seized and sold, the Kadayans
of Bruni, who in former days had been the faithful followers of the
Sultans and their main support, revolted in 1899.

Footnote 321:

Two years previously a Sarawak Chinaman was murdered in the Belait,
and that this was done at the instigation of an Orang Kaya, solely in
the expectation that the murder of a Sarawak subject would lead to
such active interference by the Government of that country in the
affairs of the district that might end in annexation, was proved in a
Court of inquiry held at Claudetown.

Footnote 322:

Many of the peaceable Kadayans removed into the Limbang, having been
driven from their homes, with the loss of all their property, by an
emissary of the Sultan, for refusing to join him in an attack on the
rebels.

Footnote 323:

Sarawak and British North Borneo.

Footnote 324:

High Chamberlain.

Footnote 325:

In reply to a question on December 15, 1906, by Sir Edward Sassoon,
the Under-Secretary for the Colonies found it convenient to take no
notice of Sir Edward's reference to the F.M.S. in this connection.

Footnote 326:

To quote the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs when addressing the
House, but a few years ago upon the subject of an export duty on
English coal.

SEA-DAYAK WAR-BOAT.]